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Preface 
This little book was written by an indignant lifelong oarsman who 
started rowing in his schooldays. Indignant because the rowers in 
the fleet have not been credited with any role in Athens' victory 
over the Persians in 490 BC. Nor have light-armed troops been 
given their due share in the glory. It has all been usurped in favour 
of the heavy-armed hoplites at Marathon. 
Ancient history is an offspring of classical philology. At 
school and university we concentrate on great writers like Hero-
datos and Thukydides, too easily assuming that great literature 
spells reliable historiography, much above the standard of the late 
'secondary' sources. This book is a defence of those 'less respect-
able' sources, and pays homage to several 19'h -century German 
scholars who are not much read these days. 
I am indbebted to friends and colleagues who have com-
mented on larger and smaller part of my manuscript, or checked 
my home-made English, or aided me in my war with the com-
puter: Peter Bilton, Vincent Gabrielsen, Jon W. Iddeng, Signe 
Isager, Tomasz Kozysa, Stig Oppedal and Hans van Wees. Also 
thanks to my wife Natten for illustrations and lay-out and to 
Tomasz for the cover design. 
I offer my sincere thanks to the Norwegian Institute at 
Athens for accepting the thing for a monograph and for meeting 
much of the cost of publication, and likewise the Department of 
History at the University of Oslo for financial support. 
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CHAPTER I 
Herodotos and the hoplites of Marathon 
In 490 BC the Persian king Dareios sent an army and navy. over-
seas to Greece in order to punish Athens and Eretria for their aid 
to the Ionian revolt (499-494). The Persians, guided by the exiled 
Athenian tyrant Hippias, swiftly conquered Eretria in the island of 
Euboia. Their next move was to cross over to the mainland at 
Marathon in order to march on Athens; facing them on the other 
side of the plain was a contingent of Athenians and their allies 
from Plataiai, intent on blocking the Persians' route. The ensuing 
battle of Marathon was almost immediatly enshrouded in myth 
and legend, an epic battle of gods and heroes and men. It remains 
a major historical challenge to reconstruct what exactly took place 
on that venerable battleground. Physical remains are few and far 
between, nor have any contemporary historical accounts survived 
into posterity. The unfortunate result is that most historians rely 
on the earliest narrative source, the often dubious H i.rtorie.r of 
Herodotos. 'Everyone knows that Herodotos' narrative of Mara-
thon will not do,' wrote Gomme many years ago, but, he adds, 
'there is very little additional evidence' to his narrative, the 'oldest 
and best account of the battle.' Gomme's verdict, expressing what 
is still not far from communi.r opinio, hardly gives a ringing endor-
sement to the Greek historian.' 
We must therefore ask ourselves: is it possible, ba~ed on 
archaeology and later literary sources, to reconstruct a more plau-
sible account of the battle than the one we find in Herodotos? 
And who exactly were the Greeks who fought at Marathon? In 
Herodotos and in much modern literature, Marathon ranks as a 
pure hoplitic victory, with no role being assigned to either light 
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infantry or navy, the arms of mainly the unprivileged free and 
unfree who played a tnost important role during the Persian in-
vasion of 480/79. It is my intent in this book to claim a substantial 
role for these arms. I leave a discussion of the literary sources, 
mostly of Herodotos versus Ephoros and writers depending on 
him, to the last chapter, preferring now to go in medias res. 
Let us briefly recapitulate Herodotos' narrative of the Persian 
expedition and the battle (6.102-120), to which we shall return in 
Chapter III. In preparation for his punitive expedition against 
Athens and Eretria with 600 triremes, king Dareios had required 
earth and water from Aigina, the enemy of Athens, and a number 
of other islands, so that the Athenians feared a joint frontal attack 
on their city by the Aiginetans and the Persians (6.49). Possessing 
no m0re than 50 ships of their own, the Athenians had to borrow 
20 ships from the Korinthians for their preventive war with the 
Aiginetans, whom they defeated flrst at sea and then on land (89-
92). If the Aiginetans seemed neutralised for the moment, they 
soon retaliated by winning a victory in which they captured four 
Athenian ships with their crews, probably after the Athenians had 
returned the loan of the ships to Korinth (93). But despite this 
success against Athens, in 490 the Aiginetans of Herodotos failed 
to bring any aid to the Persians during their invasion. And the 
Persians, after subduing hostile Naxos, put to sea again to attack 
the other islands - states which had previously given them earth 
and water (6.49, 96)! For some reason that we would have liked to 
learn, they wasted precious time by putting in at these presumably 
friendly islands, pressing troops for service and taking children as 
hostages for good conduct (99). And before eventually turning 
against Athens, their main enemy, they dealt with weaker Karystos 
and Eretria in Euboia, waiving any opportunity to catch the Athe-
nians unprepared. 
Herodotos, if unable to tell what the dream was that the 
Persian commander Datis had at Mykonos on his return to Asia 
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(6.188.1), does report that the night before Hippias led the Per-
sians to land from Eretria at Marathon he dreamt that he slept 
with his own mother, which he took to mean that he was about to 
regain his position in Athens. But on the following day when he 
had disembarked he sneezed with such force that he lost a tooth in 
the sand, which he took to signify that the tooth had taken poss-
ession of what belonged to him. The motive of the Persians for 
choosing Marathon for landing was that it was near to Eretria and 
offered good ground for cavalry (102). When the news of the land-
ing reached Athens, the strateges sent the messenger Philippides 
for help to Sparta, where he arrived already on the next day. The 
Spartans, though willing to help, declared that they had to await 
the full moon before marching out. The Athenians - led by the 
strateges, not Kallimakhos the polemarch - almost immediately 
marched to J\1arathon, without a delaying debate in the assembly. 
At Plataiai in 479, the Athenians mustered 8,000 hoplites plus an 
unspecified number of archers and other light-armed warriors 
(9.22.1, 28-29, 60.3). Our historian does not specify that 'the Athe-
nians' who marched out to Marathon in 490 were all close combat 
fighting hoplites, perhaps numbering some 8,000; but this is the 
impression, no word being uttered about other kinds of warriors in 
his narrative of this battle. Out at Marathon they encampe.d at a 
sanctuary of Herakles, and while arrayed there they were joined by 
the Plataians who again, although they came 'in full force,' seem all 
to be hoplites. The Persians, after disembarking their men and 
horses at Eretria, had straight away started their attack upon the 
city walls; and having waited a few days after their victory they 
crossed to Attika pressing hard, confident that they would treat 
Athens in the same way. But we do not hear that they promptly 
upon their landing at Marathon, in an attempt to force their way 
out of the plain and through towards Athens, assailed the Greeks 
who were drawn up in their defensive position. Instead there was a 
delay. Then the Greeks were arrayed again, not, however, to ward 
off an onslaught by the Persians but to deliver the attack them-
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selves out in the plain. As Herodotos' Mardonios will later explain 
to Xerxes (7.9.2b), the Greek way of war was to find the best and 
most even plain, to descend to it, and fight. 
In the meantime a council of war had convened in which 
there was a division among the strateges, five arguing against giv-
ing battle, five, including Miltiades, being for it. Next, 11iltiades in 
an eloquent speech appealed to Kallimakhos the polemarch. Acc-
ordingly this officer, who had only been appointed by lot and was 
no commander-in-chief, gave his casting vote in favour of fighting. 
After the decision had been taken a delay of several days ensued, 
since each of the strateges in favour of fighting surrendered his 
day-of-command to 11iltiades. He accepted it, but would not 
engage till his own day came round. Then the Athenians, without 
waiting for their Spartan reinforcements, ran no less than eight 
stades or a 1500 m race against the enemy. 'The Persians thought 
that the Athenians were mad and bent upon their own destruction 
when . they saw that they were few and came running with no 
support from either horsemen or archers.' The Athenians were 
furthermore 'the first Greeks we know of to proceed at a run, and 
the first to endure the sight of Persian dress and men clad in that 
fashion. Until that day even the name of the Persians had been a 
terror to hear among the Greeks.' Lacking the support of cavalry 
and archery, the Athenians were evidently all hoplites in heavy 
armour, in contrast to the Persians. True, Herodotos makes no 
mention of Persian cavalry in the fighting, but Persian children 
were taught three things only, riding, archery and truth-telling 
(1.136) and the preparations for the campaign in Kilikia had in-
cluded special transport vessels for cavalry, and Marathon had 
been chosen as a landing place because it was good ground for 
cavalry. Nor is he explicit about the presence of bowmen at 
Marathon, but the Persians and the Sakai are presented as bowmen 
ten years later on the invasion of Xerxes (7.61.1, 64.2). And the 
astonishment of the Persians at the absence of Athenian bowmen 
at Marathon implies the presence of these forces on their side. The 
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i\Iarathon of Herodotos is thus a contest of brave Greek hoplites 
against barbarian cavalry and archery.2 Greek bowmen and. stone 
casters who unmanly fight at a distance have no share in the glory 
of Herodotos' battle of i\Iarathon. 
The heavy hoplites were not too exhausted after the 1500 
m charge to engage in battle straight on, and fighting for a long 
time they defeated the far more numerous enemy. Fighting gall-
antly, Epizclos was blinded by the mere apparition of the only 
Persian hoplite attested in the battle, a giant whose beard covered 
his shield - 'I heard that he himself told the story about what 
happened to him.' Having defeated the enemy in the plain, the 
Greeks pursued him to the sea where they captured seven ships in 
the fighting. The surviving Persians managed to escape by a re-
markably hasty reembarkation on their remaining ships, after the 
loss of about 6,400 men in the battle. The Athenian losses 
amounted to 192 men. Without resting after the 1500 m race and 
the hard-fought battle in the plain and at the ships, the surviving 
hoplites started on, if not a true Marathon race of 42 kms, then at 
least a march as fast as their legs could carry them back to Athens. 
(Their amazing speed is reminiscent of the Athenians who in the 
year 506 first defeated the Boiotians in battle on the continental 
side of the Euripos, killing as many as 700, and then on the same 
day set over to Euboia to defeat the Khalkidians, 5.77.2.) Arriving 
at the city after the quasi Marathon race, the warriors pitched camp 
in the sanctuary of Herakles at Kynosarges outside the walls. 
As for the fleeing Persians, we do not hear what plans they 
harboured once they were safe on board the ships, but then they 
received a shield signal given, according to some, by collaborating 
Athenians. Upon this signal the fleet headed around Cape Sounion 
to Phaleron in order to make a frontal attack on Athens, wishing 
to get ahead of the Athenians to the city and probably hoping that 
traitors in Athens might be able to betray it. Now they allowed 
themselves time for a detour to the island of Aigilia to pick up 
Eretrian prisoners who had been placed there, and so the Athe-
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nians managed to rush back to the city before the arrival of the 
Persians off Phaleron. There the Persian fleet stood at sea - and 
then put off, vanishing in the direction of Asia. Herodotos is not 
crystal clear about the cause of their withdrawal, but seemingly his 
Persians were in no mood for another battle against the fast 
Athenian hoplites who, in their camp up at some 4 kms distant 
Kynosarges, apparently were visible to Argus-eyed Persians. Two 
battles were thus won by the rapid heavy spearmen, flrst a long 
and tough one at Marathon following a 1500 m race, and then a 
walk-over victory near Athens, after a prompt return resembling 
an actual Marathon race. In the year after Marathon, Miltiades took 
a fleet of 70 ships on his expedition against Paras (6.132), but no 
role is assigned to that fleet in either neutralising Persia's ally 
Aigina before Marathon or in causing the Persian fleet to turn back 
from Phaleron after Marathon. The Athenian hoplites were not the 
only rapid walkers: a Spartan force of 2,000 which left in haste for 
Attika after the full moon, arrived already on the third day out 
from Sparta - but alas, too late for the battle. Before tramping 
home again, they marched to Marathon in order to inspect the 
battlefield. 
Gomme is certainly right: Herodotos' narrative of Mara-
thon will not do. He holds that the discussion about whether or 
not to charge against the enemy took place in Athens, not at Mara-
thon, and that Miltiades cannot have used the words Herodotos 
ascribes to him. He is inclined to think that Kallimakhos was in 
fact commander-in-chief, not only a kind of president of the board 
of strateges. The delay before the battle is maintained by Gomme, 
but not the reason Herodotos gives for it,3 and the attack, he 
asserts, was delivered by the Persians, not the Greeks. Other 
scholars more confidently make the polemarch the commander-in-
chief in 490,4 contesting that he was appointed by lot. And few will 
subscribe to such items as a Persian armada of no less than 600 
triremes, or to the fanciful omens ascribed to Hippias, the 1500 m 
race m full armour, 5 the run of the hoplites from Marathon to 
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Kynosarges,6 the idea that no Greeks had earlier endured the sight 
of Persian dress, the blinding of Epizelos, or the ratio of Athenian 
to Persian casualties.7 
If Herodotus' narrative fails to convince, what do we miss 
before and after the Persian landing at Marathon?H Something 
must have intervened to explain why the Persians received no aid 
from Aigina, and why in other islands that had given earth and 
water they had to press troops into service and take children as 
hostages. The landing at Marathon with many men and horses was 
not a matter of a few hours,~ but once they had disembarked, we 
expect the Persians - far from intending to deploy their cavalry in a 
suitable battlefield - would lose no time before letting Hippias lead 
them towards Athens by the coastal road and Pallene. At least 
since the first Persian operations in Euboia were reported, a 
Persian landing in Attika was imminent, most likely one at Mara-
thon where Hippias and his father Peisistratos had successfully put 
in from Eretria in 546. So the Athenians will have called for aid 
from other states, soliciting them to send aid to Athens, be it to 
help in defence of the walls or to march out together with the 
Athenians once the location of the impending Persian landing 
became known. Since the Spartans, unlike the Plataians, had yet to 
arrive by the time the news of the landing at Marathon was 
reported, the options were to continue waiting for them in the city, 
risking to have to stand a siege, or to march out to Marathon and 
wait for them there, in the meantime blocking the enemy's way 
and enclosing him on the plain. The lesson of the year 546 was 
that Hippias and the enemy should not be allowed to slip out 
towards the city through the narrow exit between the eastern 
slopes of Mt Agrieliki and the sea. So we expect the Athenians and 
Plataians to hurry out and take a defensive position, either close to 
the southern exit from the plain or in a favourable location further 
inland, from where they could attack the enemy in the flank in case 
he attempted a march towards the city. In either case, the Persians 
would first have to deal with the Greeks in their defensive posi-
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tion. For the defence of such a position, we surmise that all 
possible sources of manpower were significant, both rich and 
poor, ,free and unfree, citizen and metic. Unskilled stonecasters and 
javelin-men, as well as specialist archers and slingers, would be of 
no less use than heavy infantry. 111 In 480, the Athenians mustered 
light-armed infantry and numerous seamen during the invasion of 
Xerxes. We doubt that they only ten years before, in the year of 
Marathon, could solicit other states for aid if they would use no 
more of their manpower for the defence than their less than 
10,000 hoplites. 
As before at Eretria, we expect the Persian commander 
Datis to take immediate action after the landing. Having observed 
to his disappointment that the Greek army had already come out 
from Athens to block his advance towards the city, he will have 
chosen to launch an assault on its defensive position before the 
arrival of the Spartan aid. If repelled, we expect him to reembark 
on the ships with the main force and skip round to Phaleron for a 
frontal attack on Athens, while leaving his rear guard at Marathon 
to keep the Greek army amused. The embarkation of men and 
horses cannot have been effected in the twinkling of an eye, under 
the pressure of a pursuing enemy. On the contrary, some time 
must be allowed to pass between the unsuccessful attack on the 
Greek defensive position and the - orderly - reembarkation. Being 
in a hurry now to reach the city in advance of the Athenian army, 
Datis is unlikely to have wasted time in picking up prisoners from 
Aigilia, a cumbersome cargo with a view to a landing at Phaleron. 
When he arrived at Phaleron and attempted to land, it is hard to 
believe that he caught the Athenian fleet of at least 70 ships nap-
ping. And despite the silence of Herodotos, it is unbelievable that 
this fleet had been totally passive before Marathon. A successful 
preemptive war against Aigina and the other islands that had given 
earth and water will best account for why no aid was given to the 
Persian invaders by Aigina, and why they had to take children as 
hostages from other islands. In short, there is a marked discre-
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pancy between what we might reasonably expect of the battle and 
Herodotos' account of it. 
In the following, I shall first, in Ch. II, demonstrate that later 
sources in fact chronicle the battle we miss in Herodotos, when 
shortly after their landing at Marathon the Persians attacked the 
Greek defensive position in an attempt to get through towards 
Athens. The assault was warded off by the Greeks under the 
command of Kallimakhos, the polemarch. The object of Ch. III is 
the subsequent battle when the Greeks led by the stratege Milti-
ades were on the offensive, defeating in the open plain· those 
Persians who remained at Marathon after the reembarkation of the 
main force for a frontal attack on Athens from the opposite coast. 
The chapter will contain a discussion of the famous Marathon 
painting in the Stoa Poikile and Herodotos' dependence upon it as 
a source. In that context I shall call in question the idea of Mara-
thon as an all-hoplite achievement, no role being assigned to light-
armed infantry and irregular fighters. In Ch. VI, I shall claim a 
considerable role for the Athenian navy both before and in the 
year 490. Before that I shall argue, in Ch. IV, that Athens did pos-
sess a substantial fleet at that time, by dating the famous naval bill 
of Themistokles to the late 490s (rather than 483/2), during the 
pre-Marathon preventive war with Persia's ally Aigina. I shall 
search for evidence for my assumption that the new triremes were 
actually employed both for neutralising Aigina before the battle of 
Marathon, and against the Persian fleet off Phaleron after Mara-
thon. The same way I claim two battles of Marathon, I also main-
tain that two naval bills were moved by Themistokles: first the 
famous one before Marathon, and then a second bill before Sala-
mis. The second bill will be the object of Ch. V, in which I shall 
demonstrate that a misinterpretation of a passage in Aristotle's 
Athenaion politeia is at the root of much scholarly confusion in 
our day. For a better treatment of Themistokles' naval policy and 
the war with Aigina, we are advised to turn to scholars who wrote 
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before the recovery of Aristotle's curious treatise more than a 
hundred years ago. In the concluding Ch. VII, I shall have a word 
to say about Herodotos versus the so-called secondary sources, 
and a .short history of the 490s and 480s will be attempted. As an 
appendix, I quote some less used sources. In the text, refernce to 
them is marked with an asterisk. 
NOTES 
1. Gomme 1958: 28, 33. Swoboda 1884: 5 dubs it 'Abirrungen der 
Forschung' to take Nepos seriously. 'Gegeniiber diesen Abirrungen 
der Forschung - der Ausdruck ist nicht zu hart - ist es Pilicht, immer 
wieder auf Herodot zuriickzuweisen.' Meyer 19 54: 311 n. 2 'Alle 
anderen Berichte haben keinen selbstandigen Wert, sondern sind 
Modifikationen der bei Herodot erhaltenen Tradition.' How & Wells 
1912: 353-354 'H.'s account of Marathon is beyond dispute our 
principal authority' ... but 'in many points defective and in some 
positively misleading.' Maurice 1932: 13 'almost our sole authority.' 
Hignett 1963: 24 is worried because 'in some recent writings, espe-
cially those of Labarbe, there has been an alarming tendency to re-
examine the secondary sources, even the least trustworthy of them, 
for fresh illumination.' Whatley 1964: 128 has it that 'the chances 
that the earliest account of a Greek war that we possess is the best 
seem to me very great indeed,' and Hignett 1963: vi subscribes to his 
statement that Herodotos' account of Marathon 'is the only one 
which is worth anything at all.' Ehrenberg 1973: 411 n. 16 'Hdt. bk. 
6 is almost the only source'; Lazenby 1993: 5 'Apart from Hero-
datos, there is not much evidence to consider.' Lazenby dubs Hero-
dotos a 'basically sober' historian, p. 72 n. 63. V.d. Veer 1982: 310 'It 
is generally accepted now that Herodotus is our best authority on the 
battle of Marathon.' Evans 1984: 2 'our earliest and best account, 
and any effort to reconstruct the battle must start with it ... What he 
says is probably accurate as far as it goes.' Doenges 1998: 1 'Only the 
brief account of the battle (6.111-114) inspires confidence.' More to 
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my taste is Hury 1896: 95 \\ny one who reads critically the Hero-
dotcan account must sec that Herodotus had not the smallest idea 
why the battle was fought, and had a very inadequate notion of how 
it was fought. He has collected a number of details, some true, 
others absurd; which, as he relates them, arc without any inner con-
nection.' Cf. Green 1996: xxii 'these much despised 'late sources' ... 
may also contain valuable material along with the rubbish.' Labarbe 
1957: 24 'la scule methode possible est d'analyser lcs tcxtes anciens 
pour son compte, ct sans idee precon<;uc.' Also the great Dclbri.ick, 
Husolt, and Hcloch arc generally more critical of Herodotos, pre-
senting a battle of Marathon rather different from his. They are dis-
missed by the devoted Hcrodotcan Pritchett, 1960: 168. Griffiths 
1989: 52 would probably include Pritchett among those who 'make 
ritual genuflections towards the altar.' 
2. In Hdt. 7.61.1 the arms of the Persians in 480 are listed as wicker 
shields, short spears, daggers, bows and arrows, and in 5.97.1 Arist-
agoras in 499 explains that the Persians used neither shields nor 
spears; in 9.62.3 they arc called anoploi, 'without arms,' the only true 
weapons being the arms of the hoplite. Hartog 1988: 46 'in Greece, 
the Persians arc regarded as barbarians, that is to say, as anti-hop-
lites.' Hartog unfortunately thinks that the Persian cavalry was absent 
at Marathon. 
3. So also Hury 1896: 97, although he is very critical of Herodotos' 
account of Marathon, cf. n. 1 above; Maurice 1932: 13. Wecklein 
1876: 274-275 has a delay when the Persian after their landing waited 
to see the reaction of the Athenians. When Miltiades and the Athe-
nians came marching out to Marathon, they reembarked for a frontal 
assult on Athens from Phalcron, leaving a rear guard to protect the 
embarkation. The Athenians defeated the guard shortly after their 
arrival. 
4. e.g. Bicknell 1970: 427 with reference to literature in n. 6. 
5. Delbri.ick 1920: 54 'cine physische UnmCigelichkcit.' Even the great 
Herodotcan Hignett 1963: 62 rejects both the 1500 m race and the 
election of the polemarch by lot. 
6. Calabi Limentani 1964: 23 'si tratta di bellimento della tradizone 
culminantc nella legcnda dell' oplita corridore.' 
7. r\vcry 1973. 
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8. Delbriick 1921: 228 'nur mit Hilfe der Sachkritik kann die Quellen-
kritik richtig gehandhabt und von jener Willkiir befreit werden.' 
9. Schachermeyr 1974: 109 n. 1 follows Kromayer in that 'cine der-
artige Einschiffung im Altertum weder schwierig erschien, noch 
besonders viel Zeit erforderte.' Better Delbruck 1920: 64, who holds 
that 'es sehr umstandlich ist, Pferde an Bard von Schiffen zu 
bringen.' Cf. Hammond 1997: 505. 
10. Cf. Hunt 1998: 26 'The Greeks used every resource, including their 
own slaves, to counter the threat to their lives and freedom pre-
sented by the Persian invasion.' Even so, Hunt p. 27 curiously thinks 
that no thetes were armed to fight against the Persians. Immerwahr 
1966: 251 speaks of 'the tradition that correctly pictured Marathon as 
a great hop lite victory' and Vidal-N aquet 1986: 90 sees Marathon as 
the ideal hoplite battle, and states (p. 92) that albeit there were more 
than 30,000 potential combatants in 490, 'faced with a formidable 
danger threatening the very existence of the city, the young demo-
cracy manageed to 'mobilize' less than a third of its available man-
power: the profligacy has something appalling about it.' But the 
Athenians did not march to Marathon for fighting a regular hoplite 
battle against other Greeks in the plain; their object was to stop a 
foreign invasion, like the Spartans who came to Thermopylai in 480. 
Just as light-armed helots were of use to the Spartans at Thermo-
pylai, so were non-hoplite warriors to the Athenians at Marathon. 
Archers and slingers were useful against cavalry according to Nikias 
in Thuk. 6.22. 
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On the famous Chigi vase of about 650 BC, two hoplite armies 
coming to grips are represented. A young flute player takes part, 
but archers or other light-armed troops are totally missing. I sur-
mise that the painting gives us more of hoplite ideology than of 
actual Greek warfare in the late Archaic Age. 
On the next page we have first a vase painting of the half-
naked hoplite Thorakion arming himself to go to war. He figures 
between two archers in Skythian dress who are clearly about to 
accompany him in the battle. Real archers would no more wear 
this Skythian outfit than real hoplites would fight half-naked. It is 
only a matter of iconography. 
Next we have the sad outcome of battle, a gravestone from 
the graveyard of Olbia, dating from the time of the battle of 
Marathon. On side A of the battered stele figures the half-naked 
hoplite Leoxos, and on side B his accompanying archer in Skythian 
dress is shown. The bowman has apparently fought together with 
Leoxos in a battle and fallen with him. We are sometimes told that 
the archer is not Leoxos' light-armed comrade but either an 
Amazon or Leoxos' barbarian slayer. But such figures are unlikely 
to have been honoured with representation on noble Leoxos' 
gravestone in Olbia. 
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CHAPTER II 
The First Marathon: the Battle of 
Kallimakhos 
It is normal to speak of the military encounter between Greeks and 
Persians at Marathon as the battle of Marathon in the singular even 
though there is evidence for two different battles (cf. the battle of 
Philippi in 42 BC). The normal practice is to my mind the result of 
a too narrow and too reverent reading of Herodotos. I have previ-
ously argued for taking not only Herodotos, but the whole bulk of 
relevant ancient material seriously, which inevitably leads to recog-
nizing two battles at Marathon. 1 In the first battle (hereafter battle 
A), which mostly appears in late sources, the Persians, attempting 
to force their way through towards Athens, unsuccessfully attacked 
the Athenians and Plataians right after these had jointly marched 
out from Athens to Marathon and had taken a position in a loca-
tion suitable for defence. The second battle (battle B), that of the 
early source Herodotos, took place several days later, when the 
Athenians set out from their defensive position and attacked the 
enemy out in the open plain. We thus have an early battle and a 
later one; one attack launched by the Persians and another by the 
Greeks; one battle in a rugged terrain and another in the open 
plain. Rather than accept two successive battles, scholars tend to 
combine them into one,2 thereby encountering a host of problems, 
e.g. whether or not the Persian cavalry took part in the battle3 and 
why the Persians tarried at Marathon instead of immediately mar-
ching towards the city, as they had previously done in Eretria.4 My 
grounds for reopening the discussion about the enigmatic events at 
Marathon5 is that I now think I understand more of the Stoa Poi-
kite in the Agora of Athens with its paintings of Marathon and 
other warlike achievements of the Athenians. 
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The victor of the second battle was the stratege Miltiades, 
who, not least due to the Stoa Poikile and the propaganda genius 
of his son Kimon, came in the tradition to rank as the hero of Ma-
rathon.6 The polemarch Kallimakhos, who commanded the whole 
host and led in the ft.rst battle, was thus ousted from his rightful 
position.7 He fell at Marathon and apparently lacked a mighty son 
to promote his case. 
Turning now to the evidence, we notice that the latest source, the 
tenth-century Byzantine Suda lexicon,* is the only one to clearly 
record two battles of Marathon. The ft.rst battle, battle A, is met 
with in the entry Hzppias (2): 
When one of the ten advised to wait for the Spartans to arrive but 
when Miltiades and Kallimakhos would take the field, the Athenians 
marched out numbering 9,000, together with 1,000 Plataians. And 
they conquered on the same day. 
Before the Persians had landed at Marathon, whether before or 
during their operations in Euboia, the Athenians had called for 
help from Sparta, Plataiai and possibly from other states.8 But only 
the Plataians had arrived in Athens by the time it was reported that 
the enemy had landed at Marathon. Now, even if the circuit wall of 
Athens had been adequate, the danger implied in withstanding a 
siege had been demonstrated by the fate of Eretria, where the 
gates had been opened by traitors. So after the arrival of only the 
Plataians in Athens, the Athenians of the Suda, on the motion of 
Miltiades and Kallimakhos, decided to quit their walls and take the 
ft.eld together with the Plataians without waiting for the Spartans. 
They had no time to lose. In 546, Hippias and his father Peisi-
stratos, marching towards Athens after landing at Marathon from 
Eretria, had managed to advance as far as Pallene before encoun-
tering their enemies coming out from Athens, and at Pallene they 
won an easy victory. The landing from Eretria of a great army in 
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490 was more time-consuming than the smaller one in 546, 
allowing the Athenians, provided they acted with speed, the chance 
to get to Marathon and enclose the Persians in the plain, waiting 
on the Spartans there rather than behind the city walls. 
In the fourth century an inscription recorded the decision 
'to take provisions and set out' to Marathon and 'meet the enemy 
at once,' rather than wait for the Spartans (Aristot. Rhet. 1411a 10, 
schol. Dem. 19.303, Plut. Mor. 628e, schol. Aristeides 2.219).9 It is 
interesting, since it is constantly referred to as the decree of Milti-
ades, that in the Suda, Miltiades has to share with Kallimakhos, the 
polemarch, the glory for moving the decree in Athens and possibly 
also for winning the victory 'on the same day'. The decision of the 
people, on the proposal of Miltiades, to free slaves before Mara-
thon (Paus. 7.15.7) was probably part of the same decree. But un-
like Pausanias (10.20.2), the Suda fails to record that the 9,000 
Athenians included liberated slaves as well as citizens above 
military age. Nor do we learn how many of the 9,000 were hoplites 
and how many light-armed troops, or whether any of the hoplites 
rode their mounts out to the battlefield, or whether the warriors 
were accompanied by slave armour-bearers. 
The second battle, battle B, is recorded in the brief Suda entry 
khoris hippeis: 111 
When Datis invaded Attika they say that the Ionians, after he had 
withdrawn, went up to the trees, and signalled to the Athenians that 
the cavalry were apart. Miltiades, learning of their departure 
(arroxwpT]CJLS'), thus attacked and conquered. Hence the proyerb is 
applied to those who break ranks. 
We shall deal further with this entry in the next chapter. Here we 
only note that the Athenians, apparently after having repelled the 
Persian attack in battle A, lay encamped for some days at 
Marathon. We hear nothing more of Kallimakhos in the Suda, but 
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Miltiades, after learning that Datis had withdrawn with the cavalry, 
launched an assault on the remaining enemies without waiting for 
the Spartans and without any discussion having taken place in the 
camp. We are not told the destination of Datis but the 
apokhoresis smacks of a departure by sea more than a ravaging of 
the immediate locality (like in Ps.-Dem. 59.94, Plut. Arist. 5.1, 
Mor. 305b), probably for a voyage around Cape Sounion to 
Phaleron and a frontal attack on Athens, after the failed attempt in 
battle A to get through towards the city. While Miltiades was 
engaging the Persians remaining at Marathon in battle B, the 
Suda's Datis may have had time to attempt a landing in Phaleron. 
Summarizing the two Suda entries, we note that Miltiades had to 
share with Kallimakhos the glory of moving the decree to charge 
out, and possibly also for winning victory A, and that he only 
conquered in battle B after substantial Persian forces had 
withdrawn. 
Since Kallimakhos has been ousted by Miltiades in the 
tradition and since no biographer has left us his vita, we turn with 
great expectations to Polemon, 'the Phrygian Demosthenes'.* 
This distinguished rhetor was chosen to deliver an oration at the 
inauguration of the temple for the Olympian Zeus in Athens in 
131 AD, and so highly was he esteemed that on one occasion he 
could charge 250,000 drachmas for a lecture. But Polemon was not 
only an outstanding orator, he also wrote an historical work that 
has not survived. The pair of declamations preserved from 
Polemon's golden pen ought therefore to be sources of high value. 
In the declamations the fathers of the fallen Marathon heroes 
Kynegeiros and Kallimakhos present their son's claims for the 
prize of valour, the law allegedly providing that the father of the 
bravest should deliver the funeral oration. The first oration is on 
behalf of Kynegeiros, the second of Kallimakhos. 
We learn (2.5-6) that after the army of Dareios had landed 
at Marathon, the Athenians did not wait for the Spartans to arrive. 
The stratege l\1iltiades decided instead to charge out immediately, 
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with Kallimakhos as polemarch and hegemon 11 leading the whole 
army out to Marathon (1.5, 2.6). While the other polemarchs (!) 
inspired the people with cowardice, the battle came about thanks 
to the vote of Kallimakhos (2.49), the scene of the debate thus 
being the assembly at Athens. The Persians delivered the attack in 
the battle, which seems to have followed shortly upon the arrival 
of the Greek army at Marathon (1.28, 2.7). In the battle, Kalli-
makhos withstood the whole of Dareios' army (2.7-8), and his was 
the hegemony (2.2, 6). He died in the first or middle part of the 
battle (1.21). 'The battle' would suggest no more than one battle, 
but panic-stricken after the earlier battle of Kallimakhos, the 
enemy turned their backs and made the pursuit easy for those who 
attacked them next (authis) (2.28). Kynegeiros started a second 
battle (2.40), and Aiskhylos is asked to praise the battles of 
Marathon (1.49). The fathers of the two heroes agree in dating the 
deeds and death of Kallimakhos before those of Kynegeiros; but 
they do not say how long before, and we would have liked them to 
be clearer on the question of one battle in two phases, or two 
separate battles. 
'Effekte und Pointe' in Polemon's two declamations 
'wirken fast komish fiir uns/ 2 and the total loss of his historical 
work is hardly among the saddest losses of Greek literature. But 
we notice that Athens, not Marathon, is the scene of the debate 
about whether or not to march out without waiting for the 
Spartans; that it is Kallimakhos who leads the army; that the attack 
in Kallimakhos' battle is delivered by the Persians; and that 
Kallimakhos' death occurs in an early phase of the fighting. As 
Jiittner puts it, 'unusquisque cognoscit haec non congruere cum 
Herodoti verbis.'n 
Our principal source, however, for the first battle of 
Marathon is neither the Suda nor Polemon but Cornelius Nepos 
Miltiades 4.3-5.5. 14 After the Persian capture of Eretria and the 
landing at Marathon, 
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the Athenians, though greatly alarmed by this hostile demonstration 
(hoc tumultu), so near and so threatening, asked help only from the 
Spartans, sending Pheidippos, a courier of the class known as 'ali-day 
runners', to report how pressing was their need of aid. But at home 
they appointed ten generals to command the army, including 
Miltiades; among these there was great difference of opinion, whether 
it was better to take refuge within their walls or go to meet the enemy 
and fight a decisive battle. Miltiades alone persistently urged them to 
take the field at the earliest possible moment; stating that if they did 
so, not only would the citizens take heart, when they saw that their 
courage was not distrusted, but for the same reason the enemy would 
be slower to act, if they realized that the Athenians dared to engage 
them with so small a force. 
5. In that crisis no city gave help to the Athenians except the 
Plataians. They sent 1 ,000 soldiers, whose arrival raised the number 
of combatants (armatorum) to 10,000. It was a band inflamed with a 
marvellous desire for battle, and their ardour gave Miltiades' advice 
preference over that of his colleagues. Accordingly, through his 
influence the Athenians were induced to lead their forces from the 
city and encamp in a favourable postion. Then, the next day, the army 
was drawn up at the foot of a mountain in an area that was not fully 
open (sub montis radicibus acie regione instructa non 
apertissuma15) - for there were trees scattered about (arbores rarae) 
in many places - and they joined battle (proelium commiserunt). The 
purpose was to protect themselves by the high mountains and at the 
same time prevent the enemy's cavalry, hampered by the scattered 
trees, from surrounding them with their superior numbers (hoc 
consilio, ut et montium altitudine tegerentur et arborum tractu 
equitatus hostium impediretur ne multitudine clauderentur). 
Although Oatis saw that the position was not favourable to his men, 
he was eager to engage, trusting the number of his troops; and the 
more so because he thought it to his advantage to give battle before 
the Spartan reinforcements arrived. Therefore he led his 100,000 foot 
and 10,000 horse and began the battle (proeliumque commisit). In 
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the contest that ensued the Athenians were so superior in valour that 
they routed a foe of tenfold their own number and filled them with 
such fear that the Persians fled, not to their camp, but to their ships. 
(Adapted Loeb trans!.) 
There are a host of problems here, apart from the impossible 
number of 110,000 enemies, more so in ch. 4 than in ch. 5. The 
threatening nearby tumultus, which caused the Athenians to call 
for outside help, suits the siege and capture of Eretria, but 
tumultus is a queer word to use about the subsequent Persian 
landing at Marathon. It could be that in Nepos' source (as implied 
in the Suda but unlike Plato Laws 698d-e), the call for aid was 
made before the Persians had crossed over from Euboia to 
Marathon. 16 It is also odd that the Spartans are presented as the 
only ones who were asked for help, since the Plataians actually did 
arrive in Athens. More likely, the Athenians will have called for aid 
from both Sparta and Plataiai, and possibly other states, urging the 
troops to come to Athens as soon as possible. Like the Suda, 
Nepos has the 1,000 Plataians joining the Athenians in Athens, not 
out at Marathon, and encouraged by the presence of these out-
standing warriors, the Athenians decided to take the field with 
9,000 men without waiting for the arrival of their Spartan rein-
forcements. The 9,000 armati were probably all hoplites, consti-
tuting a tiny part of the total manpower of Athens. The people 
made this decision on the advice of Miltiades only, and it is small 
wonder that Nepos, in a biography of lVWtiades, fails to have his 
hero sharing the glory with Kallimakhos, as in the Suda. Nor does 
he, like Polemon, allow the polemarch to lead the army out to 
Marathon: Nepos is able (like Plutarch in the Aristeides) to 
account for the battle of Marathon without mentioning 
Kallimakhos! The day after their arrival at Marathon the Greeks 
drew up their battle-line in their strong defensive position in a 
mountainous and wooded area and proelium commiserunt. Datis 
saw that the battle-ground was unfavourable, but he preferred to 
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act before the Spartans arrived and so he, too, proeliumque 
commisit. Nepos is a bit unclear here, but not so much that 'e 
difficile stabilire se Cornelio Nepote e la sua fonte intendessero 
veramente dire che erano stati i Persiani ad attacare.'17 He 
undoubtedly has the battle on the next day, with the Persians 
delivering the attack;1H an attack, that is, against an acies, a phalanx 
of hoplites, not against a defensive position also manned by light-
armed infantry, as we would expect. It is also surprising that the 
Greeks, after warding off the attack in a hard-fought battle, had 
the energy to throw the enemy back to their ships instead of 
resting in the camp while waiting for the Spartans. This pursuit of 
the enemy to the ships was more likely a feature of battle B, which 
is otherwise missing in Nepos . 
. There was no time for the Greeks of Nepos, between their 
hasty march from Athens to Marathon the one day and the battle 
the next (already the next morning?), to fell trees or build a 
stockade or an abattis, so by arborum tractu Nepos cannot mean 
'pulling of trees' but 'wooded tract', 'die Ausdehnung der (einzeln 
stehenden) Baume,' 'die lange Reihe der Baume.'19 The trees must 
be identical with the standing arbores ... rarae above, any con-
struction of an abbatis or a wooden breastwork thus being a 
modern misreading of Nepos?1 Like the Suda, Nepos fails to in-
form us about freed slaves, light-armed infantry, or armour-
bearers. It is all a matter of hoplites. 
Iustinus (2.9.9-10)* agrees with Nepos and the Suda that 
the Plataians arrived at Athens before the army marched out, 
Miltiades being et dux belli et auctor non expectandi auxilii 
from Sparta. And like Nepos, Plutarch (Mor. 349e) dates the battle 
the day after the Athenians had set out for Marathon, whereas 
lsokrates (4.87) and Lysias (2.26) both point out how promptly 
the Athenians took the field and defeated the Persians? Unlike 
Polemon and Nepos, these sources fail to specify that the attack 
was delivered by the Persians, not the Greeks, but this is what 
Diodoros (10.27) implies in Book Ten which has only survived in 
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fragments: after his landing at Marathon, Datis demanded that the 
Athenians should concede him sovereignty, or they would suffer a 
worse fate than had the Eretrians. The demand was obviously 
made after the Athenians had marched out to Marathon, for 
l\liltiades rejected it on behalf of the ten strateges, not of the 
demos in Athens. Now Oatis made ready for battle, clearly as the 
offensive party. Here the Diodoros fragment unfortunately breaks 
off, but the Persian attack is more likely to have come the next 
day, in Diodoros as in Nepos and Plutarch, than already the very 
day the Athenians and Plataians had come out to Marathon, as in 
the Suda. 
Nepos, Diodoros, lustinus, Plutarch, Polemon and the 
Suda all belong to the same tradition, which is likely to derive from 
the universal historian Ephoros who wrote about 340 BC. 22 He in 
his turn may have followed one of the early Atthidographers, 
Hellanikos at the end of the fifth century whom he is known to 
have utilised rather than Kleidemos who wrote about 350 BC. Well 
before Hellanikos' Atthi.r, the first battle of Marathon appears in 
Aristophanes' Wa.rp.r, produced in 422 BC. The chorus is of 
elderly Athenians dressed as wasps to symbolise the sting they had 
as soldiers in their younger days. In lines 1075-90 they declare: 
We who have this kind of rump on us arc the only genuine 
autochthonic 1\thenians, a most manly breed and one that aided this 
city very greatly in battles at the time when the barbarian came, 
blowing smoke over all the city and putting it to the flames, striving 
to destroy our hives by force. For we charged out and fought against 
them straight away "with spear, with shield" (EVSEWS' yap 
EKOpall{lVTES' ~vv oopl ~vv QGTTLOL EllGX011EG8' aUTOlat), after 
drinking a draught of sharp, bitter spirit; each man stood beside the 
next, biting his lip with anger. Because of their arrows one could not 
see the sky, but still, with the gods' help, towards the evening we 
pushed them back; for an owl had flown across our troops before the 
battle. Then we pursued them, harpooning their baggy pants, and 
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they fled, stung in the jaws and the eyebrows. And so everywhere 
among the barbarians it is said even now that there is nothing more 
manly than an Attic wasp. (Adapted Sommerstein transl.) 
The note of the scholiast on 'when the barbarian came' is 'he 
speaks of the victory at Marathon over Dareios,' and most scholars 
concur with him that the battle is at Marathon. Like ten years later 
at Thermopylai, there will have been a rain of Persian arrows at 
Marathon, and if it is too much to say that the barbarians actually 
managed to blow smoke over all the city in 490, they at least 
'wished to burn the sea-girt city' according to an epigram which we 
below, in Ch. VI, refer to that year.21 Eutheos is to be taken with 
emakhomesth' rather than with ekdramontes, 24 unless the wasps, 
being ·less philologically sophisticated, stress their haste in both 
running out to Marathon and encountering the enemy there - by 
no means after a delay of several days, but rather in A, the flrst 
battle of Marathon. (Cf. Himerios 6.20*: 'No sooner did they learn 
of the landing of the barbarians before they ran out in arms; no 
sooner did they encounter those who had disembarked before they 
put them to flight.') Towards the evening the wasps pushed the 
Persians back, repelling the enemy attack. We have thus traced the 
defensive flrst battle of Marathon back to the 420s,25 and the last 
step is to Aiskhylos who in his epitaph of the year 456 calls upon 
the Marathonian holy grove (alsos) to bear witness to his valour. 
He showed his valour not in battle B out in the open plain, 
regarded as a holy place,26or together with his brother Kynegeiros 
at the ships, but in a holy grove which recalls the arbores rarae of 
Nepos and the trees of Suda's khoris hippeis - the scene of the 
flrst, defensive, battle A. 
Having warded off the attack of the barbarian towards the 
evening, the wasps of Aristophanes pursued the enemy, 'har-
pooning them through their baggy trousers.' The impression is that 
the pursuit of the brave wasps followed straight upon the battle 
that ended towards the evening, the way the Athenians of Nepos 
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pursued the defeated Persians as they fled to their ships. But the 
danger is that Nepos and the wasps of Aristophanes are tele-
scoping the events, in that human hoplites would scarcely have 
given themselves immediately to an exhausting pursuit of the 
enemy after a hard day's fight? (fhe pursuit of the eneny is more 
appropriate to battle B.) The hoplite wasps of Aristophanes do the 
job all by themselves, with spear and shield, shoulder by shoulder. 
Not a word here of archers or other light-armed wasps - the 
arrows in the sky were all Persian. Nor do we hear of ships, for by 
the 420s the battle of Marathon had long been established as the 
hoplite battle, no one but hoplites contributing to the defence. 
Tbe location ~l Kailimakho.r' camp and battl~jield A 
The Athenians must have expected that Hippias intended to lead 
the Persians towards Athens by the same route he and his father 
Peisistratos had taken in 546, when they landed from Eretria and 
marched towards the city. This was the easy and level route along 
the coast, through Pallene and over the low pass between Pente-
likon and Hymettos. The route could be blocked to the Persians in 
two ways: either by an encampment near the sea in the locality of 
Valaria, in the narrow strip of land between Agrieliki and the sea, 
or from an inland camp near Vrana in the valley between Agrieliki 
and Kotroni, the Greeks could attack the Persians in their unpro-
tected flank in case they attempted an advance on Athens along 
the coastal road. 
A Greek encampment at Valaria, while waiting for the 
Spartan reinforcements to arrive, implies a march out from Athens 
to Marathon by the main road of about 40 kms through Pallene. 
Its last part near the coast would be dangerously exposed to sea-
borne Persian landings, and a camp between Agricliki and the sea 
would leave the defenders open to the danger of enemy troops 
being landed in their rear. An inland position near Vrana, with a 
supply of water from the stream, would be safer, the army having 
taken the rugged and toilsome, but some 4 kms shorter and less 
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exposed route via Kefisia/Stamata/Oinoe, or rather the one via 
Kefisia/Dionyssos/Rapentosa, which descends right to the Vrana 
area. In either case, whether the Greek defensive position was near 
the sea at Valaria or inland at Vrana, the Persians could only leave 
the plain and head for Athens after sustaining and winning a 
battle.28 
Nepos and the Suda both speak in favour of the Vrana 
option; the former by positing the Greek encampment in a fa-
vourable position where the defensive battle was fought the next 
day in a wooded and montainous area; the latter by having the 
Ionians coming up to the trees to inform :Miltiades that Datis had 
withdrawn with the cavalry. From a Valaria camp near the sea, Mil-
tiades would have seen this with his own eyes and would not have 
needed others to tell him. 
Failing to record Kallimakhos' battle A, Herodotos locates 
the camp of Miltiades at a sanctuary of Herakles, from which he 
and his hoplites charged at the double to encounter the enemy out 
in the open plain. In the Valaria area two fifth-century inscriptions 
mentioning the games of Herakles have been found. Although 
foundations of a temple have yet to be traced there, Valaria is the 
most likely location of the Marathonian Herakleion, since the idea 
of two stones having come wandering from somewhere else is too 
impossible to be accepted.29 Leaving for the next chapter Hero-
datos: account of the offensive battle of Miltiades and of the camp 
at the Herakleion, I shall presently call the Tomb of the Plataians 
and the Memorial of Kallimakhos to witness in favour of a Vrana 
area position for Kallimakhos' camp and his battle A. 
The Tomb of the Plataians 
After the battle of Plataiai in 479, the Athenians buried all their 
fallen in the same grave, unlike the Spartans who buried their light-
armed helots in a communal tomb of their own, separate from that 
of the hoplites (Hdt. 9.85.2). Not so at Marathon according to 
Pausanias (1.32.3): 'On the plain is the grave of the Athenians.' 
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Apparently the fallen citizens, both hoplites or light-armed 'infan-
try, from battles A and B were buried at the scene of battle B, 
where the Soros mound was later thrown up over their graves. 
'And there is another grave for the Boiotian Plataians and for the 
slaves, for also slaves fought then for the first time,' Pausanias 
adds, though he fails to specify the location of this grave. One 
school of scholars follows Marinatos in identifying it with the 
tumulus excavated by him in the necropolis near Vrana in 1970.30 
The tumulus contains the remains of one boy aged ten, nine men 
in the twenties (two of them with head injuries) and one man aged 
about 40 whose marker stone was inscribed with the name 
ARKHIA in Attic script. The human remains are accompanied by 
pottery from the early fifth century, a date corresponding with the 
dating of finds from the Soros. As an all-male burial it ought to be 
one for warriors fallen in battle. The fallen Plataians and Athenian 
slaves (perhaps men freed by the people on the motion of 
Miltiades as well as slave armour- and provision-bearers) from 490 
BC are obvious candidates, this area below Agrieliki and Afo-
rismos being the scene of battle A, at the foot of mountains, as 
Nepos says, and with scattered trees in those days. The Plataians 
and the 'slaves', who may not have taken part in the later, offen-
sive, battle B,31 were buried close to the camp where they fell in 
battle A'2 in flattering proximity to the awe-inspiring Middle Hel-
ladic tombs of great heroes of the past. The existence of two tu-
muli in different locations, the one of Marinatos in a mountainous 
area and the Soros out on the open plain, is thus an argument for 
two battlefields and two battles. 
On the other hand, travellers of the early nineteenth 
century noticed an elevation on the surface at a short distance 
from the Soros, suggesting that it represented the remains of the 
tumulus of the Plataians and the 'slaves'. The elevation has since 
disappeared and the place has not been excavated in search of 
pottery and fallen men of military age. But the early travellers have 
been followed by several modern scholars, who however have yet 
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to come up with a plausible explanation of the all-male graves 
underneath the tumulus of Marinatos.03 
The Memorial of Kallimakhos 
This monument was buried in the ground of the Akropolis after 
the Persian sack, only to be recovered by modern archaeology 
beween 1840 and 1888. It is a column supporting a female figure, 
probably Nike. The battered inscription on the column (IG I3 784) 
has been restored in various ways. I refrain from adding to the 
guesswork and merely cite what is reasonably certain: 
[Kallimakhos] of ,\phidna dedicated !me] to Athena meslsenger of 
the im]mortals who dwell in [Olympian homes .... pole]march of the 
Athenians the battle of Ma[ .... ] to the sons of the Athenians 1 .... ) 
The polemarch from the deme Aphidna must be Kallimakhos. 
When he was polemarch in the year of Marathon, he dedicated 
(av]E8EKEv) to Athena a memorial of his victory, apparently one 
won in TCW ciyova TOV Ma[, which looks remarkably like the 
battle of Marathon in which he is known to have taken part. 
According to the scholiast to Aristophanes Knights 660, Kalli-
makhos is said to have made a vow (A.EyETaL EU~aa8m) to 
Artemis before the battle, pledging as many cows as he slew men 
at Ma~athon (though because many were killed, he was unable to 
sacrifice so many cows and sacrificed goats instead).34 Our 
memorial of Kallimakhos, however, was a monument he actually 
dedicated (avE8KE) after his victory (as he, according to the 
scholiast, sacrificed goats); it was not one he vowed (Eu~aTo) 
beforehand. 35 Such victory memorials are quite common, and ours 
would have caused no scholarly headache if only Kallimakhos had 
not fallen at Marathon, for as a dead man he is not supposed to 
make a dedication to Athena (or to sacrifice goats to Artemis). So 
scholars, ignoring the Suda and accepting only one battle of Mara-
thon - the one of Miltiades - are faced with a problem. Various 
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ways out are taken, as attested by the lenghty bibliography. We are 
told e.g. that Kallimakhos' victory was not the one of Marathon 
but an otherwise unattested one, won earlier in the year in the 
stadion or hippodrome,'6 or that the memorial was set up not by 
Kallimakhos but by his deme Aphidna:n or by an individual demes-
man.'K But just as our latest source, the Suda, records two battles 
of Marathon, so this earliest evidence, the memorial of 
Kallimakhos, presupposes a battle A in which he held the supreme 
command when the assault of the Persians was warded off. Before 
dying from wounds inflicted in the battle, he had time to order a 
thanks-giving to be dedicated to Athena on the Akropolis at his 
cost (and a sacrifice to be made to Artemis).39 lf Kallim~khos' 
memorial thus attests the historicity of the Suda's battle A, the 
next question is if it also favours an inland Vrana location of the 
Greek camp. 
In the Vrana district, a few hundred meters east of Mari-
natos' tumulus, the foundations of a temple have been uncovered, 
and to judge fom a marble stone bearing the inscription 'boundary 
of the temenos of Athena,' the sanctuary belonged to that goddess. 
The fact that Kallimakhos thanked Athena for his victory with a 
monument on the Akropolis is possibly an argument for locating 
battle A in this area, a victory won near her sanctuary obviously 
being a gift from the goddess. The holy grove on which Aiskhylos 
called to bear witness to his valour, may have belonged to the 
temenos of Athena near Vrana. He showed his valour in battle A 
near that grove, not in battle B out in the open plain or on the 
Skhoinia beach, 'that shore where the Mediterranean pines still 
grow. ,40 
NOTES 
1. Schreiner 1970. The theory is 'abwegig' according to Welwei 2000: 
196 n. 24 and 'does violence to some of our most respectable 
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sources' according to Harrison 1971: 12 n. 21, though Harrison un-
fortunately fails to define which sources are respectable and which 
not. Cf. Wallinga 1993: 158 who accepts 'explicit statements by re-
spectable sources.' 
2. The one who comes closest to two battles is probably Delbriick 
1920: 65 'langere Pause zwischen dem Treffen im Vranatal und den 
Kampf an den Schiffen, da nur dadurch das Entkommen des Restes 
der Perser und der meisten Schiffe erklart wird.' Wycherley 1972 is 
not unwilling to accept two battles. Ehrenberg 1973: 139 'there may 
have been some earlier fighting, in which the Persians displayed 
cavalry as well as infantry, but were beaten.' But he prefers 'to speak 
of two phases of the same battle,' 421 n. 25. 
3. Macao 1895: 162 'perhaps the most obvious of all the difficulties in 
Herodotos' account of the battle.' Waters 1985: 82 does not seem to 
see difficulties: 'A perfectly plausible reconstruction of the tactics 
and course of the battle is not difficult.' 
4. Ignoring a couple of sources, Delbriick 1921: 226 states that the 
delay 'von keiner Seite angezweifelt wird,' and Schachermeyr 197 4: 
104 has it that it is 'durch die gesamte Oberlieferung versichert' that 
the Athenians, not the Persians, were the ones who attacked. Some 
explanations of the alleged delay: Munro 1899: 192 'The Athenian 
general awaited the separation of the Persian forces, the Persians 
awaited the signal.' Beloch 1914: 22 the Persians tarried because they 
had few horsemen, and the rowers were useless for war; but Oatis 
attacked before the Spartans arrived. Hammond 1973: 208 'the 
Persian commanders waited in the hope that the Athenians would be 
tempted into the plain, where the cavalry would destroy them.' 
Doenges 1998: 9 Oatis lacked sufficient numerical superiority. 
La:zenby 1993: 56 the Persians 'may have felt the need for a period 
of rest and recuperation after the operations at Eretria.' But why not 
take the needed rest in Euboia before crossing over to Marathon? 
Several scholars: Oatis hoped for an uprising in Athens, which 
would undercut the army at Marathon. Against Nepos, Berthold 
1976/7: 93 holds that Oatis 'never intended to attack the 
encampment itself.' 
5. Against Hammond 1973: 200 'the battle itself does not pose any 
problems.' Swoboda 1884: 1 noted that already by his time the battle 
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had been 'zum Oberdruss behandlet.' Wheeler 1991: 156 n. 18 'the 
tradition about Marathon (despite detailed topographical investiga-
tions and the publication of at least one article on the battle nearly 
every year) is so steeped in Athenian propaganda as to be of quest-
ionable credibility.' 
6. Cf. Paus. 4.4.7 'there are but few wars that have been made more 
illustrious by the exceptional valour of one man, in the way Akhilles 
shed lustre on the Trojan war and Miltiades on the engagement at 
Marathon.' Schachermeyr 197 4: 112 'Der Erfolg von Marathon war 
in seinem gesamten schier systematisch anmutenden Aufbau sein 
geistiges Eigentum.' Iustinus 2.9* states somewhat differently that 'in 
eo proelio tanta virtus sinbTUlorum fuit ut cuius laus prima esset, 
difficile iudicium videtur.' And Plut. Kim. 8.1 has it that when 
Miltiades in the Assembly requested a crown of olive for himself, 
one Sophanes objected, 'when you have fought and defeated the 
barbarians by yourself, l'vfiltiades, then you may ask to be honoured 
by yourself.' 
7. Jacoby 1956: 115 'for the contemporaries the battle of Marathon was 
a victory not so much, if at all, of Miltiades ... but of the polemarch 
Kallimachos.' Waters 1985: 82 'A tradition favourable to the Philaid 
house has made Miltiades the real commander, and demoted Kalli-
machos to a merely honorary position.' Macao 1895: 177 wonders 
how after his expedition against Paros, the Athenians could have 
sentenced Miltiades to pay a fine of 50 talents if indeed his achieve-
ment at Marathon was so unique. 
8. pantakhose according to Plat. Laws 698c. 
9. Spurious or genuine decree? Discussion in Podlecki 197 5: 160-161. 
A decision to take provisions could imply that the army was to 
spend several days at Marathon, waiting for the Spartan aid. I doubt 
that the hoplites would carry the provisions themselves. 
10. I fail to see how this could be battle A, as N enci 1998: 288 seems to 
suggest. He thinks that Suda refers to the end of a single battle, p. 
291. 
11. Hammond 1997: 516 thinks that Kallimakhos as hegemon led the 
army to Marathon, 'leading, not commanding.' Also in Plato Laws 
628e, it is Kallimakhos who led the army out to battle. 
12. 1\rtemis lexikon s.v. Polemon. 
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13. Ji.ittner 1898: 48, with a discussion of any dependence on Ephoros. 
14. Ultimately from Ephoros according to most scholars, e.g. Busolt 
1895: 558; How &Wells 1912: 355; Casson 1914/5; Delbri.ick 1920: 
53. Against Meyer 1954: 312 n. Hammond 1973: 236-242 prefers the 
Atthidographer Damon, and ultimately Hellanikos. How & Wells 
1912: 355 Nepos has 'no independent value, although historic ratio-
nalisation has made it comparatively plausible and coherent.' A 
further warning by How, 1919: 48 'It may seem a waste of time to 
examine minutely an account of the battle of Marathon and the 
Parian expedition so late as that contained in the brief life of 
Miltiades ascribed to Cornelius Nepos.' Nepos' source 'Ephorus 
gives us little more than a plausible but shallow attempt to ra-
tionalize the biased and defective tradition in Herodotus' (p. 60). 
Hignett 1963: 15 subscribes to Macan's verdict that 'Ephoros 
probably did as much as any one man ever did to corrupt history in 
the name of history.' Should we like what Nepos says, then we 
declare with Lehmann-Haupt 1923: 333 that it derives 'durch Epho-
ros via Nepos aus alterer vorherodotischer Oberlieferung.' For 
Nepos versus Herodotos, cf. Ch. VII below. 
15. Text as OCT, the mss reading is uncertain. 
16. Burn 1969: 119 'It was too soon for the Athenians to march, until 
they knew where the sea-borne enemy would land next; but it was 
not too soon to call for help.' 
17. Nenci 1998: 287. 
18. Hammond 1973: 212 is odd in charging Nepos with misunder-
standing a source who only said that the Greeks drew up their 
battleline the next day, not that the battle followed immediately. 
19. Georges, Handwiirterbuch, s.v. tractus, cf. Busolt 1895: 586 n. 4 
'die sich daselbst hinziehenden Baumreihen.' 
20. Grote 1869: 274 speaks of felled trees obstructing the approach of 
the Persian cavalry, cf. Wecklein 1876: 36; Macan 1895: 207-211; 
How & Wells 1912: 355; Casson 1914/5: 76 n. 1; Delbri.ick 1920: 53, 
58; Myres 1953: 207; Burn 1962: 243, 1969: 118; Hignett 1963: 65 n. 
2; Marinatos 1970: 362; Hammond 1973: 213, 235 'Nepos' expla-
nation of the felling of the trees is again too brief for clarity,' but 
Hammond himself explains, 1997: 511, that 'each night the Greeks 
shortened the distance between the two lines by a small amount. 
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Felling trees on the hillsides and bringing them down to the plain 
each night they extended their abattis farther out into the plain.' To 
which Burn 1969: 118 Hammond's 'account of the Athenians gra-
dually advancing their position behind barriers of felled trees goes a 
long way beyond what is stated by Nepos. (Milt. 5), our poor but 
only (and, I hope, correct) evidence that they used trees at aiL' 
Shrimp ton 1980: 21; v.d. Veer 1982: 314-315; Green 1996: 32. The 
idea of a stockade is aptly rejected by Busolt 1895: 586; Cary 1920; 
Evans 1984: 10; Lazenby 1993: 56. 
21. Needless to say, scholars dislike the chronology of Isokrates and 
Lysias, according to Loraux 1973: 22 'non seulement un raccourci 
rhetorique, mais un inversion de Ia tradition.' In Lazenby 1993: 59 
this chronology 'is probably due to the rhetorical tradition. which 
came to affect so much ancient historical writing.' Lazenby's Hero-
dotos was apparently not tainted by such rhetoric. 
22. Nepos Milt. 7.1-4 follows Ephoros F 63 on the Paros campaign of 
Miltiades, cf. Ch. VII below. 
23. Crosby 1936: 75; Sommerstein 1983: 220; cf. Austin 1973: 134 'pace 
Hammond and MacDowell these lines clearly refer to Marathon ... 
The narrative as a whole focuses on a famous land battle ... ' Nenci 
1998: 276 'in realta fusione poctica di tre diverse battaglie, Maratona, 
Termopili e Salamina.' Hammond 1973: 233 'a hotch-potch of 
episodes in the Persian Wars and not a description of the campaign 
of Marathon.' 
24. Schreiner 1970: 100 n. 4. 
25. In l. 1078 the wasps claim to have aided the city en makhaisin, but 
the plural hardly refers to two battles of Marathon. Lazenby 1993: 80 
n. 87 is not impressed by 'evidence like this.' Cf. p. 5 'Apart from 
Herodorus, there is not much evidence to consider.' 
26. so LSJ s.v. alsos. 
27. Clement of Alexandria, Strom. 1.162, has Miltiades launching a night 
attack. Hammond, a remarkably fast walker in his younger days, has 
the Athenians meeting in the Assembly and marching out to 
Marathon on the very day of the Persian landing, and later on he has 
them hurrying back to Athens on the day of their victory. His 
Plataians arc informed the same day of the Persian landing at 
Marathon, and they are able to join the Athenians at Marathon 
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already the next day. Also the Persian voyage from Marathon round 
Sounion to Phaleron is performed at a most remarkable speed, 1973: 
221-226. Cf. the speed he assigns to the runner Pheidippides/ 
Philippides, n. 40 in Ch. III below. 
28. March by coastal road to Valaria camp: Meyer 1954: 308-9; Hignett 
1963: 60; Vanderpool 1966a: 319-323; Holscher 1973: 52; Themelis 
1974: 226; Schachermeyr 1974: 100; Burn 1977: 90; Lazenby 1993: 
55; Petrakos 1996: 50-52. March by inland route to Vrana camp: 
Duncker 1888: 127; Schilling 1895: 262; Grundy 1901: 173; 
Delbriick 1920: 54, 58; Myres 1953: 206; Burn 1962: 242; Doenges 
1998: 8. March by coastal road to Vrana camp: Berthold 197 6/7. 
March along both roads to Valaria camp: Hammond 1997: 507. 
29. Against Muller 1982: 656 and Doenges 1998: 8 who states that the 
two inscriptions 'almost certainly have traveled since antiquity.' 
30. e.g. Hammond 1973: 197-198, 1997: 510; Berthold 1976/7: 89; Burn 
1977: 91; Muller 1982: 656; Mersch: 1995. 
31. In Herodotos 6.112, it is the Athenians, not the Athenians and 
Plataians, who charge against the Persians in the plain. 
32. Marinatos as quoted by Berthold 1976/7: 89 who disagrees. 
33. Themelis 1974: 244, 298; Koumanoudis 1978: 232-237; Welwei 
2000: 191-196; Evans 1993: 280-281; Nenci 1998: 289. 
34. This was to be usurped for Miltiades, Ailianos Var. Hist. 2.25, Plut. 
Mor. 862b-c. 
35. Jacoby 1956: 115, Meiggs & Lewis 1969: 34, Evans 1993: 304, and 
Hammond 1997: 515 all say dedication in advance of the battle. 
36. Harrison 1971. In his basic article, Shefton 1950: 143 declares that 
'the dedication, and not only the vow, must have been made by 
Callimachus before his death.' 
37. Petrakos 1996: 47. 
38. Hansen 1988: 482-483. By his heirs according to Gauer 1980: 130. 
39. Raubitschek 1965: 512 plausibly states that Kallimakhos 'entweder 
die Schlacht doch uberlebte, urn die Weihung dazubringen, oder tot 
war als sie in seinem Namen gemacht wurde.' 
40. Hammond 1997: 515. 
CHAPTER III 
The Second Marathon: the Battle of Miltiades 
Let us return to the Suda entry kboris bzppeis, quoted in the 
beginning of Ch. II as evidence for the second battle of Marathon, 
battle B: 
When Datis invaded Attika they say that the Ionians, after he had 
withdrawn, went up to the trees, and signalled to the Athenians that 
the cavalry were apart. Miltiades, learning of their departure 
(arroxwpllCHS), thus attacked and conguered. Hence the proverb is 
applied to those who break ranks. 
Having repelled the Persian attack in battle A, the Athenians of 
the Suda seemingly lay encamped for some days in their defensive 
position. After his vain attempt to get through towards Athens in 
battle A, Datis made another try, taking the cavalry along a route 
not blocked by the Athenians. Apokboresis smacks of a departure 
by the same way he had come, by sea, for a voyage around Cape 
Sounion to Phaleron and a front attack on Athens. Learning that 
Datis had departed with some of his best forces, Miltiades laun-
ched an assault upon those remaining, without waiting for the 
Spartans and apparently without any discussion having taken place 
in the camp. The Suda does not specify whether Miltiades took the 
enemy by surprise in a night attack, like in Clement of Alexandria 
(Strom. 1.162), or in daylight. 1 
The Suda's l\1iltiades had to share with Kallimakhos the 
glory of persuading the people to encounter the Persians out at 
Marathon, and he only won his victory there after Daqs had 
departed with the cavalry.2 The Byzantine lexicon thus bestows 
less glory on Miltiades than does Herodotos, our principal source 
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for battle B. Before turning to Herodotos, however, we shall have 
a word to say about two monuments in which Kimon propagated 
the role played by his father Miltiades at Marathon: a group of 
bronzes in Delphi and a painting in the Stoa Poikile in Athens. 
Bronzes in Delphi and on the Akropolis of Athens 
In the late 460s, the achievement of Marathon was commemorated 
in Delphi by a group of thirteen statues erected on the ftrst lap of 
the Sacred Way. This was an area ftrst of all for monuments of 
victories won over Sparta or by Sparta, not for the Persian Wars, 
and the thirteen bronzes were not one of two Athenian monu-
ments for the victory at Marathon, as Pausanias (1 0.1 0.1-2) erro-
neously states and as many scholars agree.' The actual Marathon 
memorial from the early 480s was constructed higher up along the 
Sacred Way: the Athenian treasury with the sculptures erected on 
the triangular balustrade against the front of its south wall.4 The 
original inscription on the base of the sculptures says: 'The Athe-
nians ·to Apollo [from the Med]es as ftrst fruits of the battle of 
Marathon.' The thirteen bronzes near the entrance to the holy 
precinct, on the other hand, were erected in commemoration of 
the battle of Oinoe in Argolis in the mid 460s, a joint victory of 
the Athenians and Argives over the Spartans. 5 The monument did 
not show warriors from the actual battle of Oinoe, but rather Mil-
tiades accompanied by such dignitaries as Athena, Apollo, seven of 
the Attic phyle heroes, Kodros, Theseus and Neleus, but unac-
companied by any mortal being, Kallimakhos the polemarch thus 
being conspicuously absent.6 The nearby monument of the Argives 
for the same Oinoe victory was made up of fourteen bronzes (one 
better than the Athenians), again not Oinoe warriors but splendid 
heroes from what we call the mythical past, the Seven against 
Thebes plus their seven Epigone sons. The monument of the 
Athenians was no better a source for the actual battle of Marathon 
than the Argive one was for a historical war between Argos and 
Thebes. But if the lost Athenian monument fails to give infor-
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mation about the actual battle of Marathon, it bears eloquent 
witness, by elevating Miltiades up into the sphere of gods and 
heroes, of the propaganda genius of Kimon in his effort to re-
habilitate his father's memory after his ill-starred campaign against 
Paras and his subsequent condemnation in a lawsuit in Athens. 
Many generations after Kimon's bronzes in Delphi, king 
Attalos of Pergamon immortalized his victory over the Celts with a 
lavish bronze monument on the Akropolis of Athens (Paus. 
1.25.2): 
By the south wall are represented the legendary war with the Giants, 
who once dwelt about Thrakia and on the isthmus of Pallene, the 
battle of the Athenians and the Amazons, the engagement with the 
Persians at Marathon and the destruction o(the Celts in Mysia. Each 
is about two cubits and all were dedicated by Attalos. 
The Attalid monument was a huge one of possibly more than 100 
bronzes of less than life size. They are all lost, but a few marble 
copies from later ages exist. But even if Attalos' Marathon bronzes 
had survived to our day we would hardly have learned more about 
the actual battle than from the thirteen Kimonian bronzes in 
Delphi, and there is no knowing if Kallimakhos was allowed his 
due credit in Attalos' monument. However, the monument is illus-
trative in two other respects. First, the Gigantomachy, a cherished 
motive with the Pergamene kings, was the mythical parallel to their 
own victory over the barbarian Celtic invaders. The other two 
groups, the Battle of Marathon and its prefiguration the Ama-
zonomachy, were compliments paid to the Athenian hosts of the 
monument. The message is that in the days of Marathon, the 
Athenians were the protagonists of Hellenism; now the kings of 
Pergamon have taken over the role of defenders of Hellenic 
civilization. Secondly, a contemporary achievement, in this case the 
victory over the Celts, is elevated to the higher sphere of three 
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earlier immortal deeds. The same was done in an earlier age down 
in the Athenian Agora, in the Kimonian Stoa Poikile. 
Stoa Poikile 
Like the Argives, the Athenians erected a memorial for Oinoe not 
only at Delphi but also in the Agora of their own city, namely the 
Stoa Poikile, built in the late 460s like their Oinoe monument at 
Delphi. The building was first called Peisianakteios as it was com-
missioned by Kimon's brother-in-law Peisianax (after whom Ki-
mon may have named one of his sons), possibly the commander 
of the· Athenian troops at Oinoe in the mid 460s, at the time when 
Kirnon himself was occupied in the war against Thasos. (Before 
Oinoe, Peisianax may have taken part in Kirnon's Skyros campaign 
when he defeated the Dolopian pirates and brought back 'the 
bones of Theseus' to Athens, to be buried in the Theseion. The 
source for this is an Attic bell-krater of c. 440, thought to depend 
on the Amazonomachy painting in the Theseion, or rather in the 
Stoa Poikile. One of the Amazons depicted on the vase is in-
scribed as 'Peisianassa', which seems to refer to Peisianax, whereas 
another is 'Dolope'. The names were obviously attached in the wall 
painting too.) Just as the Attalid monument consisted of four 
bronze groups, the Stoa Poikile was decorated with four paintings, 
as Pausanias explains, seemingly starting with the most important 
picture (1.15.1): 
This stoa contains, first, the Athenians arrayed at Oinoe in the Argive 
territory against the Lakedaimonians. What is depicted is not the 
moment at which the struggle has reached its height and the action 
has advanced to the display of deeds of daring, but the beginning of 
the battle with the combatants still coming to grips. 
The scene resembles the famous seventh-century Chigi vase: two 
armies of hoplites about to come to grips, unsupported by cavalry 
or light-armed troops (p. 21). And although the recent Oinoe 
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victory (which sadly fails to figure in Thukydides and consequently 
in many modern accounts of the period7) was won by the 
Athenians jointly with the Argives (Paus. 10.10.4), no Argives were 
apparently shown in the picture: an over-patriotic version of 
Oinoe as the exclusive triumph of the Athenians, and solely of 
their hoplites. The painting was thus a questionable source for the 
actual battle of Oinoe, which was represented on a par with the 
greatest deeds of the Athenians: 
On the middle part of the walls are the Athenians and Theseus figh-
ting with the Ama;,ons. So, it seems, only the women did not lose 
through their defeats their reckless courage in the face of danger; 
Themiskyra was taken by Herakles, and afterwards the army which 
they dispatched to Athens was destroyed, but nevertheless they came 
to Troy to fight all the Greeks as well as the Athenians themselves. 
Unfortunately Pausanias, rather than giving more information 
about the painting, prefers to reflect on the extraordinary courage 
of the Amazons who had not been annihilated on their unsuc-
cessful invasion of Attika, as some held, but later on came to Troy 
to fight the Greeks. But Aristophanes supplies a bit of information 
by referring to 'the Amazons whom l\fikon painted fighting on 
horseback with the men' (Lys. 678). Mikon's Amazons recall those 
of Herodotos (4.114.3) who declare that they practice the bow and 
javlin and ride horses, and in the picture they will have figured with 
their names attached, with the distinctive headgear and trousers 
well known from sculpture and vase-painting. Like the Parthenos 
shield, the painting will have represented the Amazonian siege of 
the Akropolis,H IZirnon's alter ego Theseus leading Athenian war-
riors characterised by hoplite shield and spear, greaves and hel-
met.~ Athenian horsemen, bowmen or skirmishers were as absent 
as in the Oinoe painting. 
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After the Amazons are the Greeks when they have taken Troy, and 
the kings assembled on account of the reckless behaviour of Ajax 
towards Kassandra; the picture includes Ajax himself and Kassandra 
and other captive women. 
The Athenians of Herodotos refer to their former deeds when 
claiming the privilege of holding the left wing in the Greek line at 
Plataiai in 479.10 After mentioning their war against the invading 
Amazons, they claim to have been inferior to none in the Trojan 
War (9.27.4). Although in the actual fighting of the Iliad the 
Athenians play at best a marginal role, the Eion epigrams of ca. 
470 claim the heroes who fought at Troy as the antecedents of 
contemporary heroes, and the men emerging from the belly of a 
bronze statue of the Wooden Horse dedicated on the Akropolis 
ca. 420 were Menestheus, Teuker and Theseus' sons Akamas and 
Demophon (Paus. 1.23.8). This deed of local heroes would have 
been an obvious object for Polygnotos' painting in the Stoa Poi-
kile. Pausanias fails, however, to record the deed in his detailed 
account of Polygnotos' Ilioupersis painting at Delphi, in the lesche 
of the Knidians, unlike the discussion of the Greek warlords in the 
joint council after Lokrian Ajax' rape of Kassandra (10.25-27). But 
this council is merely one of many themes in the painting at 
Delphi. Unfortunately, Pausanias is much less communicative 
about the painter's Ilioupersis in the Stoa Poikile than about the 
one at Delphi, and one wonders whether Ajax' swearing was so 
predominant in the Stoa as the impression is from Pausanias' brief 
report. The any additional information about the Amazonomachy 
painting in any other source is that one of the 'other captive 
women' was Priam's daughter Laodike, whom Polygnotos gave the 
features of Kimon's sister Elpinike 'when he painted the Trojan 
women in what was then called the Peisianakteion, but is now the 
Stoa Poikile' (Plutarch Kimon 4.6). Laodike had earlier had a love 
affair .with Theseus' son Akamas and secretly borne him a son 
named Mounitos. Theseus' mother Aithra, as a slave-woman in 
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Troy, had reared Mounitos for Laodike, and now she fled with him 
to the Greek camp, where Akamas and Demophon recognised her 
as their long-lost grandmother. Approaching Agamemnon they re-
ceived his approval for her rescue. Aithra, Akamas and Demophon 
were all shown in the painting at Delphi and probably also in the 
Stoa Poikile. Could it be that, against the impression given by 
Pausanias, the family story of Kimon's alter ego Theseus was a 
rather more conspicous theme in the Stoa than the oath of Little 
Ajax? In both the Attalid monument on the Akropolis and the 
Stoa Poikile, the Amazonomachy was the mythical antetype of 
Marathon, as the Gigantomachy was the parallel to the victory 
over the Celts. Was there a similar link betwen the Stoa's Iliou-
persis and Battle of Oinoe, that joint undertaking of the Athenians 
and the Argives? Was the agreement between Agamemnon of 
Argos and the sons of Theseus a mythical antecedent of their joint 
action at Oinoe? If preserved, the Ilioupersis metopes of the 
Parthenon might have given a clue to the Ilioupersis painting in 
the Stoa, but only two of the 32 north metopes are reasonably well 
preserved. Together with number 27, the lost number 26 may have 
formed a two-metope sequence of the rescue of Aithra, but that 
does noe help us much towards a reconstruction of the painting. 
It is a moot question why the sack of Troy, a paradigm of 
sacrilege and excess, was the chosen object for a Stoa Poikile 
painting and for the north metopes of the Parthenon. 11 It is easier 
to grasp why after Herodotos the Trojan War disappears from the 
standard catalogue of the deeds of the Athenians, at least from the 
extant funerary orations. 
After the Battle of Oinoe, the Amazonomachy and the 
Sack of Troy, Pausanias turns to our main concern, the Marathon 
painting, done by either 1\likon, Panaios or Polygnotos: 
The Hoiotians of Plataiai and the Attic contingent arc coming to grips 
with the barbarians. ,\t this point the action is evenly balanced 
between both sides. ln the inner part of the fight are the barbarians 
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fleeing and pushing one another into the marsh. At the extreme end 
of the painting are the Phoinikian ships and the Greeks killing the 
barbarians who are tumbling into them. In this picture is also shown 
Marathon, the hero after whom the plain is named, Theseus, 
represented as coming up from the earth, Athena and Herakles - the 
Marathonians, according to their own account, were the first to 
recognise Herakles as a god. Of the combatants the most con-
spicuous (8~AOL) in the picture are Kallimakhos, who was chosen by 
the Athenians to be polemarch, and of the strateges Miltiades, and a 
hero called Ekhetlos, whom I shall mention later. 
It is somewhat misleading to dub this a historical painting like the 
battle of Oinoe, as against the mythical Amazonomachy and Sack 
of Troy. For by the late 460s, Marathon has already become a 
myth, with gods and heroes participating. Athena herself was of 
course present, not together with the archer Apollo as in the 
'Marathon monument' at Delphi, but with the close combat fighter 
Herakles, who enjoyed a particuar position at Marathon. Pan was 
well-known to have fought on the Greek side, striking the 
barbarians with panic, and he was duly thanked with a statue in his 
cave beyond the Akropolis, but no source attests his presence in 
the painting. t:: The national hero Theseus who had performed his 
earliest deeds at Marathon, came up from the earth (although 'his 
bones' were only buried some twenty years later by Kimon, and in 
Athens, not at Marathon). The local hero Marathon was not 
missing; the plough hero Ekhetlos killed many barbarians wielding 
his ploughshare. 
Unlike the contemporaneous bronze monument at Delphi, 
the picture did show other mortals besides Miltiades. Pausanias 
mentions Kallimakhos, but the victory of the polemarch in battle 
A was conspicuously absent from the painting, and it is queer 
reading that his role 'was fully recognized in the wall-paintings in 
the Stoa Poikile.'13 The writer Herodotus, who like the painting 
only knows of one battle of Marathon, could without problems 
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first present Kallimakhos as the commander of the right wing 
(6.111.1 ), and then (114) give the impression that he was killed in 
the battle at the ships. But unlike a writer, the painter could not 
show Kallimakhos more than once: 14 not as commander-in-chief 
but as a dying hero. This is stated most clearly by Himerios (59.2),* 
pointing out to visiting Ionians in Athens the representation of 
Kallimakhos, who 'looks in the painting rather like one fighting 
than like one dead.' Ps.-Plutarch (Para/lela 1) is likely to have the 
painting in mind when stating, 'Polyzelos, having seen a super-
human apparition, lost his sight and became blind; Kallimakhos 
stood upright though pierced with many spears (dorasz) and 
already dead; Kynegeiros had his hand cut off while grasping a 
Persian ship which was putting out to sea.' Kynegeiros' death was 
depicted at the ships at the end of the battle, and arranging his 
matter more according to theme than to chronology, the painter 
seems to have shown all the deaths of the leading men in that part 
of the painting. 15 The role of leader in the battle was played not by 
Kallimakhos but by Miltiades, as we learn from Aiskhines 3.186, 
Nepos Milt. 6.3, and Aristeides 46.174. Pausanias (4.4.7) could 
hardly have stated that the battle of Marathon had been made 
illustrious by the exceptional valour of one man if indeed the part 
of Kallimakhos in the battle had been 'fully recognized' in the Stoa 
Poikile painting. 
Also represented in the painting were Aiskhylos, Butes, 
Datis and Artaphernes. The Greeks were shown pursuing the 
Persians to the coast and killing them as they were tumbling into 
the ships, whereas Datis seems to have escaped and was already 
safe on board. 16 This was in stark contrast with the Suda. entry 
kboris bippeis, in which Datis, apparently after the unsuccessful 
battle A, will have managed an orderly embarkation with the 
cavalry for an attack on Athens from Phaleron. And it was only 
after Datis' departure that the Suda's Miltiades attacked the 
remaining Persians in the plain in battle B. 
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We notice from Ps.-Demosthenes (59.94) that the Plataians 
'are depicted coming to your aid promptly, each with such speed as 
he can - they are the men who wear the Boiotian helmets.' The 
Plataians were distinguished from the Athenians by their helmets, r: 
while the headgear of the Persians, the 'trousered Medes' of 
Persius (3.53), was obviously the same as that of their Amazon 
prefigurations in the Amazonomachy.1H 
Ailianos (De nat. animalium 7.38) records that a dog was 
depicted together with his master (just as hoplites often have their 
dogs with them on vase-paintings), but no literary source mentions 
any horses on the Greek side in the painting. On the Persian side, 
Himerios (6.20) records horsemen in flight, and the Roman 
Brescia sarcophagus, probably a copy of the right extremity of the 
Stoa Poikile picture, shows a rider being killed and unhorsed: a 
Persian fighting against Greek hoplites. The south frieze of the 
Nike temple on the Akropolis may also somehow be indebted to 
the Stoa Poikile picture. The relief shows Athenian hoplites 
fighting without the support of archers or cavalry, against Persians, 
who have both archers on foot and cavalry. And Athenian vase-
paintings of the fifth century frequently depict Greek hoplites 
fighting against Persian bowmen. 19 On the Brescia sarcophagus, a 
Persian seems to hack off the hand of Kynegeiros with an axe, not 
a sword, and Kallimakhos was more probably depicted as pierced 
with Persian arrows and javelins (toxeumata and blemata, 
Polemon 1.7) than with spears (the dorasi of Ps.-Plutarch). The 
chances are that the Athenians depicted in the four paintings of 
the Stoa were all heavy infantrymen, characterised with hoplite 
helmet, round shield, spear, sword and greaves; cavalry and archery 
were left to Amazons and Persians?) 
As Pausanias informs us, the paintings of the battle of Oinoe 
and the Trojan War both showed a single moment only, the 
former the moment immediately before the Athenian and Spartan 
armies came to blows, and the latter the aftermath of the Trojan 
War. The Amazonomachy, on the other hand, will have shown a 
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developing sequence of fighting scenes, and the same is true of its 
parallel, the tainted Marathon picture: three successive phases of 
the struggle were combined into a seemingly contemporaneous 
whole. There was no place in the painting for the decision taken in 
Athens to charge against the Persians, and the defensive battle A 
led by Kallimakhos was also omitted. The first phase of the battle 
was a parallel to the Oinoe painting, showing the moment when 
1\liltiades exhorted his hoplites to attack and when the two armies 
came to blows. The second phase was when the Athenian assault 
put the enemy to flight, the third being the fight at the Persian 
ships and the heroic deaths sustained there. Unlike a writer, the 
painter was unable to develop the entire story step by step from 
the decision of the Athenians to march out from Athens to 
Marathon, to the fight at the Persian ships, to say nothing of the 
subsequent events at Phaleron. In the picture, the scene was 
restricted to Marathon proper, covering an unspecified period of 
time from the arrival of the Plataians to the left, to the fight at the 
ships and the flight of the Persian ships to the right. As against the 
Oinoe picture, which failed to show any Argives taking part, the 
Marathon painting refrained from the we-did-it-alone boast21 by 
actually showing the aid coming in from Plataiai. Being a monu-
ment to the recent victory over Sparta, the Stoa showed, in con-
trast to the tardy Spartans who arrived too late for the battle of 
Marathon, the Plataians who did arrive in time to play their heroic 
role. The point of the painter was the fact that the Plataians did 
join the Athenians, not that they did so out at Marathon rather 
than in Athens, as they do in Nepos et al. (Unlike the Athenians 
of the Suda and Nepos, those of the painting did not need the 
encouraging arrival of the Plataians in Athens to make their heroic 
decision to march out and confront the Persians at Marathon.) In 
fact, the Plataians may have left for home after the repulse of the 
Persians in battle A and after burying their dead. But their parti-
cipation at Marathon was required in the painting, and so they 
were depicted in its tainted version of l\liltiades' battle B. 22 
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What about the pamtmg and actual history? According to 
Pausanias, its first part showed a phase when 'the action is evenly 
balanced between both sides.' This may be the hard-fought first 
phase of battle B, in which the Athenians sustained their heaviest 
losses. The fallen citizens from both battles A and B were 
apparently all buried in battlefield B, where the Soros mound was 
later thrown up over their graves. Then 'in the inner part of the 
fight are the barbarians fleeing and pushing one another into the 
marsh.' This may refer to a second phase of fighting some 3.5 kms 
further northeast, near the Great Marsh. In this place, IZimon later 
replaced an impromptu trophy set up right after the battle by a 
permanent one. This monument of white marble is mentioned by 
Pausanias (1.32.5)23 and parts of it have been recovered near the 
church of Panaghia Mesosporitissa: an Ionic column bearing a 
marble statue.24 'At the extreme end of the painting are the 
Phoinikian ships and the Greeks killing the barbarians who are 
tumbling into them.' It may well be that fighting ensued on the 
Skhoinia beach, at Persian ships that remained after the departure 
of the main force; Aiskhylos' brother Kynegeiros was probably 
wounded there, and a handful of enemy ships were captured. But 
the Datis of the Suda's khoris hippeis, who was probably identical 
with the Datis of history, was far off by that time, not fleeing but 
rounding Cape Sounion for an attack on the city. The late lexicon 
is therefore a better source than the early painting. But if the 
painting gave a most tainted version of the events at Marathon by 
omitting Kallimakhos' battle A, so the Soros and the monument 
of white marble can possibly be taken to testify that the depicted 
version was more than pure fantasy. But what about its apparent 
representation of all the Greek marathonomakhoi as hoplites, no 
role being played by other arms? We shall turn to that question 
below. 
In the Marathon narrative of Herodotos, the gods and heroes of 
the Marathon painting are all absent. No Athena here and no 
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Theseus, the national hero and Kimon's alter ego; not the local 
hero Marathon or the plough-hero Ekhetlos. Herakles, whom the 
Marathonians were the first to recognise as a god, fails to fulfll an 
active role in the narrative of the historian, but the hard-won 
triumph at Marathon and the walk-over victory on the opposite 
coast were both won after the Athenians had been encamped in a 
Herakleion. But despite the absence of gods and heroes in the 
narration of the historian, it seems established, against the view of 
a few scholars,25 that the painting in the Stoa was an influential 
source for Herodotos' account of Marathon,"(' whether or not he 
ever visited the battlefield himself. In addition to the exaggerated 
role of Kimon's father, we note such extraordinary features as the 
hacking off of the hand of Kynegeiros with an axe and the 
blinding of Epizelos. 
Also from the painting probably derives Herodotos' 
statement that the Plataians arrived not in Athens, as in Nepos and 
other sources, but at Marathon, joining the Athenians as they were 
arrayed in the temenos of Herakles (6.108.1). No source mentions 
a Herakleion in the painting, but at its left end where the Plataians 
joined the Athenians, Herakles was probably shown as the pro-
prietor of his sanctuary. In fact the Plataians are more likely to 
have come to Athens, like the Spartans when they belatedly did 
come to the aid of the Athenians (6.120). As stated by Casson/7 
'there is no direct communication between Plataea and Marathon. 
The road from Plataea to Athens is straightforward enough, but 
the only way to reach Marathon without first going to Athens 
would be by going first to Thebes and thence to Eleon and 
Oropus and across the spurs of Mt. Parnes to Aphidna and so to 
the northern end of the plain of Marathon, and this would be a 
considerably longer march and a much more difficult road than if 
they went direct to Athens and then to Marathon by the coast 
route.' The call of the Athenians to the Plataians and Spartans and 
possibly other states must have been an earlier one to Athens, not 
one to Marathon only after the Persians had landed there. 
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In both the Nepos et a/. version and that of Herodotos, 
the arrival of the Plataians is followed by a discussion, some being 
in favour of waiting for the Spartan reinforcements and Miltiades 
urging a hasty move. In the plausible version of Nepos and the 
Miltiades decree, the discussion takes place in Athens and the 
move is one out to Marathon. Herodotos, on the other hand 
(6.109-10), locates his curious discussion out at Marathon, the 
move being from the defensive position in, as it seems, a hoplite 
attack upon the enemy out in the open plain. Next we get the 
notorious 1500 m race of the Athenians in full armour (112.1) -
probably Herodotos' own invention. No ancient source claims two 
discussions, one in Athens and another out at Marathon. Two dis-
cussions are an invention of modern scholarship, Nepos allegedly 
having 'fused into one two occasions when Miltiades gained his 
way and established his authority, one at Athens and the other at 
the Heracleum.'2s And the discussion at Marathon which reappears 
in a host of modern scholars2~ is 'both unlikely and undesirable,' as 
C l . 'Ill asson apt y puts lt. 
The right end of the picture showed the battle at the ships 
in which Kynegeiros had his hand hacked off with an axe. Most 
likely the heroic deaths of the leading Athenians were all shown in 
this part, wherefore Herodotos locates the deaths of the polem-
arch Kallimakhos and the stratege Stesilaos in this area (114). In 
actual fact, Kallimakhos will not have fallen in l\1iltiades' battle B, 
the object of the painting; he will have died after his own battle A, 
from wounds inflicted there. Also from the painting, in which the 
fleeing Persians were shown tumbling into their ships, must come 
Herodotos' odd idea that immediately after suffering defeat in the 
plain, most of the Persians managed to escape their pursuers by 
going· on board their ships and sailing off. It could also be that 
Herodotos' report of seven captured enemy ships was derived 
from the painting? 
In the Stoa painting, the Greek warriors at Marathon were 
evidently all hoplites, fighting against (but for one giant hoplite) 
THE BATTLE OF MILTIADES 57 
trousered archers, mounted or not. As stated in Ch. I, Herodotos 
does not say in so many words that his marathonomakhoi were all 
hoplites, but he gives that impression by having them attacking the 
enemy unsupported by cavalry or archers (6.112.2). He cannot, 
however, have had it from the painting that they were the flrst to 
endure the sight of Persian dress (112.3). This must be his own 
odd idea; or should we blame it upon his guide to the Stoa, if 
indeed he did employ one? 
The painting of l'vWtiades' victory cannot, however, have 
been Herodotos' sole source for Marathon. Although Herodotos 
follows the Stoa painting in omitting Kallimakhos' battle A, in 
which the attack was delivered by the Persians with foot and horse, 
he does leave some traces of it, whoever his source was. After 
suppressing the role of Kallimakhos by saying that it was the ten 
strateges who led the Athenians out to Marathon (103.1), he goes 
on to state, contrary to the paining, that in the battle the right wing 
was commanded by the polemarch (111.1), which would notmally 
mean that he was in supreme command. The Greeks were not only 
drawn up for battle B which did come about (111-112) but also 
several days earlier (1 08.1 ), apparently for the missing battle A. 
The Persians were also arrayed for this missing battle, for it was 
while Hippias upon landing at Marathon was arraying (etasse) the 
barbarians that he lost a tooth in the sand - drawing them up for 
the offensive battle A which fails to ensue in Herodotos' narrative. 
When Herodotos' battle after several days did come about, the 
Greeks had thinned out their line to make it equal that of the 
Persians in length (111.3), which means that the Persians had already 
formed their line and were on the offensive - battle A, not B. 
The Athenian-biter Theopompos rightly complained 
(FGrHist 115 F 153, 154) of the habit of magnifying Marathon and 
other accomplishments of Athenian history, but the two fragments 
sadly do not indicate which version of Marathon it was he objected 
to. But Plutarch (Mor. 862d) might have Theopompos in mind 
when referring with indignation to 'those' who dubbed Marathon 
58 CHAPTER III 
no real agon but only a brief obstacle for the barbarians when they 
landed. Is it Miltiades' battle B rather than Kallimakhos' battle A 
that is dismissed in this way? 
Today we may follow in the footsteps of Theopompos, 
questioning the notion of the Marathon accomplishment as being 
due to the hoplites only. Herodotos may be right in that in the 
offensive battle B in the open plain, the Athenians - viz. the 
Athenian hoplites - fought without the support of bowmen, the 
typical Persian arm. But the defensive battle A was an altogether 
differ~nt matter. As stated in Ch. I, for warding off an assault on 
their defensive position, not only hoplites but all possible sources 
of manpower must have been significant, skilled and unskilled 
men, citizens and metics, free and unfree; unskilled stonecasters 
and javelin-men as well as specialist archers and stingers. And we 
doubt that the Athenians who mustered numerous light-armed 
warriors and ship crews against the Persian invaders in 480-479, 
could in 490 ask other states to send troops if they would only use 
a fraction of their own manpower. But what is the evidence for the 
existence and participation of non-hoplites? 
As for archers in about 490, Athenian vase-paintings of the 
sixth century depict hoplites and bowmen side by side, the hoplites 
being accompanied by archers whether they are arming themselves 
at home or leaving for battle.32 The Themistokles decree of 480, 
whatever its value for early fifth-century events, speaks of four 
bowmen on each of 200 ships. And Herodotos' own 8,000 
Athenian hoplites at Plataiai in 479 were attended by a group of 
archers, Masistios' horse being felled by an Athenian arrow (9.22.1, 
60.3). And though proof is unattainable, it seems likely that archers 
participated in 490 too. In the battle of Plataiai, each hoplite was 
accompanied by a light-armed attendant, whatever their actual 
armament (9.29.2), and it is hard to see why it should it have been 
otherwise at Marathon. Now Pausanias states that the Athenian 
army of 9,000 at Marathon included both citizens above regular 
military age and slaves (10.20.2), and in the battlefield of Marathon 
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he records two grave mounds. On the plain he saw the mound of 
the Athenians, with stelai giving the names of the killed according 
to their tribes.D (He does not say whether those buried under the 
Soros and listed on the stelai were hoplites only, or also citizen 
light-armed infantry.) 'And there is another grave for the Boiotians 
from Plataiai and for the slaves, for slaves fought then for the first 
time' (Paus. 1.32.3). The slaves, whether those set free by Miltiades 
and the Athenians before the battle (Paus. 7 .15. 7) or private 
armour-bearers, are more likely to have served as bowmen or 
other light infantry than as hoplites.14 The absence of bowmen in 
Herodotos' narrative is hardly due to the archery force first being 
organised after 490," and other light-armed warriors are scarcely 
missing from his text because they failed to participate at 
Marathon. 11' Their absence in Herodotos is rather sheer hoplite 
ideology,17 Marathon being presented as the triumph of sturdy, 
hand-to-hand fighting, speedy, and respectable hoplites. As for 
Pausanias' mention of citizens above military age, there is no 
knowing how they were armed, only that they may have been 
useful for defensive fighting in battle A. They were of questionable 
use for a hoplite battle B in the plain - even should some of them 
have been physically fit for a Herodotean old boys 1500 m in 
heavy hop lite armour. Some of those below and above military age 
must have been left behind in the city as a home-guard wh~n the 
army marched out to Marathon, but in 490 Heroclotos has room 
for no one but fast hoplites. 
Also lacking from the Marathon narrative of Heroclotos were 
horsemen, and a cavalry corps would hardly have been of much 
use in blocking the route towards Athens to the Persians. 1H On the 
battlefield of Plataiai in 479, an Athenian on horseback was sent as 
a messenger (9.54), but using horses for soliciting aiel from far 
distant Sparta would have required a regular system of staging 
1~ posts where one could change horses. We may therefore accept 
Heroclotos' statement that the runner Philippicles (or Pheidippicles) 
relied on his own feet, having a horse in his name only; but it is 
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harder to swallow his idea that he covered the distance Athens-
Sparta. some 240 km. in two days, with time for a conversation 
with the god Pan on Mt. Parthenion near Tegea (6.105.1, 106.1).411 
In Herodotos, we have to do without the first runner of a 42 kms 
Marathon race, the man who announced in Athens the news of the 
victory only to fall dead to the ground. He only figures in later 
sources, whether his name was Philippides (Lukianos, pro lapsu 
3), Thersippos (Herakleides of Pontos) or Eukles 'who ran in his 
armour, hot from the battle' (so most writers according to Plut. 
Mor. 347c), not one single horse apparently being available out at 
Marathon.41 It is acceptable that a genuine cavalry corps was 
lacking at Marathon but hardly that no individual had a horse on 
offer,. no officer like Kallimakhos or Miltiades, not Kallias who 
dedicated the statue of a horse to Apollo in Delphi after the battle 
(Paus. 10.18.1 ), none of the wealthy citizens who took part in the 
Panathenaic and other games with their horses, and no hoplite 
who had ridden his horse from Athens to Marathon, to dismount 
there and fight on foot. 42 Thus later writers follow in the foot-
steps of Herodotos, presenting Marathon as a pure hoplitic 
achievement. 
Nor was the Stoa Poikile painting or Herodotos the first to 
enhance the role of the hoplites in the Persian Wars. In his 
Persians of 472 BC, Aiskhylos has Atossa ask the chorus of 
Persian elders about the Athenians (11. 239-240), 'Do they fight 
with bow and arrow?' The answer is 'Not at all. Spears for close 
combat and shield-bearing armour.' And indeed in the tragedy the 
victory in the battle of Salamis is due to a large extent to the 
hoplites, who fought on Psyttaleia 'with well-made arms of 
bronze.' Unlike Herodotos at Marathon, however, Aiskhylos 
concedes that in the island, the Persians were also struck by rocks 
and arrows- obviously sent by stone-throwers and archers (11. 447-
464). After Herodotos, Marathon is praised again and again as a 
hoplitic achievement, in Aristophanes (Ach. 181, Clouds 986, 
Wasp~ 1075-1090). in funerary orations, 4' in Plato (Rep. 347b-d, 
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Laws 707a-d), in Aristotle (Pol. 1326a). If the victory at Salamis 
belonged mostly to the poorer citizens manning the fleet (apart 
from the fictitious hoplite engagement at Psyttaleia in Aiskhylos 
and Hdt. 8.95), Marathon was viewed as the triumph of the land-
owning Athenian hoplites.44 
Also absent from the Herodotean account of Marathon is the 
Athenian navy. The motive he gives to the Persians for landing at 
Marathon is that it was near Eretria and the most suitable place for 
deploying cavalry - as if they came to Marathon to fight a battle 
there, not for a straight march towards Athens (6.102). And having 
lost at Marathon and headed round Cape Sounion to Phaleron, the 
cause of their surprising retreat was apparently the presence of the 
rapid Athenian hoplites (at inland Kynosarges, not on the beach of 
Phaleron). No word is uttered about the fleet of 70 ships that 
l\Wtiades would take the next year on his expedition against Paras 
(6.132): the navy is non-existent in Herodotos' report of the year 
490, having no say when the Persians preferred Marathon for 
Phaleron as an undisturbed place of landing,45 or when they later 
decided to sail off from Phaleron. When soliciting Spartan aid 
before Marathon, it might have been an idea to send the 
messenger by a fast vessel to Thyrea, modern Astros, and let him 
run from there to Sparta. But there was no more room for ships 
than for horses in the year 490. In the next two chapters I shall 
deal with the fleet. 
Herodotos and the Camp at the Herakleion 
As argued in Ch. II, the encampment of the Greeks in battle A 
was most likely in the inland Vrana area. Herodotos, omitting 
battle A, locates the camp of the Athenians in which they were 
allegedly joined by the Plataians, at a Herakleion (6.108.1); and 
after the hard-fought battle they, 'coming from the Herakleion in 
Marathon, encamped in another Herakleion, the one in 
Kynosarges,' before winning their walk-over victory (116) - a 
supernatural coincidence in the eyes of the historian.46 As attested 
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by the two inscribed stones, the Herakleion was located at Valaria, 
not inland near Vrana.47 There are two options here. First, 
Herodotos may be right about camp at the the Herakleion, for 
when Miltiades after battle A and the death of Kallimakhos was 
informed of the withdrawal of Datis with a substantial part of his 
troops, he may have moved the camp from the Vrana area to the 
locality of V alaria. And charging out from the encampment he 
defeated the remaining enemies out in the open plain. 
Alternatively, Herodotos has misunderstood an oral 
source. The Marathonian Herakles bore the epithet Empylios, 'he 
who is at the gates', and the narrow strip of dry land between 
Agrieliki and the sea was apparently called Pylai. After their victory 
in battle B, the Athenians will have left the plain by this gateway, 
hastening across Attika by the main road. And according to 
Herodotos they did not only take up a position at the Kynosarges 
Herakleion outside the city walls but even pitched camp 
(estratopedeusanto) there. But the idea of the warriors pitching 
camp right outside the city walls rather than seeking protection 
inside is very odd. Herodotos may have heard of the hasty return 
of the army from the Herakleion at Marathon to the one at 
Kynosarges, meaning from the gateway of Marathon to the gates 
of Athens. The historian took this to mean that the army had been 
encamped at the Marathon sanctuary and that they pitched camp at 
Kynosarges. Now Herodotos must be mistaken in stating that the 
Plataians joined the Athenians not in Athens but at the 
Marathonian Herakleion, and so we may be entitled to reject the 
alleged camp at the Marathonian Herakleion no less than the one 
at Kynosarges. If so, there was no more than one Greek camp at 
Marathon, pitched by the Athenians and Plataians in the Vrana 
area after their joint march out from Athens. 
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NOTES 
1. Schachermeyr 197 4: 98, 105, 108 thinks that the Suda's source was a 
Hellenistic paroimiograph who in his turn depended on a logograph 
or an author of a Persika or an Atthis, 'etwa an die des Hellanikos,' 
rather than on Ephoros. 
2. How 1919: 55, noting that in Nepos Milt. 5.4, the Persians in the 
battle only used 100,000 of the 200,000 foot soldiers they had in 4.1, 
suggests a faint trace of the tradition that half their force had taken 
ship again for Phaleron. Munro 1899: 195 'if we suppose that the 
brigade for Athens, including the cavalry, was already embarked and 
under way when the Athenians assumed the offensive, we avoid the 
most serious difficulties.' Cf. Wecklein 1876: 274, following Curtius, 
and Lehmann-Haupt 1922. 
3. e.g. Gauer 1968: 25, 51-64; Raubitschek 197 4. Pomp tow 1924: 1216-
1217 is an exception, denying that the monument was a dekate from 
Marathon. 
4. The treasury is dated after Marathon by Pausanias 1 0.11.5. Scholarly 
opinion is sharply divided. In my view, Amandry 1998 and 0stby 
2003: 45-48 argue persuasively for the 480s. Francis 1990: 101 even 
opts for the 4 70s. Like most literature in German, Gauer 1980: 130 
says pre-Marathon, placing the Amazonomachy shown in the six 
front metopes in Amazonland, not in Attika. Cf. Boardman 1982. 
5. Schreiner 1997: 28. 
6. Against Stahler 1991: 197 who takes 'das Fehlen des als Polemarch 
massgeblichen Kallimakhos' in the monument as an argument that 
the Miltiades depicted was not the hero of Marathon but his uncle. 
7. For Oinoe literature cf. Schreiner 1997: 24. Add Taylor 1998 who 
replaces Argive Oinoe with the Attic border fortress Oinoe. The 
author makes 'no attempt to survey all the scholarly literature on 
Oinoe' (p. 223, n. 1). Throughout antiquity the Oinoe painting will 
have been admired, and the battle discussed, by thousands of visitors 
to the Stoa. It is food for thought that but for two mentions in 
Pausanias, the battle would have passed into the oblivion to which 
several scholars in fact condemn it. 
8. Harrison 1966. 
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9. Amazons tend to be archers but Amazon hoplites do occur, wearing 
helmets of Oriental type, Lissarrague 1990: 33, or Greek type, D.J.R. 
Williams 1977. Cf. also Boardman 1982 on Amazonian equipment. 
10. Herodotos implies that in 479, the Athenians prevailed with such 
arguments, unlike in 88 BC when their envoys to Sulla talked in lofty 
strains about Theseus and Eumolpos and the Persian Wars. Sulla 
had not, however, been sent to Athens to learn its history, but to 
subdue its rebels, Plut. S u !Ia 13.4. 
11. Ferrari 2000. 
12. Harrison 1972a: 366 thinks that also Pan, Demeter, and Kore were 
shown. Herodotos 6.105 attests that Pan promised his aid to 
Philippides/Pheidippides, and Simonides (fr. 133 Bgk.) that in the 
battle, the god struck the Persians with panic. According to Lukianos 
Philops. 3, the Athenians insisted that Pan had come from Arkadia 
to Marathon to take hand in the battle. Hermes subscribes to this in 
Bis accus. 9-10, as does Pan himself, complaining that the Athenians 
thank him with no more than two or three sacrifices a year of a 
stinking he-goat. 
13. OCD2 s.v. Callimachus. Cf. Evans 1993: 306 'The Stoa Poikile 
promoted non-partisan pride in the victory.' Harrison 1972a: 369 the 
painting 'may have presented history in a slanted or propagandistic 
manner which would have emphasized certain aspects of the battle 
at the expense of others, but it cannot simply have invented history.' 
Hammond 1973: 190 'it is certain that this record of the battle was 
correct in its facts.' Kinzl 1977: 214 n. 85 'The painting in the S loa 
poikile is the prime and ultimate source of the literary tradition ... a 
distorted one from the outset.' Prost 1997: 32 'La peinture de 
Marathon n'est pas au service exclusif de la famille de Cimon: elle 
sert l'aristocratie et ses valeurs en general.' 
14. Against Massaro 1978: 461-468 who argues for no less than three 
panels. Wycherley 1972: 78 and HOlscher 1973: 242 n. 11 put right 
my theory of two panels, Schreiner 1970: 102. As against continuous 
compositions in which each figure is represented only once, in 
Massaro's three-panel Marathon picture certain individuals would 
need to appear more than once, among them Kallimakhos, allegedly 
displayed in the first panel as commander-in-chief and in the third as 
fighting although mortally wounded. Holscher 1973: 54 'Jede Figur 
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erschien nur einmal im Bild, jede an dem Ort ihrer personlichen 
Aufgabe oder ihres charakteristischen Schicksals.' 
15. Against Harrison 1971, 1972 who, referring to Polemon, argues that 
the painting showed the dying Kallimakhos in the centre of the 
battle. HCilscher 1973: 67 'Das Ende war gepragt von den Einzel-
thaten des Kallimachos, Kynegeiros, Epizelos.' 
16. Harrison 1972a: 366; HCilscher 1973: 59. 
17. Already in the Oinoe painting of the late 460s, the Spartans may have 
been shown with a lambda in their shields and with helmets no more 
made of metal (fyrtaios fr. 8, 1.31), but of stiffened felt, cf. Thuk. 
4.34.2, the year 425. The Spartans had no helmets according to 
Philostratos, G_ymn. 9. 
18. Lissarrague 1990: 32 'L'armee perse est representee sur le modele de 
celle des Amazoncs. Les memes types guerriers se retrouvent chez 
ces deux "pcuples", et il n'est pas necessaire d'insister sur le sens 
metaphorique de bon nombre d'amazonomachies du Vc siecle.' It 
has been discussed whether the battered west metopes of the 
Parthenon showed Amazons or Persians. Only a female breast 
speaks in favour of Amazons. 
19. Lissarrague 1990: 29-30 'A. Bovon et, apres elle, T. Holscher ont 
montre comment les peintres avaient construit une image du Perse 
qui permet de I' opposer en tous points a celle de l'hoplite.' 
20. Miller 1997: 6 may be too optimistic in stating that 'very probably, 
careful attention was paid to details of Persian armour and 
equipment.' 
21. Cf. e.g. Plato, Laws 699. 
22. An epigram quoted by Lykourgos Leocr. 19 fails to mention the 
Plataians as joint victors of Marathon with the Athenians. It is 
quoted in Suda s.v. Poikile with the impression that it stood beneath 
the painting, but there is no knowing that it was an original from the 
late 460s. 
23. Cf. Aristophanes Knights 1334, Wasps 7112, ~ys. 285, Kritias Diels-
Kranz, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker II 377. 
24. Vanderpool 1966b; Petrakos 1996: 26-30. 
25. How & Wells 1912: 354; Macao 1895: 229; Holscher 1973: 239 n. 
186 'Das entspricht sicher nicht der Arbeitsweise Herodots.' 
26. Robert 1895: 26; Jeffery 1965; Bicknell 1970: 430; Harrison 1972a: 
370; Massaro 1978; Francis & Vickers 1985: 109; Viviers 198-7: 297; 
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Nenci 1998: 275. Harrison 1972b: 401-402 thinks that Herodotos 
also based his account of the preparations for Marathon on an 
unattested painting she claims in the Theseion. 
27. Casson 1914/5: 73, against Burn 1977: 91 'there was no need for 
them to march by way of Athens.' 
28. Hammond 1973: 212. Cf. Hamel 1988: 166. Gottlieb 1963: 61-62 
has two discussions, one in Athens before the Persian landing at 
Marathon and another at Marathon before the battle. 
29. e.g. Wecklein 1876: 274; Hignett 1963: 70; Shrimpton 1980: 25-26. 
Burn 1962: 241 n. 12 and c;reen 1996: 34 question the debate 
described by Herodotos. 
30. Casson 1914/5: 72, against Swoboda 1884 and How 1919: 53. 
31. Schilling 1895: 265 is right in stating that the number of ships 
captured by the Athenians would have been much greater than seven 
if Herodotos' version of the battle had been correct. Embarkation of 
a great army is not feasible right after a defeat. 
32. Cf. Lissarrague 1990: 45-53. 
33. One of the stelai has reportedly been found in the villa of Herodes 
Atticus at Astros. 
34. Evans 1984: 16, against Hunt 1998: 27, 34-37 who also has the 
35,000 Spartan helots at Plataiai serving as hoplites. Labarbe 1957: 
170 oddly thinks that the slaves were freed and equipped with 
hoplite armour out at Marathon. So also Vidal-Naquet 1986: 91. 
35. So Wardman 1959: 55; Bugh 1988: 13. Against the Herodotean 
Pritchett 1965: 91 'the passage in 6.112.2 must be taken to prove that 
the Athenians did not have archers and horsemen.' 
36. Curtius 1874: 20 has 9,000 citizens accompanied by their slaves 
'welche ihnen als Schildknappen dienten und als Leichtbewaffnete 
rnitfechten konnten.' Duncker 1888: 126 estimates more than 9,000 
hoplites and 'eben so viele leichtbewaffnete,' since 'auf jeden 
Hopliten ein Leichtbewaffneter zu rechnen ist.' Bcloch 1914: 21 
assumes 6-7,000 Athenian hoplites and 'mindestens die gleiche Zahl 
leichterer Truppen.' Burn 1962: 248 plausibly asserts that light-
armed were present 'but for the kind of battle which Miltiades meant 
to fight, they were useless.' They were far from useless, however, for 
Kallimakhos' battle A, which of course is as missing in Burn as in 
Herodotos. Berthold 1976/7: 86 thinks that Athens had no regular 
light infantry at the time. Vidal-Naquet 1986: 91 is faithful to the 
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tradition that presents Marathon as an exemplary hoplite battle. 'The 
battle itself conforms in the strictest sense to the rules of archaic and 
classical combat.' So we are asked to believe that the Athenians who 
employed at least 34,000 seamen at Artemision in 480, and who 
ventured to ask other states for aid in 490, used their own manpower 
most incompletely at Marathon (p. 92)! Some apt statements by van 
Wees 1995 are worth quoting: 'It would be a truly remarkable 
example of the power of ideology if hoplites went so far as to 
deprive themselves of the support of a group of men at least as 
numerous as they, unencumbered by heavy armour, more ~obile 
and better able to cope with mountainous terrain. There is, in fact, 
some evidence to suggest that light infantry was considerably less 
maq,rinal in actual battle than it was in ancient perceptions and 
accounts of battle' (p. 162). Herodotos and Thukydides, 'in 
attributing military success and failure almost exclusively to the 
heavy infantry, are reflecting the hoplite ideology that the well-off 
deservedly enjoy political power because no one but they 
contributed decisively to the defence of the state' (p. 165). 'Political 
bias thus pervades ancient accounts, not only of constitutional and 
political history, but also of warfare, and the modern historian 
should treat these with caution' (p. 170). 
37. Hanson 2000: 211 'Herodotos wrote more about the ideology of the 
hoplite than any other Greek historian.' 
38. It is contested whether Athens had a ret,>ular cavalry corps in about 
500, as Pollux Onom. 8.108 states and as appears from black-figured 
Athenian vases, e.g. those showing tryouts for entrance to the 
cavalry. For the existence of cavalry, e.g. Alfoldi 1967; Evans 1984: 
98; against e.g. Rosivach 2000: 41. 
39. As kindly pointed out to me by H. van Wees. 
40. Hammond, that brisk walker, back in 1973: 224 had wretched 
Philippides reaching Sparta in two days and starting immediately on 
the return. In 1997: 507 he allowed Philippides a day's rest in Sparta 
before speeding back to Athens on the 11th of Boedromi9n, his 
news being relayed to Marathon the same day! Lazenby 1993: 52 
states that in the 1980s, some Englishmen showed that it is perfectly 
feasible to run to Sparta in two days. As if Philippides in 490 BC ran 
on modern roads with modern footwear. The journey to Sparta in 
two days is accepted e.g. by Frost 1979, 160. 
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41. Rawlings 2000: 247 seems to accept Eukles' running in hoplite 
armour from Marathon to Athens. Contra Siewert 1990: 126 who 
aptly dubs 'ein Lauf in vollcr Riistung tiber 40 km ebenso unmoglich 
wie auch unsinnig.' 
42. Burn 1962: 242 'Men of the 'equestrian class' may have ridden to the 
front, though once there they would dismount to fight in the 
'modern' manner.' 
43. Loraux 1986: 37 'the epitaphioi have no other subject than "the 
Athenians," that homogenous body of warriors whose mentality is 
implicitly hoplitic.' Strauss 2000b: 262 'The seamen were under-
represented in the funeral oration.' 
44. West 1970; Loraux 1973: 42 "Marathon" a occulte ... Marathon, 
1986: 157-171; Vanotti 1991: 16; Spence 1993:165-179. 
45. Lazenby 1993: 50 states that 'the Persians probably did not fear that 
a landing there (at Phaleron) would be contested,' for like his hero, 
Herodotos, he fails to ask what the Athenian navy was up to in 490. 
Hunt 1998: 27 'The Athenians had no significant navy at this time 
and so the thetes ... were playing no role in the war.' Doenges 1998: 
3 'A landing at Phaleron with a superior cavalry force putting 
immediate pressure on the city had every prospect of success. 
Athens' preemptive war with Aigina eliminated that option.' Correct, 
but he might have asked what the victorious fleet from that 
preventive war was up to in the year of Marathon. Cf. p. 5 'As it 
turned out, the campaign involved no naval action.' 
46. N enci 1998: 296 'Per Erodoto, Ia battaglia di Maratona si svolse 
sotto Ia protezione di Eracle, eroe civilisatore, e dunque primo 
trionfatore della civilta sulla barbaric.' 
47. Pindar Pyth. 8.79 is of little help in locating the Herakleion in 'the 
nook of Marathon' which thus suits both the Vrana and the Valaria 
area. Nor is there any help in Lukianos Theon ekklesia 7, who 
locates the Herakleion near the grave of Eurystheus. 
CHAPTER IV 
The First Naval Bill ofThemistokles 
Just as our sources present two battles of Marathon, they also give 
two naval bills moved by Themistokles. After quelling the Ionian 
revolt in 494, the Persians, in preparation for a punitive expedition 
against Eretria and Athens, concluded an alliance with Aigina, the 
enemy of Athens. In the first place, the Athenians enlarged their 
fleet for a preventive war against Aigina. After Marathon, when 
another retaliatory invasion by the Persians was imminent, a se-
cond shipbuilding programme was voted for, this time against the 
Persians themselves. In Themistokles' archonship, 493/2, the 
Athenians initiated the fortification of Piraeus as an up-to-date 
harbour for the fleet that was being strengthened by the first naval 
bill (hereafter bill A). 1 The fortification of Piraeus was only com-
pleted after the Persian Wars, so that evacuation within solid Pi-
raean circuit walls was not an option in 480 and 4 79. But thanks to 
Themistokles' second naval bill (bill B), the fleet of Athens was 
sufficiently increased to render possible the victory in the battle of 
Salamis. 
In 187 4, Curti us found it likely that the construction of new ship-
yards and new ships was concomitant with Themistokles'. forti-
fication of Piraeus in the late 490s, and in 1884 one Themistoklean 
naval bill before and another after Marathon were plausibly 
claimed by Holzapfel, whereas Duncker in 1888 dated the first bill 
in 487 and the second in 483.2 After the publication of Aristotle's 
Athenaion politeia in 1891, the only spokesmen for two bills 
seem to be Garland and van Wees. The former unfortunately fails 
to follow up his observation/ whereas the latter in a note plausibly 
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claims a major shipbuilding programme carried out in the 490s, to 
be associated with the early career of Themistokles; then in 483 he 
increased the number of ships.4 Two bills are likewise asserted by 
Labarbe, one financed with silver from Laurion and the other with 
silver from Maroneia. But in his most valuable book Labarbe un-
fortunately dates both bills in 483.5 
Just as scholars believe in just one battle of Marathon in 
490, they regularly claim only one naval bill, not in 493 but in 483. 
This would mean that Athens had only a negligible fleet in the year 
of Marathon, in spite of the fact that in 489, they were able to send 
70 ships against Paras. We are told that this was their full fleet, no 
ships being left behind to guard the coasts of Attika against the 
Aiginetans.6 The start of the Piraeus fortifications in 493/2 is ac-
cepted by most scholars, and we are asked to believe that ten years 
were to pass between the harbour fortification and the building of 
triremes.7 Themistokles is known to have persuaded the people to 
use the new-found silver from the mines to construct a navy of 
100 ships or more. After Marathon, it was only a matter of time 
before the Persians would mount a new invasion to exact venge-
ance for their defeat. But we are told that in the late 480s it was 
Aigina, not Persia, Themistokles held up as the threatening enemy 
for his fellow citizens,8 the war with Persia's friend Aigina allegedly 
going on until the very eve of Xerxes' invasion in 480.9 Then all of 
a sudden Aigina and Athens would collaborate very closely against 
the common enemy. And the alleged shipbuilding activity- appar-
ently inexperienced shipwrights in new-built dockyards - from 483 
to 480 when the Athenians mustered no less than 200 ships at the 
battle of Salamis, calls for our gaping admiration.10 The shipwrights 
outdid, if not Odysseus who single-handedly felled the trees and 
built a ship in four days (Od. 5.262), then perhaps Caesar's men in 
Arles who needed a month to construct and equip 12 ships (Bell. 
Civ. 1.36). Odysseus and Caesar's men were apparently lucky to 
have trees for ship-timber ready at hand, whereas the Athenian 
shipwrights were at work at a time when Makedonia was con-
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trolled by Persia and the supply of ship-timber and straight beams 
for at least 34,000 oars cannot have been easy. 11 The alleged ship-
building of the late 480s was to appear even more impressive after 
the 1980s, when it took experienced shipwrights, working with 
modern tools and not having to worry about the supply of building 
materials, about two years to build the modern trireme O!ympias. 
Some scholars, disliking the idea of ten years passing from 
Themistokles' fortification of Piraeus during his archonship to his 
shipbuilding programme in 483, prefer to move his archonship 
p 
down from 493 to the final years of the 480s. - I shall do the 
opposite, following Curtius, Schmidt, Bauer and Holzapfel in as-
signing both the inception of harbour fortifications and a naval bill 
(bill A) to the late 490s. 11 
In the beginning of Ch. II we quoted Suda as the clearest evidence 
for both a battle A and a battle B at Marathon, whereas Nepos 
only knows of battle A. In the present case, no source is clearer 
than Cornelius Nepos in recordig both a naval bill A and a naval 
bill B ofThemistokles (Themistoc/es 2): 
The first step in his public career came in connection with the war 
with Korkyra; chosen praetor by the people to carry on that contest, 
he inspired the ,\thcnians with greater courage, not only at that time, 
but also for the future. For while the public funds which came in 
from the mines every year were being syuandered by the magistrates 
in largess, he persuaded the people to usc the money to build a fleet 
of 100 ships. The fleet was yuickly built, and with it he first humbled 
the Korkyreans, and then made the sea safe by ridding it of pirates. In 
that way he made the Athenians not only rich, but highly skilled also 
in naval warfare. How much this meant to the safety of all Greece 
became evident during the Persian invasion. ... After the news of 
Xerxes' coming had reached Greece ... the people sent to Delphi to 
inyuire what measures they ought to take. The Pythia replied to the 
envoys that they must defend themselves with wooden walls. When 
THE fiRST NAVAL BILL OFTHEMISTOKLES 73 
Stesimbrotos of Thasos who wrote in the 420s is an early 
source for bill A. Plutarch quotes him from one of his lost works 
as saying that Themistokles carried through his shipbuilding pro-
gramme against the opposition of Miltiades (Them. 4.3 = FGrHist 
107 P 2). 1r' Being unlikely to have questioned 489 as the year of 
Miltiades' death, Stesimbrotos will have put bill A in the latter 
490s,17 after Miltiades' return to Athens from Thrakian Kherso-
nesos. Stesimbrotos is also the likely source for Plutarch's state-
ment (Them. 4.1-2) that the revenue came from the silver mines at 
Laureion and that Themistokles persuaded his fellow citizens to 
use it for shipbuilding 'not by shaking Dareios and the Persians 
before them as a threat, for they were a long way off and offered 
no flrm fear that they would attack, but by making opportune use 
of their anger and rivalry against the Aiginetans in order to secure 
the armament.' 1H This seems to date Themistokles' naval bill before 
the ill-starred expedition of Mardonios which stranded at Athas in 
492, after which it was only a matter of time before Dareios would 
make another attempt at taking vengeance on Eretria and Athens 
for the aid they had brought in the early 490s to the Ionian revolt. 
This must have been clear to all with eyes to see and ears to hear, 
and most of all to a Thasian like Stesimbrotos, whose city was first 
captured on Mardonios' campaign and was later ordered to destroy 
her circuit wall and hand over her fleet (Hdt. 6.44.1, 46.1, 48.1). At 
least after i\Iardonios' campaign, the Persians must indeeq have 
'offered flrm fear that they would attack.' In advance of most of 
his fellow Athenians, the Themistokles of Stesimbrotos may have 
foreseen that the Persians would indeed come to take revenge 
once they had free hands after suppressing the Ionian rising. But 
he found it more tactical to hold up Aigina as the enemy - during 
the Aiginetan war, which is well attested for the 490s. 
Plutarch's statement in the same ch. 4, that the number of 
triremes built by the Athenians on this occasion was 100, is also 
likely to derive from Stesimbrotos. Now Plutarch has it that at the 
battle of Salamis, the Athenians mustered some 200 triremes 
74 CHAPTER IV 
(Them. 11.4, 14.1) without indicating that Stesimbrotos held an-
other opinion, and so our Thasian is likely to have included bill B 
which gave 100 more ships in the late 480s. But unfortunately, 
Plutarch fails to record a second building programme or to ac-
count for the origin of the remaining 100 vessels at Salamis, and so 
we miss a quotation of Stesimbrotos on this score. 
We do not know what Stesimbrotos had to say about that 
other part of Themistokles' naval policy, the fortification of Pi-
raeus. But in the 490s his own state had used the profit from the 
mines· both to strengthen the city wall and to build a fleet of long 
vessels (Hdt. 6.46.2), and he may well have stated that the 
Athenians, too, in the late 490s started fortifications and ship-
building as parts of the same scheme. 
My point is one of chronology, that Stesimbrotos clearly 
recorded bill A of the 490s, and probably also bill B of the next 
decennium. Before Miltiades sailed against Paros in 489 with 70 
ships, he had captured Lemnos with his fleet and had come from 
his principality in Thrakia to Athens in 493 with four triremes, 
after the fifth, which was commanded by his son Metiokhos, had 
been captured by the Phoinikians (Hdt. 6.41.2). He must have 
been the personal owner of the ships, like K.leinias who distin-
guished himself at the battle of Artemision in 480 with 200 men, 
whom he provided from his own means, and on his own ship 
(Hdt. 8.17, cf. Plut. Alkib. 1). 1 ~ Stesimbrotos was therefore mis-
taken if he presented i\1iltiades as a spokesman of pure hoplite 
ideology, on principle opposed to any shipbuilding scheme. The 
Thasian was probably in the right if he opined that Miltiades had 
opposed Themistokles more as a personal rival than on account of 
h. 1 li O(l 1s nava po cy.-
. Next we turn to Herodotos, the contemporary of Stesim-
brotos. His account of the mostly naval war with Aigina ends with 
the brief ch. 6.93. Thereafter Herodotos is heading for the battle-
field of Marathon. In his narrative, the triumph of Marathon is the 
feat of Miltiades and his hoplites alone, and in 6.103 i\1iltiades is 
THE FIR.'iTNAVAL BILL OPTHEMISTOKLES 75 
introduced with his noble ancestry (cf. 6.35 where the hero Aiakos 
is introduced as the remote ancestor of the family). In this setting, 
our historian has no time for the archonship in 493/2 of Themi-
stokles, the spokesman of a naval policy; no word is uttered about 
his fortification of Piraeus or his naval bill A, to say nothing of a 
defeat of the Aiginetans and other medizers with the new fleet 
between the loss of four ships and the battle of Marathon, or a 
role for that fleet at Phaleron after battle A. On the contrary, as we 
shall presently see, Herodotos expressly denies that the new fleet 
was used for the war with Aigina for which it had been built. It is 
only after the year of Marathon, in 6.132, that the navy comes into 
the narrative, when Herodotos ends his Miltiades story with the ill-
starred expedition against Paras with 70 triremes.21 Themistokles 
and his naval policy are not allowed to enter the narrative until 
7.143, when our esteemed author, after the land battle of Mara-
thon, is heading for the sea battle of Salamis. In Themistokles' 
case, no noble ancestry is given, and we are asked to believe that in 
the 480s, he had only recently come to the fore, which means that 
he could hardly have been archon in 493/2 (cf. the surprising 
chronological information that king Kleomenes of Sparta reigned 
for only a short period, 5.48). After reporting the mission of the 
Athenians to Delphi in the 480s, the Wooden Wall oracle of the 
god, and the adoption of Themistokles' interpretation of it, Hero-
datos goes on (7.144): 
On a previous occasion Themistokles had given another counsel 
which prevailed seasonably, when the Athenians had collected from 
the mines at Laureion a large sum of money and were about to share 
it among themselves at a rate of ten drachmas a man. Then Themi-
stokles persuaded them to give up this idea and build with the money 
200 ships for use in the war, meaning the war with Aigina. This war, 
by the fact of its having arisen (otJTOS" yap o TTOAEILOS" auanis-), was 
what saved Greece at that time, by forcing Athens to become a 
maritime power. The ships were not used for the purpose for which 
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they had been built and were consequently a help to Greece in her 
hour of need. The I\thenians possessed these ships, which were 
already built, and there was need to build more. And they resolved to 
obey the god, and to withstand in their ships with all their forces the 
barbarian invader, together with any other Greeks who chose to join 
them. These were the oracles that had come to the Athenians. 
Instead of pursuing a chronological narrative, Herodotos prefers 
to deal with the entire naval policy of Themistokles in this post-
Marathon chapter. Having wondered how the 70 ships taken by 
Miltiades against Paras in 489 had come into existence, we are now 
informed by the presentation of shipbuilding in two phases, like in 
Nepos. The 70 ships obviously resulted from the first naval bill 
which was recorded also by Stesimbrotos, namely Themistokles' 
famous bill A from the pre-Marathon Aiginetan war (although the 
whereabouts of the ships in 490 are untold). Later there was 'need 
to build more ships' before the battle of Salamis, which obviously 
refers to bill B.11 We shall return to Herodotos and his version of 
bill B in the next chapter. For the present, let us consider the 
Aiginetan war during which Herodotos, like Stesimbrotos, dates 
the first bill. 
The Aiginetan war 
In Pausanias, Aelius Aristeides and Polyainos, the war was still in 
progress in the 480s. Scholars agree. 23 Pausanias states that Mara-
thon was the first battle in which Athenian slaves took part 
(1.32.4) and he records the grave of the Athenians and slaves who 
fell in the Aiginetan war 'before the Persian invasion' (1.29.7). This 
would make the slaves fall in war with Aigina after Marathon. 
Aristeides speaks of a bill, carried during the war with Aigina, 
when· Themistokles stopped the distribution of silver from the 
mines. He used the Aiginetan war as a prophasis for spending the 
silver on shipbuilding, foreseeing that Marathon was only a 
prooimion for more war (3.236-7). 24 In the next chapter, we shall 
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deal with Aristotle who, without speaking of the Aiginetan war, 
assigns a naval bill (evidently bill B) to the year 483/2. Now 
Polyainos (1.30.6), without indicating the exact year, puts this bill 
during the war with Aigina (1.30.6). And so it seems that Poly-
ainos, like Pausanias and Aristeides, imagined that the war was still 
going on in the 480s. I shall argue that the three ancient sources 
and modern scholars are equally wrong, whereas Herodotos plau-
sibly implies a termination of the war before Marathon. 
Herodotos states that the Aiginetans had hated the Athe-
nians for a long time, and when in about 505 they were asked by 
the Thebans for aid in the war against the Athenians, they (dubbed 
thalassokratores at 5.83.2) inflicted grave losses in an unheralded 
war against Athens by harrying Phaleron and the coasts of Attika 
(5.81). When the Athenians prepared themselves for revenge they 
were advised by the oracle in Delphi to wait for thirty years; if they 
attacked Aigina forthwith they would ultimately be victorious, but 
only after suffering as much loss as they inflicted. Against the 
advice, they began preparations for attack but were hindered by 
the Spartans (5.89). After this no more is heard of the conflict until 
heralds from king Dareios appeared in Greece to request the 
Zoroastrian symbols of earth and water. After the suppression of 
the Ionian revolt, Dareios matured plans not only to punish 
Eretria and Athens for their part in the uprising but also to subdue 
as many Greek states as possible (6.43.4). We expect Dareios to 
prepare the ground by requesting earth and water from many 
Greek states before his flrst attempt, the ill-starred expedition led 
by Mardonios in 492. But for some reason, in Herodotos' narrative 
Dareios will only send his heralds, 'some in one direction, others in 
another,' in 491, after the failure of Mardonios' campaign (6.48-
49). Herodotos states, unfortunately without identifying them, that 
many of the continental Greeks responded to the request. (What 
about Thebes, Argos, and the Messenians who according to Plato 
Laws 698 were in revolt against Sparta in 490?) He also says that 
all the island states gave what the king put forward as a demand, 
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but the Aiginetans are the only ones he names before returning to 
Atheno-Aiginetan relations. A remarkable sequence of events is 
now crammed into the narrative before Datis and the Persian fleet 
set out for Greece and Marathon in 490 (6.49-93): 
At the outset, the Athenians tried negotiation, not war. At 
their request, king Kleomenes of Sparta went to Aigina, where he 
demanded that those responsible for yielding to Dareios be 
handed over. But I<rios, a principal citizen of the polis, pointed 
out that Kleomenes did not speak for the whole of Sparta since 
Demaratos, the other king, was absent. (I<rios thought of Dem-
aratos as less anti-Persian than Kleomenes.) Before returning to 
Sparta and deposing Demaratos, Kleomenes warned I<rios that he 
would ram into great harm in the future. Reverting from Sparta to 
Aigina in company with the new and more anti-Persian king Leo-
tykhidas (the brother of Demaratos), Kleomenes arrested Krios 
with nine other pro-Persian Aiginetan oligarchs and delivered 
them for custody at Athens, obviously to prevent any medizing 
behaviour by Aigina. After the death of their foe Kleomenes/5 the 
Aiginetans sent ambassadors to Sparta where the friends of pro-
Persian Aigina now had more influence. They demanded that 
Leotykhidas should intercede in Athens for the release of the 
hostages. But the intercession of Leotykhidas with Athens was 
unsuccessful. Apparently in retribution for Athens' refusal, the 
Aiginetans lost no time before they tit-for-tat ambushed the sacred 
vessel full of leading Athenians on its way to the festival at 
Sounion, obviously in order to trade them for their hostages.2c, 
When negotiations had failed, the Athenians went to war. 
In the first place, the people decided to suport a democratic, anti-
Persian revolution in Aigina led by Nikodromos. Herodotos fails 
to tell us who moved, or spoke for the bill, or who was in com-
mand of the expedition, but this policy will have had the support 
of Themistokles. Possessing no more than 50 ships of their own, 
the Athenians had to hire 20 from the Korinthians for a nominal 
fee. 27 But this took time, and the aid to Nikodromos arrived too 
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late. When the plot miscarried, Nikodromos and the other Aigi-
netan leaders escaped to Attika, whereas their followers became 
victims of a sacrilegious punishment by the oligarchs. 'This was 
how they treated their own citizens,' writes Herodotos, but he fails 
to describe what the pro-Persian oligarchs did to their Athenian 
captives. Nor do we learn what happened to the Aiginetan 
hostages in Athens, and so it could be that Herodotos implies that 
an exchange took place before Nikodromos' attempted revolu-
tion.2H Next the Athenians, with the 50 plus 20 ships, first defeated 
the Aiginetan fleet, and thereupon the Aiginetan land forces who 
were aided by Argive volunteers, obviously men of the anti-
Spartan and pro-Persian party at Argos. For the moment medizing 
Aigina seemed neutralised.2~ 
Herodotos seems to imply that after their victory, the 
Athenians returned the loan of 20 ships to Korinth. The oracle in 
Delphi had foretold as much loss for the Athenians as they 
inflicted on the Aiginetans if they did not wait for thirty years 
before attacking them, and after their initial success at sea and on 
land the reverse of fortune came: the Aiginetans caught the 
Athenian fleet in disorder and captured four ships, crews and all 
(6.93). As the need of a good harbour had been pressing since the 
harrying of Phaleron by the Aiginetans in about 505, so the lack of 
an adequate fleet became obvious enough when the Athenians had 
to withdraw their 20 ships sent to the aid of the Ionians i~ their 
rising, and when they had to borrow 20 from Korinth for the war 
with Aigina. The lack became even more obvious now after the 
loss of four ships, and as suggested above, the apparently incom-
plete chapter 6.93 would be the appropriate place to account for 
Themistokles' archonship, harbour fortification and bill A. The 
oracle had also told the Athenians that they would ultimately, after 
suffering losses, be victorious if they attacked Aigina against its 
advice. We are accordingly prepared for the ultimate victory - and 
surprised by Herodotos' express statement that the new fleet was 
not used for its original purpose, war against Aigina. With Poly-
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ainos (cf. p. 106 below) and Nikolaos of Myra (prosgymn. 8.7)* he 
would have done better to record the use of the new ships in the 
second phase of the preventive war against the island state and 
other islands that had given earth and water to the Great King. 
(Nepos oddly says war with Korkyra and the pirates.) Herodotos 
would thus have accounted for the mysterious absence of aid to 
the Persians from the Aiginetans in 490. This would also have 
explained why the expedition of Datis did not sail directly to Pha-
leron for a surprise attack on Athens, rather than cruising around 
to the islands and taking hostages.30 But as it is, ch. 6.93 ends 
abruptly without the slightest trace of these feats of Themistokles. 
After the oracle which foretold grave sufferings before final 
victory, Herodotos' only hint of the second phase of the pre-
emptive war is his obscure reference to the penalty paid by the 
Aiginetans, some time after their capture of the sacred Athenian 
ship, for the high-handed wrong they had done the Athenians to 
please the Thebans (6.87)? After 6.93, Herodotos has no word to 
say about war with Aigina until the late 480s in 7.145, to which we 
shall presently recur. 
· Though he suppresses the defeat of Aigina and other 
medizing states before Marathon, Herodotos has packed an im-
possible number of events into his narrative between the arrival of 
the Persian heralds to demand earth and water in, seemingly, 491 
and the campaign of Datis in 490. Some scholars think that 
Herodotos has told more or less the full story, but consider him 
mistaken in placing it all before Marathon. They divide his narra-
tive in two; dissenting about where to put the dividing line, they 
date the first part before Marathon and, against Herodotos, the 
other in the 480s until the eve of Xerxes' invasion.32 Others claim 
that Herodotos only tells half the story: what he does report 
belongs before Marathon, whether they follow him in cramming it 
all between 491 and Marathon,33 or whether they ignore the upper 
limit of his account and date the Persian's demand for earth and 
water well before the campaign of Mardonios in 492.34 The latter 
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view is plausible, since Herodotus states that after the suppression 
of the Ionian revolt in 494, Dareios matured plans to punish Ere-
tria and Athens for their part in the uprising and the burning of 
Sardis (6.43-44). The time right after the suppression of the revolt 
would be the obvious one for seeking allies in Greece; it is hard to 
see why Dareios should have tarried until 491 before sending 
heralds to win allies in preparation of his punitive expedition. 
These scholars agree with the other school in letting the Aiginetan 
war break out again at some (disputed) time in the 480s and 
continue until the eve of Xerxes' invasion, but they charge Hero-
datos with having almost totally omitted this crucial part of the 
war when Themistokles, so they say, referred to it when proposing 
his naval bill.'" For my own part, I believe that Herodotos tells 
nearly the full story, rightly placing it before Marathon but erro-
neously dating the Persian demand for earth and water as late as 
491. He only omits the second phase of the preventive campaign 
against Persia's friend Aigina before Marathon, after the loss of 
four ships and then the shipbuilding scheme launched by bill A. 
Along with Themistokles' archonship, Piraean fortification and bill 
A, his defeat of Aigina with the new fleet ought to have figured in 
a rather longish ch. 6.93. 
No scholar known to me postulates that Herodotos has the 
Aiginetan war in progress in the year 489 when his Miltiades sailed 
with 70 ships against Paros. The alleged Herodotean evidence of a 
new outbreak of the war after 489 is twofold. First 6.90-91: after 
his abortive attempt at a democratic revolution in Aigina in the 
490s, Nikodromos with his men were given Sounion in Attika. 
From there they harried Aigina. 'This happened later,' Herodotus 
writes, possibly a flash-forward to the 480s, but we do not hear 
that any Athenians took part in these raids. Alternatively, the 
harrying took place before Marathon and before the preventive 
war that is likely to have resulted in an anti-Persian regime 
being set up in Aigina. Second 7.145: in 481 (?) the Greeks 
agreed to terminate all enmities and wars between themselves 
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(KaTaA.AciaaEa9aL TO<:) TE EX9pas- Kal TOU<:) KaT' aAA~AOVS' 
EOVTas- TTOAE~ovs-), the greatest war being the one between the 
Athenians and the Aiginetans. This is frequently taken to mean 
that hostilities broke out again some time after Marathon, but the 
ekhthrai and eontes polemoi that were terminated in 481 could 
refer mainly to the ekhthre palaia of the Aiginetans against the 
Athenians and the polemos akeryktos which they had started 
against them in 505 BC, an unheralded war which had never been 
ended by the conclusion of a formal peace (5.81.2). The meaning 
of 7.145 is probably that a formal peace was now concluded, and 
any grudges the parties might still entertain were patched up.36 
Consequently Aigina and Athens could act as solid allies in the 
crucial year 480. The Aiginetans who back in the late 490s had 
given the Persians earth and water, had become Xerxes' enemies 
by the time he crossed the Hellespont in early 480 (7.147), and 
Athenians and Aiginetans were jointly on the look-out off Skiathos 
before the fighting at Artemision (7.179). Thereupon the 
Athenians deposited some of their refugees in Aigina (8.41) and 
the Aiginetans sent their 30 best ships to Salamis, manning others 
to guard their own island, obviously in fear of retribution from the 
Persians, their former friends, for having deserted them (8.46). 
Their Aiakids did service for the common cause (8.64) and during 
the battle the Athenians and Aiginetans acted in remarkable 
concert (8.91). Polykritos, the son of the medizer Krios who had 
been held as a hostage in Athens during the conflict between the 
two states, shared honour with two Athenians for his valour 
(8.93.1). Herodotos' picture of close collaboration between Athens 
and Aigina in 480 is more reasonable if he thought of their actual 
fighting as terminated before 490, than if he, like Pausanias, Aelius 
Aristeides, Polyainos and modern scholars, figured that the war 
had been in progress until the eve of Xerxes' invasion. Thus in 
Herodotos as well as in actual fact, the naval bill moved by Themi-
stokles during the war with Aigina is to be dated before Marathon 
and to be identified with bill A of Nepos and Stesimbrotos. 
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Now Thukydides. His reference to Themistokles' bill A is 
vague since he fails to mention the find of a new vein of silver and 
the decision of shipbuilding instead of distribution among the 
citizens. But he is our main source for that other part of 
Themistokles' naval scheme, the fortification of Piraeus as a first-
rate harbour to replace the open beach at Phaleron. 
Whoever his source, Kleidemos seems to have stated in 
about 350 BC that Theseus had built a fleet of triremes (Plut. 
Thes. 19.5 == FGrHist 323 F 17), a notion rejected by Thukydides: 
strong fleets of up-to-date triremes were a prerequisite for the 
greatest war ever, namely his own 27-year Peloponnesian War, 
which he claims to have recorded meticulously from its very 
beginning. He saw his war as greater than the Trojan War 
embellished and exaggerated by Homer who lived many 
generations later, in which the ships were only small (1.10); greater 
also than the Persian Wars as strung together at a later time by 
Herodotos with a view to making them not more truthful but 
more attractive to his audience (1.21), wars quickly decided by two 
battles on land and two at sea. Strong fleets of fully developed 
triremes were a recent phenomenon. True, in the past the 
Korinthians, the lonians, Polykrates of Samos and the Phokaians 
all did have powerful fleets, but of pentekonters and long vessels 
rather than of triremes (1.13). Then Thukydides goes on (1.14.2-
15.1): 
These navies, then, which arose many generations after the Trojan 
War, were the most powerful, ant! it seems that even these were using 
few triremes. They continued to outfit pentekonters ant! long boats 
just as in the earlier conflict. Shortly before the Persian Wars (Ta 
MTJbLKa) and the death of Dareios, who ruletl Persia after Kambyses, 
triremes were usetl in strength by the tyrants in Sicily ant! by the Kor-
kyraians. These were the last naval powers of note to be established 
in Greece before the expedition of Xerxes. ,\igina, Athens, ant! per-
haps a few other states hat! paltry navies made up mostly of pente-
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konters. And long after the time (6<)JE a<!>' ou) when Themistokles 
persuaded the Athenians - when they were at war with Aigina and 
when too the barbarian invasion was expected (Tou ~ap~apov 
rrpoo8oKLj.lOV OVTOS) - to build the ships with which they actually 
fought at sea (atorrEp KGL EVGU!J.clXTJOav), even these were not yet 
fully equipped with decks fore and aft. Such were (the inadequacies 
of) the Greek navies, both of those of antiquity and those that arose 
later. 
Thus the correct interpretation of Schmidt in 1879, with a comma 
after enaumakhesan.37 But all editions I have found prefer a semi-
colon, and the sentence 'And long after the time when (opse aph' 
hou ... )' is regularly translated: 'It was only quite recently that 
Themistokles persuaded the Athenians - when they were at war 
with Aigina and when too the barbarian invasion was expected - to 
build the ships with which they actually fought at sea.38 Even these 
were not yet equipped with decks fore and aft.' This against the 
prudent protest of Schmidt (p.12): 'Die traditionelle Interpunction 
der Stelle ist falsch; es handelt sich nicht urn zwei Satze, sondern 
urn einen Vorder- und Nachsatz; hinter EVGVj.lGXTJOGV, wo der 
Vordersatz schliesst, darf nur ein Komma stehen; der ganze Sinn 
ist sprachlich und geschichtlich klipp und klar, wenn man das acj>' 
ov in der gewohnlichen Bedeutung nimmt, «seit der Zeit, wo».' 
What happened late according to Thukydides, was not the con-
struction of the ships but their decking. 
Mentioning ta Medika before the death of Dareios in 486, 
Thukydides seems to be including in the term the expedition of 
Datis in 490:19 In the early period, Aigina and Athens had only had 
small fleets, of mostly pentekonters. Then Themistokles, during 
the Aiginetan war and before the expedition of Datis, persuaded 
the Athenians to build the fleet with which they actually fought at 
Artemision and Salamis (bill A). These triremes were not of the 
advanced kind used by the Athenians later, when after the Persian 
Wars they acquired that arche which by causing fear in Sparta be-
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came the true cause of Thukydides' own Peloponnesian War, the 
longest and greatest in all history. 411 For the triremes of Themi-
stokles used in the insignificant Persian Wars recorded by Hero-
datos did not have the full decks that could carry many soldiers.41 
Thukydides might have added that it was only at the time of the 
battle of Eurymedon in the 460s42 that fully developed triremes 
were used by the Athenians, Kimon adding bridges to connect the 
decks (Plut. Kim. 12.2). 
In 1.41.2 Thukydides has the Korinthian delegates refer-
ring to the 20 long vessels (not triremes4) that they had lent to the 
Athenians in the Aiginetan war ~yper ta Medika. Here again ta 
Medika will include the expedition of Datis. We learn in 1.18.2 
that Athenians only became nautikoi when they packed off their 
possessions and boarded their ships, evidently in 480. Now the 
Athenians had long possessed pentekonters, and triremes from 
before Marathon, so what Thukydides means to say must be that it 
was only in 480 that they acquired that competence in naval war 
which allowed them to win their subsequent arche. He cannot, like 
many modern scholars,44 mean that the fleet of triremes possessed 
by the Athenians in 480 was all brand new. 
In 1.89.3-93.2 we learn how after 479, the Athenians on 
Themistokles' proposal built a city wall around Athens against 
Spartan opposition. They had little benefit from the earlier circuit 
wall since only small parts of it were still standing and because they 
extended the bounds of the city in all directions. The new wall was 
a makeshift construction erected in great haste. 'The foundations 
were made of different kinds of stones, unsquared here and there 
and laid down as they came to hand. Many gravestones and bits of 
sculpture were also built into it.' (Upon these lower courses there 
will have been a sunbrick wall.) Then by contrast we pass from the 
hastily built post-war wall of Athens to the extremely well-built 
one of Piraeus (1.93.3-7): 
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Themistokles also persuaded (ElTEL<JE) them to finish constructing 
the wall around Piraeus. A beginning of this had been made earlier 
during his magistracy which he held among the Athenians for a year 
(urr~pKTO 8'at!Tov lTpOTEpov ElTL T~S' EKELVOU apx~s ~S' KaT' 
EVLaUT<lV A6Tjva(OLS' ~PCE), considering (vo~-t((wv) that the 
location, with its three natural harbours, was excellent, and that it 
would greatly assist them towards the acquisition of power if they 
themselves became a nation of seamen (aiJTous vauTLKOUS' 
YEYEVT]I-lEVOUS'). He was the first man bold enough to say that the 
Athenians must take to the sea, and he forthwith in action helped to 
lay the basis of their empire (T~V apx~v EMus cvyKaTEaKEUa(Ev). 
In accordance with his plan they had built the wall to the thickness 
which still can be seen around Piraeus, namely so that two wagons 
abreast could carry building stones atop it. The inside was not filled 
with gravel or clay, but with huge stones, hewn square and fitted 
together, and bound to one another with iron and lead clamps. The 
height of the wall, however, was only about half what Themistokles 
had intended. He had wanted its sheer height and width to discourage 
enemy aggression, and believed that a few men, drawn from the most 
inferior troops, would suffice to defend it, while the rest would man 
the fleet. In my opinion, he attached great importance to the navy 
because he foresaw that the king would launch a naval rather than a 
military offensive. He believed that Piraeus would be of greater 
advantage than the upper city, and he frequently urged the Athenians 
to go down to it if they were attacked by land and resist all their 
opponents with their ships. 
Themistokles had a broader picture of what would take place in 
the future than anyone else (1.138.3), and his prediction that the 
Persian king would launch his offensive by sea rather than by land 
must belong before the naval expedition of Datis in 490, not 
before the land-and-sea invasion of Xerxes in 480. Rather than 
strengthening the poor existing circuit wall of Athens, Themi-
stokles had persuaded his fellow citizens to initiate the construe-
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tion of a very solid wall around Piraeus, which he considered more 
valuable than Athens (and so, having only an insufficient city wall 
in 490, the Athenians did not dare to stand a siege but marched 
out to encounter the Persian enemy at !Vlarathon). Contrary to the 
common interpretation,+" Themistokles' argument that with its 
three natural harbours, Piraeus offered a splendid location, must 
belong to his archonship 493/2 when he persuaded the Athenians 
to initiate the work (like clearly in Pausanias 1.1.2), not to the time 
after 479 when he would have them complete it!1' Like in 1.14, it is 
all a matter of punctuation. The text from imi)pKTO to ~p(E is 
not, as e.g. in the ( )xford edition, to be bracketed, and the 
participle VOIJ.L(wv should be linked not with ETTEL<JE which 
Themistokles did after 479 but with ~p(E, which he did in the year 
493/2. After 480 he would have been more apt to have said 
something like: 'If only you had after Marathon completed the 
strong Piraeus fortification which I had initiated in my archonship, 
instead of wasting our resources on building the treasury in Delphi 
and starting the huge building project of the pre-Parthenon 
entirely in marble on the Akropolis, then we would have had an 
impregnable Piraeus fortress to evacuate to when Xerxes and the 
Persians were here.+" No evacuation to Aigina and Troizen would 
have been needed. Let us now for Poseidon's sake complete the 
half-finished Piraeus fortification.' And as Thukydides assures us, 
after the retreat of the Persians Themistokles did prevail on his 
fellow citizens not only to build a new wall around Athens but also 
to finish the Piraean wall. It could be that he had originally, in 
493/2, planned for his harbour a sound and solid wall right to the 
top. But given the opposition of Sparta, there was not time in the 
early 470s to complete the half-finished wall in the same quality. 
We should think ofunsquared stones and mud-brick in these post-
war upper courses. 
An up-to-date harbour was only one prerequisite for 
Athens to acquire the seapower and the arcbe that by producing 
fear in Sparta was allegedly the true cause of Thukydides' ever-so-
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great Peloponnesian War. The other was that the Athenians them-
selves became experts in naval war. So autous nautikous 
gegenemenous does not mean 'the fact that they had now after the 
Persian Wars become expert sea fighters' but 'if they became a 
nation of sea fighters in the future', viz. if they built a fleet of 
triremes and learned how to use them. Here Thukydides again, like 
in 1.14 quoted above, is referring to the pre-Marathon bill A of 
Themistokles. So in 493/2 the farseeing Themistokles of 
Thukydides launched his double project, the fortification of 
Piraeus and construction of a fleet, not only as a defensive 
measure against the Persians but as a means for Athens to acquire 
an empire in the future. And he followed up his thoughts by 
immediate actions to lay the foundations of the empire (ten 
arkhen eut~ys xygkateskeuazen). These immediate actions refer 
to the pre-Marathon campaign by Themistokles against Aigina and 
other states. The campaign is sadly omitted by Herodotos, but we 
have seen it figuring in Polyainos and Nepos (who oddly says 
Korkyra). We also meet with it in Nikolaos of Myra (prosgymn. 
8.7)*: when the Athenians were wasting public money by 
distributig it, Themistokles persuaded them to build ships instead, 
with which they conquered the islands and Aigina. 
Diodoros Book Ten is lost, and his record of the archon-
ship of Themistokles in 493/2 is unknown. Diodoros cannot 
however, like Thukydides, have put the inception of the Piraean 
fortifications already in the archon-year, for in 11.41.2 we learn, 
under the year 477/6, that 
Piraeus, as it is called, was not at that time a harbour, but the Athe-
nians were using as their ship-yard the bay called Phaleric, which was 
quite small; and so Themistokles conceived the plan of making 
Piraeus into a harbour, since it would require only a small amount of 
construction and could be made into a harbour, the best and largest 
in Greece. He also hoped that when this improvement had been 
added to what the Athenians possessed, the city would be able to 
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compete for the hegemony at sea; for the ,\thenians possesed at that 
time the largest number of triremes and through an unbroken 
successsion of battles at sea which the city had waged had gained 
experience and renown in naval conflicts. 
Athens possessed a large number of triremes, but it was only in 
477/6 that Diodoros' Themistokles conceived the plan of granting 
them a harbour by fortifying Piraeus, which was so ideally located. 
He told the people that he had an advantageous plan, but knowing 
that the Spartans were as much opposed to a fortified Piraeus as to 
a walled Athens, he first did not dare to divulge the plan to the 
people. The impulse of the Spartans to interfere was, however, 
dulled by the argument that it was in the interest of Greece to have 
a first-rate harbour, whereupon Themistokles 'devoted himself to 
the work, and since everybody enthusiastically took part it was 
speedily done and the harbour was finished before anyone 
expected' (11.43.2). In Diodoros, like in Nepos Them. 6, it was a 
matter of constructions from scratch, not of completing a half-
finished work. Diodoros' reason for cramming the whole con-
struction from inception to completion into one post-war year was 
probably that like Nepos he was following Ephoros who, writing 
kata gene and not annalistically, treated the entire Piraeus forti-
fication when after his account of the Persian Wars he passed over 
to the subsequent period of relative peace. (Cf. 11.54-59, where 
Diodoros packs into the year 471/0 Themistokles' whereabouts 
from his impeachment to his death some eight years later. Dio-
doros may have taken the year 4 77/6 for the entire Piraean forti-
fication from a chronographic source different from from Euse-
bios Cbron. who records in 496/5 Peiraieus munitus est a 
Tbemistocle, and in 479/H Atbenienses Piraemll muro tJa//ant.) 
If Diodoros' reading of Ephoros misled him into cram-
ming Themistokles' Piraean fortifications into one year, the ques-
tion is whether Diodoros also combined pre-Marathon naval bill A 
and pre-Salamis naval bill B into just one bill of the late 480s. As 
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we saw, the Diodorean Themistokles states that in 477, Athens 
had the largest number of triremes and through an unbroken suc-
cession of battles at sea had gained experience and renown in naval 
conflicts. The unbroken succession suggests naval battles previous 
to Artemision and Salamis in 480, namely Miltiades' Parian cam-
paign after Marathon and Themistokles' preventive war with 
Aigina and other medizing islands before Marathon. These cam-
paigns require that the Athenians, after adopting bill A, had built a 
considerable fleet of triremes. This means that in the lost Book 
Ten, Diodoros is likely to have recorded flrst bill A under a year 
before Marathon and then bill B before Salamis. This sounds 
hypothetical, but I shall argue in ch. VII that bill A must indeed 
have figured in Ephoros, the influential historian upon whom 
Diodoros and Nepos depended. 
NOTES 
1. Against Kahrstedt 1934: 1687 who dubs the fortification of Piraeus 
in 493/2 'keine Massregel gegen Persien, da Athen noch keine Flotte 
hatte .. .' 
2. Curtius 1874: 18, referring to the fact that in 489, the Athenians 
possessed at least 70 ships. Duncker 1888: 173 dates the first bill 'im 
Jahre des Wiederausbruchs des Krieges mit Aegina (487 v. Chr.) 
unrnittelbar nach jenem Verlust der attischen Trieren gegen die 
Flotte der Aegineten.' Correct, except that the new outbreak of war 
is to be dated before Marathon, not in 487. Duncker saw that 
Themistokles did defeat Aigina with the new fleet, p. 174. 
3. Garland 1987: 2, 19. 
4. van Wees 2000: 173 n. 10. Gabrielsen 1994: 33 'With or without 
Themistokles' direct involvement, a naval policy seems to have been 
adopted earlier than 483/2.' 
THE FIRST NA \'i\L BILL OJ! THI~f\!ISH)I,LES 91 
5. Labarbe 1957. Podlecki 1975: 201 speaks of Labarbe's 'improbable 
theory that Themistocles sponsored two naval decrees.' Cf. 
Gabrielsen 1994: 29, with bibliography on p. 235 n. 29. 
6. How & Wells 1912: 185 state that 'the creation of the navy clearly is 
later than the expedition to Paros,' and understandably they have 
qualms (p. 184) over 'the long separation between fortification of 
Piraeus (493) and the building of the fleet (483).' .\lso 
understandable are their problems with the , \thenians who, after 
sending 70 ships against Paros in 489, on their chronology in 486 
had only 50 sails of their own for the war with :\it,rina (p. 100). Many 
scholars think that the .\thenians dared to send Miltiades with their 
full fleet against Paros, as if A.it,rina did not exist and no ships were 
needeJ to guard the coasts, e.g. Burn 1962: 258, Amit 1965: 18, 
Karavites 1977: 131, Green 1996: 44, HammonJ 1997: 518; Link 
2000: 41 n. 6, 47. How & Wells 1912: 100 anJ Ehrenberg 1946 Jo 
not accept that Athens possessed as many as 70 ships in 489. 
7. Wallinga 1993: 157 explains that the inception of the Piraeus 
fortification in 493 'can have nothing to do with the fleet of his bill, 
not even inuirectly,' whereas the Themistokles ofCurtius 1874:37 in 
483 woulJ continue his naval policy 'nach langem Warren und 
unverurossenem Streben.' Busolt 1895: 642 reasonably held that the 
fortification 'zuglcich fur die Flotte, Jeren V ergriisserung er wohl 
damals ins Augc gefasst haben wird, Jie notwenuigc sichere Basis 
gewahren solltc.' The version of Ehrenberg 1973: 128 is that 
Themistoklcs' first move was to create a safe harbour, but then he 
was stoppeJ by Miltiaues; for the shipbuiluing, 'the time was not yet 
ripe, and it was at any rate a long-term policy.' Labarbe 1957: 85 
thinks that Themistokles wanted to builJ a fleet in 493 'mais lcs 
moyens lui manquaient encore.' Jordan 1975: 18 asserts that the 
Piraeus fortification plus the construction of a large fleet 'woulJ 
have taxed the resources of Athens bevonJ enuurance.' C~reen 1996: 
28 has a curious statement, 'In 493-2 his naval Jevclopmcnt pro-
gramme was defeated; but the 1\ssembly nevertheless voted for the 
fortification of Piraeus, and its development as the port of Athens.' 
Cf. also Wolski 1983/84. 
8. Like Plut. Them. 3.4, Busolt 1895: 644 and Hignett 1963: 96 
underrate the ;\thenian brains, the latter imat,rining that 'the threat 
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from the East was forgotten after the battle of Marathon.' Cf. Kinzl 
1977: 215 who speaks of a false sense of security shown by the 
construction of the pre-Parthenon on the Akropolis and Miltiades' 
expedition against Paros. Wallinga 1993: 158 states that the majority 
of the Athenians were unaware of an acute Persian danger. Badian 
1971: 6 'no politician would have tried to frighten the Athenians 
with the bugbear Darius ... to conceive of Persia (defeated in 490) as 
a serious future enemy demanded far more foresight than 
democracies, ancient and modern, are given to applying in politics.' 
Knight 1970: 35 wrongly states that Herodotos gives 'no credit to 
Themistokles for foreseeing in the year 483/2 B.C. the possibility of 
a Persian invasion, and the triremes built at this time (sic) at the 
instigation of Themistokles are said to be solely for the war against 
Aigina.' Better Gruen 1970: 94 'after Marathon it would surely be 
nonsense for Themistocles (or anyone else) to feel that the Persians 
were too far away to contemplate an invasion of Greece.' 
9. Frost 1980: 83 states that the war continued right down to the eve of 
the Persian invasion. In Hammond 1982: 80, 85 the war was only 
brought to an end in late October or early November 481. He states 
(p. 86) that the Aiginetan fleet was a threat to Salamis and the coast 
of Attika in 480, and he has to reject the plausible restoration 
Aigineton in l. 17 of the Themistokles Decree. Bur cf. Gabrielsen 
1994: 237 n. 50. Podlecki 1976: 403 is certain that 'hostilities not 
only continued but reached a distinct crescendo' during the 480s. 
The engagements 'reached a climax immediately preceding 
Themistocles' "Naval Bill" of 483/2.' Williams 1982 speaks on p. 
542 of 'the one fact that seems certain in the mid-480s, that matters 
with Aigina had reached crisis propotions,' and on p. 543 of 
'Themistokles' failure in the Aiginetan War' in 486. Williams knows 
(p. 541) 'that it was Themistokles who offered the Aiginetan War as 
the motivation for strengthening the Athenian navy in the years 
immediately preceding 483/2.' The authors of C4H IV2 agree that 
the war with Aigina went on until the eve of Xerxes' invasion. In 
Sealey 1976: 182 intermittently from 505 to 481. Hignett 1963: 96 n. 
4 has it that the war between Athens and Aigina was not the only 
internecine war in progress between Greek states in 481. 
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10. I quote some 1mpressive numbers from great scholars. McGregor 
1940: 82 says 200 ships built from 482 to 480. Wilcken 1951: 148 'in 
fieberhafter 1 \nspennung aller 1....-:rafte' 180 ships built in a year and a 
half; Hammond 1982: H5 says 200 ships in anything between 14 and 
26 months. Green 1996: 57 has 6 to H triremes a month. So also 
Labarbe 1957: 123, but 'par Ia force des choses' 15-20 ships from 
early May to mid-July 480. For comparison, in the years from 357/6 
to 353/2, when the .\thcnians had a long tradition of shipbuilding, 
the fleet was increased with 66 triremes from 283 to 349, IG lP 
1611.9, 1613.302. 
11. Oars pderably of silver fir, about 4,5 m long, with blades consisting 
of a separate piece spliced and riveted on to the shaft. Hignett 1963: 
97 suggests that the timber came from the forests of South Italy. 
According to Hammond 1997: 525 it came from king Alexander of 
tvlakedonia who was thanked by the ,\thcnians with a grant of 
citizenship. 
12. Kenyon 1891: 63, against Di<m. Hal. 5.34. Bicknell 1970: 437 rightly 
states that the fortification of Piraeus is ln.L,rically connected with the 
naval bill, and so he transfers the fortiftcation to 483. He suggests 
that it was another Themistoklcs who was archon in 493/2, whereas 
Gomme 1950: 262, accepting the archonship of our Themistokles in 
493/2 and finding it unlikely that he began a naval policy which was 
dropped for ten years, explains that it was when he held another 
office in the late 480s that he initiated the Piraeus fortification. Frost 
1968: 114 questions Themistokles' prominence before Marathon but 
accepts his archonship in 493/2. He regards the archonship as a 
proving-ground for young men of promise. Badian 1971: 7, 9 
accepts Themistoklcs' archonship in 493/2, but 'the office had 
relative unimportance, and only small bq.,rinnings of fortifications 
were made in that year.' 1\lternativcly, Badian like Gomme goes for 
some other office held just before the invasion of Xerxes. Devclin 
1989: 55 notes that Thukydides does not state that Themistoklcs was 
responsible for the Piraeus fortifications, only that a be.L,rinning was 
made in his archonship. Cf. also Fornara 1971a; Mosshammer 1975; 
Podlecki 1975: 7 'perhaps no more than the surveying and planning'; 
Sealey 1976: 185; Chambers 1984. Ehrenberg 1973: 131 thinks that 
Themistokks held office in 493/2, 'though hardly the first 
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archonship.' He is against inventing another Themistokles for the 
archonship in 493/2. A prominent Themistokles in the 490s is 
plausibly claimed by a phalanx led by Meyer, 1954: 292-294 and 
Walker 1926: 170 'If the party (of Them.) was in existence at the 
time of the embassy of Aristagoras, it cannot be doubted that 
Themistocles would have been one of the strongest supporters of 
the Ionian cause.' 
13. Schmidt 1879; Bauer 1881: 57, 166; Holzapfel 1884: 585. For 
obvious reasons, these scholars wrote in blissful ignorance of 
Aristotle's Athenaion politeia. But Labarbe 1957: 83 is far from right 
in stating that the publication of AP 'a inflige un dementi' of their 
view. In 378/7, the Athenians furnished Piraeus with gates and set 
about building ships: harbour fortification and shipbuilding hand in 
hand, Xen. Hell. 5.4.34. 
14. Against Figueira 1993: 130 who thinks that praetor does not mean 
archon in 493/2 but stratege in 483/2. 
15. Hammond 1982: 91 n. 65 oddly thought that the 100 obviously new 
ships of Nepos were old ships in the sheds. 
16. Scholars can be amazingly certain that Stesimbrotos was mistaken. 
Jacoby on FGrHist 107 F 2: 'Miltiades' name ist sicher falsch.' Meyer 
1954: 296 n. 1 'Das ist unmoglich und kann auch von Stesimbrotos 
... nicht erzahlt sein.' Podlecki 1976: 404 suggests that Stesimbrotos 
meant to say Aristeides and Xerxes, not Miltiades and Dareios. Cf. 
Bicknell 1970: 438 who emends Miltiades to Aristeides, and Lazenby 
1993: 84 n. 14 who has it that 'this is obviously wrong.' Bibliography 
in Carena/Manfredini/Piccirilli 1983: 235. 
17. Against Gruen 1970: 94. 
18. Schmidt 1879: 10, against Frost: 1980: 87. 
19. Haas 1985: 43; in the title of his arricle 'Athenian naval power before 
Themistocles,' before Themistokles means before 483. He totally 
ignores Stesimbrotos. Kimon may have inherited from Miltiades his 
private trireme on which he brought home 'the bones of Theseus' 
from Skyros, Plut. Kim. 8.7. 
20. Kinzl 1977: 212 may, however, be right in stating that 'evidence for 
rivalry in 492/89 between these two men has yet to be produced.' 
But as he states (p. 211), it would 'have been a miracle in Greek 
politics if he (Miltiades) had had no enemies.' Williams 1982: 532 
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'What little tradition we have speaks of rivalry between the two 
men,' whereas in Walker 1926: 270-271 and McGregor 1940: 85, 
Themistokles is an ally of Miltiades. Knight 1970: 28 'From the 
avilable evidence there appears to be nothing that is clear and 
reasonable about anything in the relationship between Themistokles 
and Miltiades.' 
21. After his achievement at Marathon, the Miltiades of Herodotos is 
put in a poor light when he turned to the sea, for as stated by 
Bicknell 1972: 226 n. 5, Herodotos only mentions his setback in 
Paros and 'suppresses successful operations by Miltiades, recorded 
by Ephorus and confirmed by Hdt. 8.1 and 46-8, against other 
islands of the Kyklades.' Cf. Ch. Vll below. 
22. Herodotos clearly means that the ships were actually built and not 
only planned for the future, against Lenardon 1978: 45; Lazenby 
1993: 100; Gabrielsen 1994: 235 n. 30. As stated by Hammond 1982: 
80 n. 26, 'the Greek of Herodotos is crystal clear.' 
23. Cf. n. 9 above. 
24. Cf. Iustinus 2.12.12* who, without mentioning the war with Aigina, 
has Themistokles building 200 ships in the 480s. 
25. Most frequently dated in 488, e.g. Walker 1926: 262 who is certain 
that the death of Kleomenes cannot be put before 489; Bcloch 1914: 
174 'in keinem Faile' before 490. Burn 1962: 267 prefers 489. 
Cawkwell1993: 412 says, more plausibly, 491. 
26. There is nothing in Herodotos to warrant the idea that non-
appearance of Aiginetan aid to the Persians in 490 is attributable to 
their ten oligarchs being held as hostages in Athens, against Meyer 
1954: 304; Cartledge 1979: 151; Figueira 1993: 127. With DeSanctis 
1930, Amit 1973: 27 is unwilling to accept that Persian heralds were 
ever sent to Greece. 
27. Surprisingly some scholars like Figueira 1993: 116, 122 and 
Gabrielsen 1994: 34 think that the ships were bought, not borrowed. 
But Herodotos' verb KLXP'll.l.L must mean borrow. 
28. Macao 1895: 115 'The exchange of captives is an omitted passage, 
that would come in well between c. 87 and c. 88.' Against Figueira 
1993: 126 'it was the retention of the hostages that compelled the 
Aiginetans to remain inactive.' So also Grundy 1901: 155. 
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29. The defeat was hardly serious enough to account for the non-
appearance of aid to Oatis in 490, against Hegyi 1969: 181. 
30. Balcer 1995: 213 reflects on why the Persian navy made rounds of 
the islands rather than proceeding rapidly toward Athens: 'The 
Persians had to exercise on land their shoeless horses, then feed, 
water and groom them.' They likewise chose Marathon for their 
landing because the plain would serve the horses well for food, water 
and exercise (p. 215). But the Persians intended to march 
immediately towards Athens, not to spend some days at Marathon. 
Schachermeyr 197 4: 87-88 asks 'Warum nun all das Zbgern, warum 
die systemarische Unterwerfung all der Athen vorgelagerter Platze, 
welche nach einer Gewinnung von Atrika - zumal die Perser die 
uneingeschrangte Seeherrschaft besassen - doch ohnehin kampflos 
dem Imperium zufallen mussten?' His answer (p. 93): 'Die 
Burgerschaft sollte gar nicht uberrascht werden, nein, sie sollte im 
Gegenteil recht vie! Zeit zur Dberlegung haben und hierdurch dem 
Milriades abspenstig, der Kapitulation aber zuganglich gemacht 
werden. Daher also die Grundlichkeit, ja fast Gemachlichkeit, mit 
der die Perser sich zuerst der Unterwerfung der Inseln hingaben.' 
Kraft 1973: 10-15 argues persuasively against Schachermeyr. 
31. Walker 1926: 264 'At this point the narrative of Herodotus breaks 
off. Evidently Athenian tradition had no further successes to 
recount.' As if there was only one Athenian tradition, which was 
recorded meticulously by Herodotos! Hammond 1997: 502 also 
states that the operations ceased after the seizure of four ships by 
the Aiginetans. Holzapfel 1884: 585 is the only scholar known to me 
who holds Herodotos wrong in denying that the new ships were 
used against Aigina before Marathon, cf. Doenges 1998: 3 who 
claims 'naval operations continuing apparently until the very eve of 
the Persian landing at Marathon.' Duncker 1888: 178 (ignoring 
Polyainos and Nikolaos but referring to Nepos in whom Korkyra is 
'verschrieben' for Aigina) agrees with Holtzapfel in that 
Themistokles defeated Aigina with the new fleet. But Duncker 
unfortunately puts bill A as late as 487, cf. n. 2 above. 
32. How & Wells 1912: 101-102; Andrewes 1936/7: 7 new outbreak as 
late as in 482. Most scholars say new outbreak in 488/7, Busolt 
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1895: 575, 644; Meyer 1954: 331; Labarbe 1957: 172; Jeffery 1962: 
44 n. 1; Figueira 1993: 113-149. 
33. Hammond 1955:410-411,1997: 501-502;Jcffery 1962. 
34. Meyer 1954: 299; Podlecki 1976: 400-403. 
35. Cf. n. 7 above. 
36. After the publication of AP, I have not found any scholar who like 
Herodotos and myself see the Aiginetan war as terminating before 
Marathon. 
37. Labarbe 1957: 82 n. 4 is right in stating that 'Ia punctuation d' Adolf 
Schmidt est Ia seule qui donne un sens acceptable.' 
38. Rhodes 1981: 279; Hornblower 1991comm. ad loc; and Gabrielsen 
1994: 27 all distort the text by ending their quotation after 
enaumakhesan. 
39. Schmidt 1879: 10; Hammond 1997: 501; against Labarbe 1957:82 n. 
4. 
40. Thukydides was no more modest than Josephus, ~hose Judaean war 
was 'the greatest of any wars on record between either citystates or 
nations,' War 1.1.1. For the polemic nature of Thukydides' unitary-
war thesis, cf. Strauss 1997. 
41. Schmidt 1879: 11 Thukydides 'will daher an dieser Stelle gar nichts 
weiter behaupten, als class auch die athenische Flotte, selbst nach der 
Annahme des themistokleischen Antrags, noch lange Zeit in Bezug 
auf die Schiffconstruction hinter den Anspruchen der Zeit, und 
namentlich hinter Sizilien und Kerkyra zuriickbliebt.' 
42. Scholars follow Thukydides 1.100 in dating the battle before 465. I 
have argued for the year 462, cf. Schreiner 1997: 38-49. 
43. Against Gabrielsen 1994: 34. 
44. e.g. Green, 1996: 57. 
45. e.g. Hornblower 1991: comm. ad loc. Most recently Joyce 1999 n. 
47. He is right in seeing, like LS s.v. umipxw, urrfjpKTO as an 
impersonal pluperfect passive. Ruschenbusch 2003: 8 aptly states 
that Joyce's 'Polemik gcgen Jacoby ist nicht nur ungerechtfertigt, 
sondern dariiber hinaus unerfrculich.' 
46. The statement of Podlecki 1975: 7 that 'Themistocles' main activity 
during his year as archon was to begin the fortification of the 
Peiraeus, whose three natural harbours he discerned would be more 
serviceable as the port of Athens than the relatively open Bay of 
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Phaleron' is a correct paraphrase of Thuk. 1. 93.3-4. But on p. 203 n. 
13 he surprisingly rejects this interpretation. 
47. I imply that Themistokles agreed with those modern scholars who 
date the treasury and the pre-Parthenon in the 480s. For Delphi cf. 
e.g. Gauer 1968: 51-64; Amandry: 1998; for pre-Parthenon Drerup 
1981, Boersma 1970: 38-39. The marble treasury at Delphi was 
something of a luxury since it replaced a sixth-century predecessor 
of poros, and the pre-Parthenon required immense foundation 
works. Kinzl 1977 takes the building activity as evidence of a false 
sense of security in Athens. I prefer the opposite stand, that the 
Athenians in a mood of awed anticipation and terror would spare no 
effort to ensure future aid from Athena and Apollo. The 
construction of temples was as much a defensive measure as the 
building of triremes and walls. Kinzl also sees the conduct of 
ostracism in 483/2 as a trivial matter in comparison with the threat 
of renewed war with Persia. I read it as a means to get rid of 
medizing traitors. Cf. Ch. VII below. 
CHAPTER V 
The Second Naval Bill of Themistokles 
In the previous chapter, we saw that thanks not least to Themi-
stokles' naval bill A from the latter 490s, Athens possessed a 
substantial fleet in the year of Marathon. The role of that fleet in 
490 is our obvious next theme. But in this chapter I prefer to stick 
to shipbuilding for a moment, dealing with Themistokles' naval bill 
B of the 480s, before returning to the year 490 in the next chapter. 
Our principal sources for bill A were Stesimbrotos, Hero-
datos and Nepos. Also recorded by Herodotos and Nepos is bill 
B, which was carried after the adoption of Themistokles' expo-
sition of Apollo's Wooden Wall oracle. Herodotos speaks of a 
need to expand the existing fleet by building new ships, whereas 
Nepos specifies the number of ships as 100. A shipbuilding 
scheme of such dimensions was not a matter of months, and 
sufficient time must be allowed to pass between the Wooden Wall 
oracle and the year of Salamis. Now scholars, erroneously dating 
the famous bill from the Aiginetan war as late as 483, imply that 
the Athenians were pre-occupied with shipbuilding in the 
following years. So they date the subsequent mission to Delphi, 
and the resolution to obey the god, as late as 481 or even 480. 1 
There was hardly time now before Artemision and Salamis even 
for constructing Herodotos' undefined number of new ships, to 
say nothing of the 100 vessels of Nepos. We are thus told by some 
scholars that the new ships were not actually built but only planned 
for the future.2 
Herodotos states that after the defeat at Marathon, king 
Dareios began three years of preparations for a major campaign 
against Greece to exact vengeance, before his death in the fourth 
year (7.1,4). The Argives learned of the plans of 'the king' right 
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from the beginning and consulted Delphic Apollo. This was only a 
few years after their defeat by Kleomenes of Sparta in about 494 
(7.148.2), and so 'the king' is Dareios rather than Xerxes after his 
accession in 486. The Spartans were the first of the Greeks to be 
informed of Xerxes' planned invasion of Greece, warned from 
Susa by their ex-king Demaratos, and they too consulted Delphi 
(7.239, 220.3).3 The Athenians must have had a particular cause for 
fearing a Persian revenge after Marathon. They were in close 
contact with Delphi in these years, pleasing Apollo by replacing 
their former treasury of poros with the splendid one entirely in 
marble, and they would hardly have been tardier than the Spartans 
in consulting the oracle about their conduct. They are unlikely to 
have done so much later than, say, 485, and so there would be time 
enough from the Wooden Wall oracle to the battle of Salamis for a 
substantial shipbuilding programme. Even after the pre-Marathon 
Athenian shipbuilding scheme (bill A), many Greeks still feared 
that there were not ships enough to face the Persian invasion 
(7.138.2). After the Wooden Wall oracle, this was put right by bill 
B, the decision of the Athenians to mount a second shipbuilding 
programme (7.144.3). 
A third important source after Herodotos and Nepos, and 
one that explicitly identifies Themistokles as the mover of our bill 
B, is Aristode's Athenaion politeia. The historical first part of 
that work is not a history of Athens but one of her constitution, 
from the original one under Ion to the one prevailing in the 
author's own time, and in his Atthidographic sources he mainly 
searched for any 'facts' with a bearing on constitutional change. In 
ch. 41, he summarises all the changes, one of them being that after 
the Persian Wars the Areiopagos obtained the leadership, the next 
being Ephialtes' reform, which deprived the Areiopagos of its 
power. In 23.1-2 we are told how the Areiopagos had acquired its 
ascendancy: 
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After the Persian Wars, the Areiopagos again acquired strength and 
was again in control of the public life. It acquired this leadership, not 
by formal decree, but in consequence of the fact that it had been 
responsible for the battle of Salamis. For when the strateges did not 
know how to deal with the emergency and made a public 
proclamation saying that everybody should care for his own safety, 
the council provided sufficient money to distribute eight drachmas to 
each man and so prevailed upon them to man the ships. For this 
reason the people held it in high repute, and during this period the 
public order in Athens was in an excellent state. 
When Themistokles and the other strateges were at a loss as to 
what to do, the situation was saved by the Areiopagos. And not 
only was the credit for manning the ships in 480 due to the old 
council; some years previously it was the aristocracy who had 
constructed 100 of the ships which were to win the day at Salamis 
(22.7): 
In the archonship of Nikodemos (483/2), when the mines in 
Maroneia came to light (E<)>avE) and the state had a surplus of 100 
talents from their exploitation, some men proposed to distribute the 
money among the people, but Themistokles prevented this. He did 
not tell what he would use the money for, but urged that it be lent to 
the 100 wealthiest citizens, a talent to each and then if their 
expenditure of it should be satisfactory, the state would bear the 
expense, but if not, the state could reclaim the money from the men 
to whom it had been lent. When he was granted the money on these 
terms, he had 100 triremes built, each of the 100 citizens building one 
of them. With these ships they fought at Salamis against the 
barbarians. 
According to Xenophon (Vect. 4.2), everybody knew - and 
Aristotle will have been no exception - that the silver mines had 
been worked for a long time. For the Laureion area this is 
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conftrmed by archaeology. But in 483/2 new mines came to light 
in Maroneia. 4 The people honourably renounced taking the money 
from Maroneia themselves, and so great was their trust in their 
betters that they lent it to them, without the faintest idea of what 
the money was to be used for, since Themistokles did not utter a 
word about shipbuilding or a threat from Aigina, Persia or any 
other foe. The trust was not unfounded, for to a man the 100 
aristocrats entrusted with the silver did their job so well that the 
result was another 100 ships to contribute to the victory at Salamis. 
So far Aristotle and his source Androtion, who like his 
teacher Isokrates was a champion of the Areiopagos.5 But we learn 
from Plutarch that there existed a rival version6 of how the ships 
were manned for the battle of Salamis (Plut. Them. 10.4 = Klei-
demos FGrHist 323 F 21): 
At this moment the Athenians were without any public funds, and 
according to Aristotle it was the council of the Areiopagos which 
gave an advance of eight drachmas to each fighting man, and so was 
mainly instrumental in getting the triremes manned. However, 
Kleidemos claims that this, too, was achieved by a trick on 
Themistokles' part. He says that as the Athenians were moving down 
to Piraeus, the Gorgoneion was lost from the statue of the goddess. 
Themistokles, under the pretence of searching for it, ransacked 
everything and discovered large sums of money hidden away in the 
baggage; these were confiscated and served to provide ample 
subsistence for the men embarking on the ships. 
'This too' was achieved by a clever trick of Themistokles according 
to Kleidemos who wrote his Atthis about 350, some ten years 
before Androtion. This means that also the previous trick just 
recorded by Plutarch must come from Kleidemos: 7 when it was 
believed that the snake had disappeared from its sacred enclosure 
on the Akropolis, Themistokles instructed the priests to tell the 
people that Athena had abandoned her city and was showing them 
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their way to the sea, and thus he made the people pass his decree 
of evacuation. Under the evacuation of Athens, Themistokles 
invented an excuse for searching men's luggage and confiscating 
the money that he found, wealth that rich people apparently 
tried to hide away instead of making it available for public 
benefit. Favouring Themistokles, the historian Kleidemos has the 
Athenians evacuating to board the ships in Piraeus, not in the old 
harbour Phaleron. This may mean that Kleidemos agreed with 
Thukydides in having Themistokles initiating the fortification of 
Piraeus before Marathon. Attributing the glory for manning the 
ships before Salamis to Themistokles rather than to the aristocracy, 
Kleidemos will have painted the ascendancy of the Areiopagos in 
the period from Salamis to Ephialtes' reform in rather darker 
colours than did Androtion. In the choice between his two 
sources, Kleidemos and Androtion, Aristotle preferred the latter 
and his glorious Areiopagos constitution to the more hostile 
version of the former. 
Of Ephialtes, the man who brought the ascendancy of the 
Areiopagos to its end, we would expect a positive judgement in 
Kleidemos and a negative one in Androtion. Aristotle's picture of 
Ephialtes is first friendly and smacking of Kleidemos. We learn 
that the Areiopagos had the leadership for seventeen years after 
the Persian Wars, and then (25.1-2): 
As the common people grew in strength, Ephialtes, the son of 
Sophonides, who had a reputation for incorruptibility and loyalty to 
the constitution, became the leader of the people and made an attack 
upon the Areiopagos. First he eliminated many of its members by 
brint,>ing suit against them on the ground of administrative mis-
conduct. Then, in the archonship of Konon (462/1) he deprived the 
council of all those prerogatives which it recently had acquired and 
which had made it the guardian of the state, and gave some of them 
to the council of 500, some to the people, and some to the law courts. 
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An honest and laudable Ephialtes restores the good old order by 
taking dishonest aristocrats to court and depriving the Areiopagos 
of power it had recently usurped. Expecting now to meet a 
righteous Perikles as Ephialtes' accomplice in his justified reform 
of the Areiopagos, we are somewhat amazed to read (25.3-4): 
Ephialtes did this with the assistance of Thernistokles who was a 
member of the Areiopagos and was about to be put on trial for 
treasonable dealings with Persia. For this reason Themistokles wished 
the Areiopagos to be destroyed, and therefore he told Ephialtes that 
the council was going to arrest him, while at the same time he told 
members of the Areiopagos that he would give information about 
certain persons who were conspiring to overthrow the constitution. 
Then he led selected members of the Areiopagos to a place where 
Ephialtes could be found, as if he were going to show them the 
conspirators who had assembled there, and conversed with them 
seriously. Ephialtes was dismayed when he saw this, and took refuge 
at an altar in only his undergarment. Everybody was amazed at what 
had happened, and afterwards when the council of 500 assembled, 
and later, before the assembly of the people, Ephialtes and Therni-
stokles denounced (Kanry6pouv) the Areiopagites again and again 
until they deprived them of their power. 
A very different and unfriendly picture of Ephialtes. Again he 
seems to take individual members of the Areiopagos to court 
before his final assault upon the institution, acting with 
Themistokles as his consort, the villain who was about to be tried 
for medism and had only a personal motive for his sordid action. 
An honest Ephialtes collaborating with such a dark figure is odd. 
A more appropriate Ephialtes for such wicked company is the one 
of the hypothesis to the Areiopagitikos of Isokrates, the teacher 
of Androtion. The motive of this Ephialtes for the assault was 
that, like his accomplice Themistokles, he was in debt to the state. 
The date of the actions of the discreditable consorts against the 
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venerable old council is not, in this Androtion-smacking version, 
the 460s, with the final blow in 462/1, but the 470s, before the 
ostracism of Themistokles and at a time when I<imon, the chief of 
the better people, was still a rather young man (26.1 ). 
Chronology was of course one of many issues disputed by 
the Atthidographers whom Aristotle used as his sources: 'most 
writers' dated the institution of the eponymous archon under king 
Medon, whereas 'others' said Akastos (3.3); 'some' dated Peisistra-
tos' marriage to Argive Timonassa during his exile, whereas 
'others' said while he was in power (17.4). For Ephialtes' reform 
we would have preferred the philosopher to follow I<leidemos 
with his friendly version and chronology or Androtion with his 
hostile version and chronology - instead of following first !<lei-
demos and then Androtion.8 What, then, about Perikles, the likely 
accomplice of Ephialtes in the version of I<leidemos (and of Ari-
stotle himself in Pol. 1274a 7-8)? Perikles' action against the Areio-
pagos is curiously transplanted to the 450s (27.1), but the philo-
sopher would hardly have welcomed being pressed for a more 
precise date and substance of Perikles' act. 
I<leidemos and Androtion disagreed about the mode and 
date of the reform that put an end to the leadership of the Areio-
pagos. They also disagreed about how the whole fleet had been 
manned right before Salamis, and there is no reason why they 
should have agreed about the mode and date of the construction 
of new ships some time prior to the battle. There is no knowing 
that, like (probably) Androtion as reproduced in AP, I<leidemos 
dated the bill in Nikodemos' archonship 483/2, or that in the 
narrative of this Atthidographer, the shipbuilding was brilliantly 
effected by the 100 richest citizens and financed from a new mine 
opened at Maroneia. But we may be confident that both of these 
patriotic historians attributed to their own city the lion's part of the 
glory for the Salamis victory and that they had the Athenians 
mustering more ships than just the 100 triremes of AP 22.7.9 So if 
the pre-Marathon bill A of 100 ships is missing from Aristotle, 
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whose exclusive concern was constitutional change, it will certainly 
have been recorded by Kleidemos and Androtion (as well as by the 
other Atthidographers). Dealing with constitutional change, the 
philosopher concentrated on the building of the ships that, jointly 
with their manning, in Androtion's version legitimated the pre-
dominance of the Areiopagos after the Persian Wars. Aristotle is 
not to be blamed for the fact that modern scholars writing after 
the recovery of AP unanimously and erronously identify the bill of 
the year 483/2 (AP 22.7) with the previous bill A from the days of 
the pre-Marathon war with Aigina. As stated in Ch. IV, for histo-
rical truth we have to turn to good old scholars from pre-AP days. 
Polyainos (1.30.6) gives much the same story as Aristotle: 
During the war with Aigina, when the Athenians were about to divide 
the income from the silver mines, 100 talents, Themistokles pre-
vented them and persuaded them to give a talent each to the 100 
wealthiest men. If what was done proved satisfactory, the expenditure 
would be counted among the city's expenses, but if it did not, the 
men would return the money. This proposal was approved. The 100 
men each hurriedly outfitted a trireme, beautiful and fast. The 
Athenians were delighted at having made a new fleet, and they used 
these triremes not only against the Aiginetans, but also against the 
Persians. (Trans!. Krentz & Wheeler 1994) 
Unlike the Themistokles of Aristotle, the one of Polyainos does 
not say that Themistokles persuaded the Athenians to lend the 100 
talents to the wealthiest c1t1zens without indicating that 
shipbuilding was what it was all about; but this was probably 
Polyainos' idea, since he records the story as a clever stratagem by 
Themistokles. In its original version, the fanciful story presupposes 
that, like in Aristotle, no war with Aigina or any other state was 
going on, for otherwise Themistokles must necessarily have re-
ferred to that war if he wanted to persuade the Athenians. So 
Polyainos has combined Androtion's bill B of the warless year 
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483/2 with bill A from the pre-Marathon Aiginetan war. We are 
often told that Aristotle is Polyainos' source here. 10 More 
probably, Polyainos derived Androtion's (?) fanciful story from an 
intermediary source other than Aristotle. 11 At least he did not use 
AP for his account of Peisistratos (1.21.1 ), but plausibly gives to 
the tyrant just one exile and one return. This was the correct 
version of the Atthidographers; as stated above, these historians 
disagreed on the chronology of the tyranny, 'some' dating the 
marriage of Peisistratos to Argive Timonassa during his exile, and 
'others' while he was in possession of power (AP 17.4). One of 
them said that Peisistratos was exiled in the sixth year after he 
seized power and returned in the twelfth after that, while another 
preferred exile in the seventh year and return in the eleventh. 
Following Herodotos (1.59-62), who gives to the tyrant two spells 
of exile and two returns, Aristotle here in ch. 14-15, as in ch. 25, 
makes a mess of all chronology by duplicating the two historians, 
adding 6+ 12 years to 7 + 11.12 Wisely failing to use AP as his 
source for Peisistratos' tyranny, Polyainos is no more likely to 
derive his report of Themistokles' bill B from that curious piece of 
literature. 
In this chapter I have argued that like Nepos, Herodotos 
attributed to Themistokles a second naval bill in the 480s; but 
unlike the Roman historian, he did not specify the number of new 
ships as 100. The year of the second bill was possibly as late as 
483/2, a time when the Aiginetan war had been history for years 
and the invasion of Xerxes was imminent. The victory of Salamis 
was conditioned by the existence of these additional Athenian tri-
remes and the collaboration of the former enemies Athens and 
Aigina. 
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NOTES 
1. Robertson 1987: 3, 12 has the oracle in mid-481, and in n. 4 he 
quotes scholars who even say 480. Cf. bibliography in Green 1996: 
295 n. 3 and Hamel1998: 173 n. 5, 7. How & Wells 1912: 186 saw 
the problem, asking: 'But was there time to build more ships?' 
Labarbe 1957: 123 finds time for 15-20 ships in the second 
programme. 
2. Cf. Ch. IV, n. 22. 
3. Iustinus 2.10 has it that Dareios died while preparing an invasion of 
Greece, and that Xerxes planned his expedition for five years. 
4. For the location, cf. Labarbe 1957: 24-37; Rhodes 1981: 278. 
Labarbe 37: 'La faute initiale commise par Ia critique a ete d'assirniler 
les 100 trieres de Plutarque aux 100 trieres d'Aristote. On doit 
abandonner !'idee que, chez ces auteurs, le revenu du Laurion et le 
revenu de Maronee seraient une seule et meme chose. II s'agit, dans 
un cas, de Ia somme qu'avait donnee le district ancien et, dans 
!'autre, de celle que l'Etat, continuant a user de son droit n!galien, 
venait de retirer pour Ia premier fois d'un district nouveau.' 
5. Jacoby 1949: 75 AP 23 is 'almost certainly following Androtion'; cf. 
Chambers 1993: 42, against Harding 1977: 153 n. 51; Rhodes 1981: 
289. I feel more confident that AP 23.1-2 is from Androtion than 
AP 22.7 with its record of a clever trick by Themistokles, reminding 
of his tricks in Kleidemos, cf. below. But in 22.7 the rich people 
come out with so much more credit than in Kleidemos F 21 that it is 
hard to imagine Kleidemos as its source. 
6. Jacoby's theory of political bias in the Atthidographers is maintained 
by e.g. Malitz (p. 144) after the paper of Rhodes 1990; Mcinerney: 
1994; Hornblower OCD3: 714. Harding is the standardbearer of the 
opposite school. He (1977: 153) finds that the difference between 
Kleidemos F 21 and AP 'might be more imagined than real.' The 
Androtion of Harding had scholarly concern for accuracy of detail. 
Cf. Piccirilli 1988: 81; Rhodes 1990; Ostwald 1993: 142. Meister 
1994: 121-123 gives a useful review of the discussion. A third 
version of how the ships were manned is given in the Themistokles 
Decree, which charges the council and strateges to provide the 
money. 
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7. Busolt 1895: 628. 
8. Chambers 1990: 259 states that Aristotle combines two sources with 
different chronolo!:,ries but he emends the text in 26.1 to get away 
with Kimon's youth (p. 262). Rhodes 1981 is confident that the story 
of Themistokles and Ephialtes is a later insertion not contained in 
the original version (pp. 53-55), 'a late addition to the text of A.P., 
probably a deliberate revision made by the Aristotelian school rather 
than an interpolation made by a later reader in his own copy (p. 
283).' As for Kimon's youth in 26.1, it is misapplied to the period 
after Ephialtes' reform (p. 326) and Perikles' attack on the 
Areiopagos in 27.1 is a misunderstanding of a source (p. 335). Better 
to use Occam's razor and explain the oddities by claiming that 
Aristotle was clumsily trying to combine his discordant sources. ,\n 
amusing statement about the Ephialtes-Themistokles story: 'It is 
precisely because the story is at first sight so confusing that we 
should value it as evidence,' Jones 1987: 63. 
9. Ktesias PGrHist 688 F 13, 26 gives to the Athenians 110 of the 700 
Greek ships, Thukydides 1. 7 4.1 says a little less than two-thirds of 
400 ships, whereas Demosthenes 19.238 puts the number at 200 out 
of 300. Andokides 3.5 seems to think of only 100 ships. 
10. e.g. Podlecki 1975: 201; Rhodes 1981:277. 
11. Labarbe 1957: 43. 
12. Cf. Schreiner 1981. The AP chronology has caused much scholarly 
headache, cf. the eight pages of discussion in Rhodes 1981: 191-199. 
In this case Rhodes saves the AP author not by claiming a later 
insertion in his text but by 'correcting' it, blaming the mess on later 
copyists. Chambers 1990: 200-204 does not think of two discordant 
sources here as in AP 25; like most scholars, he decides for two 
exiles and two returns of Peisistratos, emending the text. Jacoby 
1949: 193-194 'Actually out of seven numbers relating to intervals 
five must be altered' (p. 194). But even after having created his own 
personal text by chanbri.ng five of the seven figures, Jacoby still did 
not manage to get away with the mess. The error is certainly with 
Jacoby, not the copyists. The great scholar acutely detected the 
political bias of the Atthidographers but he failed to accept their 
controversy over chronology. Two exiles and two returns of Pcisi-
stratos are claimed for the Atthidogaphers as for Herodotos by 
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Maddoli 1994: 143. The complicated theory of Piccirilli 1988: 77-90 
is that Aristotle combines two different chronological schemes; in 
addition to the high chronology, Piccirilli assumes 'un tipo di crono-
logia 'bassa', Ia quale si differenziava de quella 'alta' per uno scarto di 
dieci anni.' As for my interpretation of the AP chronology, 'E super-
fluo sottolineare come tali ipotesi abbiano scarso fondamento.' A 
further Italian contribution to the scholarly headache is Micalella 
1983. 
CHAPTER VI 
The Phantom Battle of Phaleron 
I suppose that many scholars would ask with Henderson, 'Why did 
the Persians retreat from Phaleron without striking a blow?'1 For 
my part, I could hardly imagine, even lacking the slightest bit of 
literary or epigraphical evidence, that the Persians actually failed to 
strike a blow, or that the Athenians failed to prepare for battle 
once the Persian fleet, after doubling Cape Sounion, appeared off 
Phaleron for an attack upon their city. I take Athenian resistance 
for granted, by infantry and by the fleet consisting of the 70 trire-
mes that sailed against Paras the next year while other vessels 
undoubtedly guarded the coast. Docs any evidence exist for the 
surmised engagement? Our principal source for the aftermath of 
Marathon is Herodotos 6.115-116: 
In this way the , \thenians captured seven ships. With the rest of the 
fleet, the barbarians embarked, and after picking up the Eretrian 
prisoners from the island where they had left them, rounded Cape 
Sounion, because they wished to get to Athens in advance of the 
Athenian army. There was a slander prevalent in Athens that they got 
this idea from a contrivance of the ,\lkmaionidai. It was said that the 
Alkmaionidai, in accord with a covenant they had made with the 
Persians, raised a shield as a signal to them when they were already on 
board. While the Persian fleet rounded Sounion, the ,\thenians, 
rushing with all speed to defend their city, reached it before the bar-
barians came, and encamped, moving from one sanctuary of Herakles 
- the one at Marathon - to another, the one at Kynosarges. The bar-
barians anchored off Phaleron (at that time the harbour of ,\thens) 
and, after riding at anchor there for a while, they sailed back to Asia. 
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As stated in Ch. I, it is surprising that the Persians, despite their 
hurry to get to Athens before the Athenians, should waste time in 
picking up the Eretrian captives from the island. Unlike Hero-
datos' Mardonios, who did disembark his troops at Phaleron in 
479 (9.32.2), his Datis in 490 just sailed away - though not, appa-
rently, frightened off by Athenian ships in Piraeus or Phaleron, or 
by the report of 2,000 Spartan hoplites approaching. The cause of 
the retreat was rather the speedy marathonomachoi who had 
reached the city and had set up camp at Kynosarges. A generation 
later, the helmet and spear of Athena Promakhos on the Akropolis 
(allegedly financed by a tithe from the battle of Marathon, Paus. 
1.8.2) may have been visible from ships off Phaleron, but even 
sharp-sighted Argos would have been hard put to it to discern 
hoplites encamped in the 4 kms distant suburb of Kynosarges. If 
Herodotos' version fails to convince, we turn to Frontinus (Str. 
2.9.8) who likewise has the Persians sailing for Athens after the 
battle of Marathon: 
When Miltiades had defeated a huge host of Persians at Marathon, 
and the Athenians were losing time in rejoicing over the victory, he 
forced them to hurry to bear aid to the city, at which the Persian fleet 
was aiming. Having thus got ahead of the enemy, he filled the walls 
with warriors, so that the Persians, thinking that the number of the 
Athenians was enormous and that they themselves had met one army 
at Marathon while another was now confronting them on the walls, 
straightaway turned their vessels about and laid their course for Asia. 
To men aboard ships off Phaleron, soldiers posted upon the walls 
of Athens would hardly have been more discernible than hoplites 
encamped outside the walls at Kynosarges. In Frontinus the time 
wasters were not the Persians who picked up prisoners but the 
marathonomakhoi who at Marathon were rejoicing over their 
victory. So the Persians of Frontinus may have had time for an 
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undisturbed landing at Phaleron. But we would have liked the 
author to be more explicit if indeed he meant to say that it was 
after disembarking in Phaleron and advancing upon Athens that 
the Persians became aware of the warriors on the walls. In any 
case, there are no more subsequent land or sea battles in Frontinus 
than in Herodotos. 2 The saving of Athens was again due to 
Miltiades and his sturdy hoplites from Marathon. 
The Suda gives a somewhat different version. Unfortun-
ately, we are not told in the brief entry khori.r bippei.r that it was 
for a voyage to Phaleron and a frontal attack on Athens that Datis 
embarked his forces. But as stated in Ch. II, his apokbore.riJ 
smacks of a retreat the way he had come, by sea. Having set out 
from Marathon already before Miltiades' battle B, such a Datis 
will have arrived at Phaleron before the return of the mara-
thonomakhoi, in time to land and attempt an assault on the city. 
Unlike the Datis of Herodotos who returned safely to Asia after 
his ill-starred expedition (6.119), the one of Ktesias, whom we only 
know from the abridged version of Photios, was killed in the battle 
of Marathon, the Athenians refusing to restore his body to the 
Persians (FGrHist 688 F 13, 22).1 It could be that the Datis of 
Ktesias' own full account, like the one of the Suda, had left 
Marathon before Miltiades' battle B, only falling after a voyage 
around Sounion and a landing at Phaleron (like the Spartan 
commander Ankhimolios in c. 512 who was buried near the 
Kynosarges Herakleion, Hdt. 5.63). And the fall of their 
commander may, in the original full Ktesias, have caused the 
Persians to give up the fight, like they did after the death of 
Mardonios at Plataiai in 479 (Hdt. 9.63). But this is just guesswork. 
The Persians of modern scholars mostly resemble those of 
Herodotos and Frontinus in setting off for Asia without even 
attempting a landing at Phaleron! The exceptions are Maas5 and 
Raubitschek.6 The former claimed an engagement at Kynosarges, 
whereas the latter held that the Persians did try to land, but now 
the marathonomakhoi had hurried from Marathon back to Athens 
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and Phaleron, where on the shore of the sea they forced the 
Persians to turn back. It was a feat by the army alone, Maas and 
Raubitschek assigning no role to the Athenian navy. But the ob-
vious question is posed by Kinzl: 'Why is it that the Athenian fleet 
(numbering no less than seventy ... ) -with rare consistency among 
our sources (and their modern counterparts) - is at least as chon's 
as the notorious hippeis of the invaders?'7 From Herodotos who 
ventures to deny that the new navy of Themistokles' bill A was 
used against Aigina before Marathon (and surpresses its use by 
Miltiades against islands other than Aigina in 489), we cannot 
expect a report of its use right after Marathon. But as we have 
seen, the pre-Marathon expedition of Themistokles against Aigina 
with the new fleet is happily recorded by Polyainos and Nikolaos 
of Myra, whereas not one preserved author reports seamen and 
footsoldiers jointly hampering and repelling a Persian assault on 
Athens from Phaleron. Themistokles is likely to have had a hand 
in such assumed naval operations. Now Plutarch is inconsistent 
about Themistokles' whereabouts in 490, having him participating 
at Marathon at Arist. 5.4 (like Iustinus 2.9.15), but at Them. 3.4 
dubbing him pretty young at the time and afterwards jealous of the 
success of Miltiades, the impression now being that Themistokles 
did not take part in the battle.8 If Themistokles' presence at 
Marathon can be questioned,9 and if it is hard to imagine him 
being idle in 490, then some naval activity suggests itself. But sad 
to say, any such activity by Themistokles, and any military 
engagement at Phaleron or closer to Athens is unattested in the 
vitae of Themistokles by Nepos or Plutarch, or in our entire 
literary record. 
The only possible evidence for our missing engagements is 
that used by Raubitschek and Maas, namely the so-called Marathon 
epigrams in the Agora museum at Athens (JG I3 503/504, ML 26). 
Two epigrams are inscribed on a block of which two parts have 
long been known, the so-called Block I. The nature of the monu-
ment has been in dispute: obviously the top course of a base, but 
THE PHANTOM BATrLE OF PHALERON 115 
for herms, statues, reliefs or casualty lists?111 In 1988 Matthaiou 
opened a new phase in the study of the monument with his publi-
cation of a new Block III. We now see that the top layer consisted 
of at least four contiguous blocks. Of Block II on the right side of 
Block I, we only have a tiny fragment published by Peek in 1953; 
and nothing remains of IV to the right of ~1atthaiou's Block III. 
(fhere may even have been one block or more outside Block IV.) 
The long base supported at least three large stelai anchored into 
cuttings in the top surface centered over the joints. The cuttings 
are 17 em from the edge of the sane, for stelai 68 em wide and 
20 em thick. Nothing is preserved of the stelai. They were perhaps 
among the stones from public graves that in the early 470s were 
taken as building material for the city wall (fhuk. 1.90.3). Hidden 
within the wall, the stelai might have had a chance of survival, like 
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Barron must be right in arguing that we have to do with a funerary 
monument from the Demosion Serna in the Kerameikos.11 A 
fragment of a vase gives a glimpse of such a monument. 12 Upon a 
base which may be barely discernible on the sherd, at least five 
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stelai were erected, one of them recording casualties 'in By-
zan(tion)'. 
The vase painting may have shown ten stelai, one to a tribe, like 
the case of the monument of 460 BC to which the casualty list of 
the Erekhtheis (177 fallen in three columns) belonged (IG l' 1147 
= ML 33). Or the vase showed no more stelai than the five we see, 
the dead of two tribes being listed on each stele as in the Koroneia 
monument (IG I3 1163). In years without that many war dead 
deserving of a state burial, a single slab could suffice for all ten 
tribes (IG I3 1162 = ML 48, with 58 fallen in two columns; cf. 
Paus. 1.29.11). Returning now to our monument, stelai 68 em wide 
in the bottom and slightly narrowing towards the top (but of 
unknown height) will have been wide enough for three or even 
four columns of inscribed names. Three stelai may have sufficed 
for listing the substantial number of casualties from all tribes, but 
there may have been more stelai than the three attested. They will 
have indicated the locations where the men had fallen, like 'in 
Byzan(tion)' on the vase sherd and 'in Khersonesos' and 'in 
Byzantion' in ML 48. Some geographical designation may recur in 
the epigram inscribed below; in ML 48, only the Hellespont is 
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recorded, whereas the four localities Euboia, I(hios, Asia Minor 
and Sicily were given in the epitaph of the monument mentioned 
by Pausanias 1.29.11. No locality is indicated, however, in the 
epitaph contained on the base IG l' 1163, a monument commonly 
associated with the battle of Koroneia in 446 BC. But since no 
geographical designation has survived in the fragments we have of 
four of the stelai, the monument has alternatively been ascribed to 
the battle of Delion in 424. u The stelai belonging to our monu-
ment from the Persian Wars are totally lost, and what is preserved 
of the epigrams on the base is frustratingly vague about locations. 
On the long-known Block I, two elegiac couplets are inscribed on 
the original smooth band which ran around the face of the base, at 
the extreme left-hand end of the monument: 
avopov Tovo' GETE[""9'""0<:) a<j>8LTOV] GLEL 
["''8""]V [·]p[""9"'"VEjlOGL 8EOL] 
Eaxov yap rrE( o( TE [KaL oKum)pov ElTL VEo ]v 
hEna[oa ll]E' rraaav oouA.Lov Ellap i.o£v 
The valour of these men will shine as a light imperishable forever 
No matter to whom the deeds of war the gods may grant success 
For they on foot and on swift-faring ships 
Kept all Greece from seeing a day of slavery. 
(trans!. Meritt 1962: 296) 
The crucial words for our purpose, 'and on swift-faring ships', are 
only restored by comparison with what is almost certainly a fourth-
century copy of the epigram. More couplets will have followed to 
the right on the same original band, whether a continuation of the 
poem or separate epigrams. But there is no knowing if the loca-
tions of the deeds of 'these men' were indicated in the lost distichs 
that followed. 
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Later, as it seems, a new panel was smoothed on the blocks 
in the previously stippled area below the upper band to receive 
other couplets: 
Block I: 
EV apa TOLCJ(' a8a~[aS' EV CJTE8ECJL 8u~6S'] hoT' atx~EV 
CJTECJa~ rrp6a8E 1TUAOV av[ TLa ~UplclCJLV] 
avx[a,\o~ rrpEaaL ~[ OAEUCJa~EVOV EPLKU8ES'] 
a a Tv ~[m 0Epaov KAL vci~Evo[L aTpanciv] 
Block II: 
r --- -------TIE K OL TE KaL--
--- --- --- --- -- 0 VECJOL 
--- --- - --- --- -E ]~a,\ov 
Block III: 
hEpKOS' yap rrporrcipoL8Ev- --- --- --
TES'-- ---~E ~ 0a,\,\a80S' hLrro--
ou8ap 8' cl1TELpO rropn Tpo<j>o aKpov EXOVTES' 
TOLCJL~ rrav8aAES (),\~oS' E1TLCJTpE[<j>ETm] 
The fragmentary two couplets on Block I seem to refer back to 
'the valour of these men' in the first line of the poem above. While 
the upper poem commemorates the achievements of the infantry 
in general and the fleet, those honoured here seem to be hoplites 
who fell 'when spear was poised in front of the gates in the face of 
[---] [who wished] to burn the sea-girt [---] city, turning back by 
force the Persian [power].' Of the two couplets following on the 
lost Block II, little more is preserved than ]balon of the second 
line, which continued on Block III adjacent to the right. Then on 
Block III we seem to read a specification of the deeds recorded 
earlier in the poem on Block II, herkos gar proparoithen probably 
meaning 'for they put up defence before the city.' Again as in the 
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original inscription above, we cannot tell whether this secondary 
inscription hewn below it was one long epitaph or several separate 
poems. For our purpose, it is frustrating that herkos gar 
proparoithen on Block III is no more geographically informative 
than pros the pylon on Block I. 
We were often told, before it became clear that the base 
was one for stelai, not for herms etc., that the secondary epigram, 
with spears poised in front of the gates, refers to Marathon, some 
40 kms distant. 14 But the fallen marathonomakhoi were buried in 
the battlefield, not in the Demosion Serna in Kerameikos. Being 
buried in the same grave, the men honoured in the epitaphs must 
all have fallen in the same campaigning season of the Persian 
Wars. 15 The question is: what year? 
Excluding Marathon, M ykale, and Salamis plus Plataiai, 
Barron ends up with 'All for Salamis' and the year 480. The men of 
the secondary epitaph who poised spear prosthe pylon to hinder 
the sea-girt asty from being burnt, were in Barron's view those 
who in 480 bravely refused to evacuate the city on Xerxes' 
approach and remained to save Athens from destruction. 11' But 
according to Herodotos (8.51 ), those who did remain in Athens 
stayed up on the Akropolis, which they fortified by a wooden 
palisade. They can hardly have poised spear prosthe pylon in an 
unsuccessful attempt to hinder the Persians from burning the city. 
The men honoured in the original epitaph who fought 'as 
footsoldiers and on swift-faring ships' were more likely the seamen 
who in 490 manned the fleet that had been expanded by 
Themistokles' pre-Marathon bill A and the footsoldiers of the 
home guard who stayed behind when the army marched out to 
Marathon. 17 They fell in battle on land and sea when Datis 
disembarked his troops at Phaleron for a frontal assault on Athens. 
Some Persians may have got through to the Kynosarges area, and 
by that time some victorious marathonomakhoi may have returned 
from Mararthon for the defence of the city and have sustained 
losses in an engagement outside the gates. In the first place, a 
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funerary monument was erected with elegiac verses inscribed on 
the original smooth band of the base, honouring all the fallen -
both ship crews, 18 footsoldiers of the home guard, and 
returning marathonomakhoi. Later a band was smoothed under-
neath the original inscription, and secondary couplets were added, 
not because more fallen had been found and been buried in the 
grave, but with a view to bestowing particular honour on those of 
the dead who were hoplites and had met their destiny outside the 
walls of Athens. These spearmen had failed to win immortal fame 
by falling at Marathon and having like heroes and aristocrats of the 
past, an oldfashioned tomb raised above their graves,19 with their 
names inscribed on the monument. The secondary inscription was 
hardly made many years after the first, 20 and so it seems that 
already from a date well before the Stoa Poikile painting of the late 
460s, the hoplites were singled out as having fulfilled an 
extraordinary role in the year of Marathon. 
This cannot be other than guesswork until one of the lost 
stelai is recovered, with for example a 'these men fell at Phaleron 
and Kynosarges,' or until another neos lithos from the base is 
found, its elegiac verses giving precise geographical designations. 
As it is, despite the epitaph's (restored) wording 'as footsoldiers 
and on swift-faring ships' I do not pretend that the funerary 
monument provides irrefutable evidence and sturdy proof of the 
fighting I am claiming. But by no stretch of imagination can I 
accept that Themistokles' fleet failed to raise a finger the moment 
the Persians came sailing around Cape Sounion to Phaleron. 
A final problem: the use of the new fleet by Themistokles 
against Aigina and other islands before Marathon is attested in 
sources other than Herodotos, whereas any participation by him in 
presumed naval actions at Phaleron after Marathon is unknown 
from any source. If we are right in thinking that with the new fleet, 
Themistokles did play a significant role before as well as after 
Marathon, how could it then be that the command in the 
subsequent naval expedition against Paros and other islands was 
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given to Miltiades rather than to him? A personal rivaly between 
the two men is suggested by Stesimbrotos, and a contest may have 
taken place in the assembly about the command. Here the 
triumph of Miltiades at Marathon will have carried more weight 
with the citizens than the achievements of Themistokles. 
Guesswork again, but what is the alternative when the sources 
desert us? 
NOTES 
1. Henderson 1932: 302, cf. Currius 1874: 25 'Was nun aber die Perser 
veranlasste, von jcdcm V crsuche der Landung abzusehen, ist schwer 
zu entrathseln.' I guote some answers, Wecklein 1876: 277 'die 
Annahrung der Spartaner' made Oatis withdraw; Burn 1962: 252 
'when their leading ships arrived at Phaleron, it was only to sec the 
spearmen of Marathon facing them again.' In the floriu parlance of 
Green 1996: 38 'The reappearance of the Marathon warriors - grim, 
indomitable, caked with dust and sweat anu dried bloou - not only 
gave Oatis pause for thought; ... ' Obst 1932: 1694 has the Persians 
sailing to Phaleron already before the battle of Marathon, for after 
the battle the voyage would have been 'absuru und aussichtslos'. 
2. No fighting coulu be expected in Plut. Arist. 5.3 where the Persians 
double Cape Sounion not by intent but unuer compulsion of wind 
and wave. Doenges 1998: 16 has it that Oatis' 'purpose almost 
certainly was reconnaissance only. He wished to survey the bay of 
Phaleron and the defenses of the city with the intent of reporting 
back to Dareios.' 
3. Cagnassi: 1999 is a healthy attempt at an Ehrenrettung of Ktesias. 
4. e.g. Bengtson 1960: 159 n. 2 'Dass Kampfuandlungen stattgcfunden 
haben ... ist nicht i.iberlicfert und kaum wahrscheinlich.' Hammond 
1973: 226 is able to report that the Persians arrived off Phaleron 
about 5.30 p.m. 
5. Maas 1935: 236. 
6. Raubitschek 1991: 208, 210. Unfortunately, Raubitschek later 
abandoned his plausible theory, 1965: 513. Mciggs & Lewis 1969: 56 
'the Maas-Raubitschck theory ... has not found support.' 
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7. Kinzl1977: 214 n. 85. In Der kleine Pau(y, s.v. Thernistokles, Kinzl 
has not a word about the fleet in 490, and Hammond 1973: 218 
states that 'the Persian fleet was not challenged by Eretria and 
Athens; it had complete thalassocracy wherever it sailed.' Cf. 
Wallinga 1993: 139 in 490 'none of the poleis attacked could 
mobilize its naval forces. The tradition evidently did not preserve 
any memory of such a thing being proposed or even contemplated.' 
8. Sansone 1989: 182 against Podlecki 1975: 8; Frost: 1980: 73. 
9. Calabi Limentani 1964: !iii, 23 with reference to the discussion about 
whether Thernistokles participated at Marathon. 
10. Wclwei 2000: 183 'Stelen mit Totenlisten oder Hermen bzw. 
Statuen.' 
11. Barron 1990. 
12. Bradeen 1967: plate 70d. 
13. Mattingly 1966: 167-177. 
14. Koumanoudis 1978: 236 thinks that pros the pylon refers to Pylai at 
Marathon. Welwei 2000:183 explains that pros the pylon is 'nariirlich 
nicht in wordichem Sinne zu verstehen.' He refers to Marathon. 
15. So e.g. Amandry 1960; Vidal-Naquet 1986: 90; Welwei 2000:188. 
16. Barron 1990: 140. 
17. Plut. An's!. 5.4 cannot be right in stating that the city was left empty 
of defenders when the army marched to Marathon. 
18. Strauss 2000 argues convincingly that also sailors were buried in the 
Demosion Serna. Plato Menex. 234c, states that even the poor were 
honoured with a state burial. 
19. 0stby 2003: 44-45. 
20. Against Vidal-Naquet 1986: 92 who states that the second poem was 
'undeniably inscribed in the time of Cimon, around 465,' whereas 
the first poem 'doubtless describes the second Persian War.' He 
might have left some room for doubt. 
CHAPTER VII 
Conclusion: Sources and Facts 
Herodoto.r tJer.ru.r Epboro.r and Nepos 
In Ch. I, I questioned the common notion that Herodotos is our 
best source for the battle of Marathon. This book is to a large 
extent a defence of the secondary sources, at the expense of Hero-
dotos. The theory is that much non-Herodotean matter in Cor-
nelius Nepos and other secondary sources somehow derives from 
Ephoros, who wrote his lost UnitJer.ral Hi.rtor:y in about 340 BC, 
and that he in his turn drew upon earlier literature, and possibly on 
oral tradition as well. Our only fragment of Ephoros which allows 
a direct comparison with Herodotos unfortunately does not 
concern Marathon or, directly, the naval policy of Thernistokles, 
but the expedition of Miltiades against Paras shortly after 
Marathon (FGrHist 70 F 63).* We shall flrst discuss the diverging 
versions of the expedition of Herodotos and Ephoros, before 
dealing with the debt of Nepos to Ephoros. 
Herodotos (6.132-136) relates that shortly after his triumph at 
Marathon, l'vfiltiades, with a promise to obtain much gold for the 
Athenians, induced them to give him 70 ships for an expedition 
against a target known only to him. He attacked Paras, ostensibly 
because the Parians had sent one trireme to help the Persian war-
effort at Marathon but in fact because of a private grudge against 
the Parian Lysagoras who had reported ill of him to Hydarnes the 
Persian (and who may have had some hand in the medism of 
Paras). l\filtiades began a siege of Paras, demanding 100 talents. 
But refusing to yield, the Parians in one night doubled the height 
of the wall where it was most assailable. So far the version of all 
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the Greeks, Herodotos says; in the following, he will give the 
version of the Parians. When he was unable to get anywhere with 
the siege, Miltiades was approached by a woman prisoner called 
Timo who was a priestess of the earth goddesses Demeter and 
Kore. On her advice, he made his way to the shrine of Demeter 
Thesmophoros on the hill in front of the city. Finding the door to 
the precinct wall locked, he jumped over and made for the shrine, 
intent on some sort of sacrilege which Herodotos is unable to 
specify. But when he reached the door a sudden panic came upon 
him, and he ran back. In jumping the wall, he fell and twisted his 
thigh, or as others say, smashed his knee. He now returned empty-
handed to Athens, all he had achieved after 26 days of siege being 
to destroy the crops in the countryside. The Parians wanted to 
punish Timo and asked Delphi if they were right in putting her to 
death for her treachery and for reavealing to Miltiades the mys-
teries which no man was allowed to know. Pythia answered that 
Timo was not guilty of these crimes, but Miltiades was destined to 
end badly. She had only been his guide into trouble. So far, it 
seems, the Parian version, and henceforth the one of the Athe-
nians or all the Greeks. On his return to Athens, Miltiades became 
the talk of the city, and Xanthippos brought him to trial for de-
ceiving the people, proposing the death penalty. 1\filtiades was 
present at the trial but was incapable of speaking in his own 
defence because of his gangrened leg. His friends spoke for him, 
reminding the Athenians of his his victory at Marathon and his 
earlier conquest of Lemnos, which he had handed over to the 
Athenians. The proposed death penalty was rejected and he was 
given a fine of 50 talents. Soon afterwards he died of his wound, 
and his son Kimon paid the fine. 
The idea of the citizens entrusting Miltiades with a fleet of 
70 ships on which many of them would themselves be sailing, 
without any inkling of the destination, is scarcely more credible 
than that in 483, rather than receiving some drachmas themselves, 
they should have handed over 100 talents to the richest people 
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without the faintest idea that they were to build 100 ships (AP 
22.7).1 And one wonders how Herodotos could be familiar with 
Miltiades' purely personal motive for the raid. The contrast of the 
common version told by all (!) the Greeks with what was stated by 
the Parians alone is meant to inspire confidence but Fehling aptly 
asks how it could be that Herodotos was constantly capable of 
citing the inhabitants of the places in which events occurred, the 
ones who ought to know best.2 As for one Parian version that 
Miltiades injured his thigh, against others who said his knee, 
Fehling comments that 'such slight variation is tantamount to the 
agreement of two separate sources and at the same time serves to 
demonstrate the author's own painstaking accuracy.'-' The true 
motive of Miltiades, and whatever else Herodotos does report, is 
presented as the plain truth, and should he be ignorant of some-
thing, like the nature of Miltiades' intended sacrilege at the 
sanctuary of Demeter, he confesses his ignorance. Now thigh 
versus knee, like the professed want of knowledge about the 
sacrilege, do have an air of literary tricks, but we cannot rule out 
the possibility that Herodotos had actually heard a Parian version, 
one he prefers because it gave a supernatural explanation for the 
failure of Miltiades, pointing a moral acceptable to his mind. To 
some readers, the precise duration of 26 days of the siege looks 
like genuine historic tradition,4 whereas Fehling would retort that 
preference for precise numbers is based on the principle that the 
detail makes for credibility.5 
Herodotos' first presentation of Miltiades starts in a minor 
key, with Miltiades establishing himself as tyrant of the Thrakian 
Khersonesos by an unsympathetic ruse. But so dear did he soon 
become to the inhabitants that they fetched him back once when 
he had to flee from his principality (6.39-40). In Book Four, Hero-
datos has applauded Iviiltiades' counsel to the Greeks to break up 
the bridge over the Danube on the advice of the Skythians, thus 
liberating Ionia from Persian sway (4.137). Foreshadowing Themi-
stokles, the victor of Salamis who ended up in Persian serv1ce, 
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Metiokhos, the son of the victor of Marathon, was brought to 
Persia where the king presented him with a house and property 
and a Persian wife (6.41.4). This was hardly flattering for the 
family, but Miltiades himself in words and acts personated the 
great champion of freedom at Marathon, and Herodotos has com-
posed an eloquent speech for him: 'It is now in your hands, 
Kallimakhos, either to enslave Athens, or to make her free and to 
leave behind you for all future generations a memory more 
glorious than even Harmodios and Aristogeiton left .. .' The speech 
prevailed, and by the vote of Kallimakhos the decision to fight was 
made. But the glory of the victory certainly belonged to Miltiades 
rather than to the polemarch, and no role whatsoever was fulfilled 
by the fleet. The hoplite battle of Marathon denoted the cul-
mination of the career of the Herodotean Miltiades, greatly 
enchancing his already high reputation. But 'the admonition that 
all that is too high and too mighty must fall runs through the entire 
Histories as their most important leitmotiv,'6 for when he was 
making no progress in the siege in Paros, he intended, on the 
counsel of the priestess Timo, to commit an act of gross impiety 
against Demeter and was punished by her for his hybris with a 
serious injury. Pythia declared that Timo was not guilty of treason 
but that it was Miltiades' destiny to die, like Kandaules, king of 
Sardis and Skyles, king of the Skythians, we may add (1.8.2, 
4.79.1).7 
The apt statements of Blosel about the Herodotean picture 
of Themistokles are no less valid for Miltiades:H 'A curious ambi-
valence characterizes Herodotus' tales about him; we see Themi-
stocles now as upright champion of Greek liberty, now as un-
scrupulous egoist ... While Herodotus' tales do not condemn The-
mistocles utterly, neither do they praise him without exception. 
Rather, not only do they know the white and the black, but they 
are quite familiar with all the intermediate shades of grey as well. 
This mixture of contrary opinions must in my view be the result of 
Herodotus' shaping of the source material available to him.' 
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In their defence of I\filtiades in the trial in Athens, his 
friends will have presented a flattering version of his general 
loyalty to the polis and his role at Marathon, likely to have raised 
the eyebrows of any relatives and friends of Kallimakhos present. 
The defence was probably the first presentation of the Marathon 
myth,9 whereas the notion that Miltiades' motive for the raid on 
Paros was a private grudge against Lysagoras may derive from the 
speech of Xanthippos in prosecuting 1\filtiades for defrauding the 
people with an empty-handed return after promises of an abund-
ance of gold. Could Lysagoras have been a friend of Xanthippos 
and the Alkmaionidai? 
Stephanos of Byzantion s.v. Parn.r explains the verb anapariazein 
by a quote from Book Ten ofEphoros: 
Miltiades landed on some of the other islands and sacked them; then 
he for a long time besieged Paros, the richest and biggest of the 
Kyklades, cutting off its supplies from the sea and moving forth the 
siege train. As the walls were about to break and surrender had been 
agreed on, a forest fire broke out on Mykonos. The Parians, assuming 
that this was a beacon-signal from Datis, called off the negotiations 
and refused to give the town over to Miltiades. It is said that it is 
from this we use the saying avanapLCl(HV about those who call off 
the negotiations. 
Here Stephanos' quote of Ephoros breaks off. With K.inzl, 111 
Ephoros' narrative can tentatively be supplemented with four 
scholia on Aelius Aristeides For tl1e four* in which Ephoros is not 
referred to by name: 11 Miltiades' object was to bring the islands 
back under the Athenians (~ 232,2); he attacked Paros for having 
given aid to the Persians or for having defected from its allegiance 
to the Athenians (~ 177,2; in ~ ~yp. Milt., Paras was held by the 
Persians). During the siege 1\filtiades, approaching the sanctuary of 
Demeter near the city wall tainted with enemy blood, was 
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wounded in his thigh by a shot which he assumed was sent by the 
goddess, and in religious fear he returned empty-handed to Athens 
(I: 177,2; 232,2). He was accused of treason and sentenced to a 
fine of 50 (I: 177,2) or 40 talents (I: hyp. Milt. 244,3) and thrown 
into prison, and there he died. The fine was paid by his son Kimon 
(I: hyp. Milt. 244,3). 
Stephanos and the Aristeides scholiast are unlikely to have 
known Ephoros at first hand, and they merely give a brief extract 
of Ephoros' detailed narrative. A test of Ephoros' broad narrative 
can be Diodoros' queer story (10.27) - unknown from Herodotos 
and likely to derive from Ephoros - that Datis, himself a Mede, at 
Marathon demanded that the Athenians should return to him the 
sovereignty which had belonged to Medos, his ancestor who had 
once been king of Athens. Three points in Stephanos and the 
Aristeides scholia suffice to demonstrate how much Ephoros di-
verged from Herodotos on Miltiades' Parian expedition: 
• Before his fiasco in Paras, Miltiades reduced several islands back 
under Athenian sway. This means that islands which had pre-
viously given earth and water to the Persian king, had first been 
subdued under Athens by Themistokles, in the preemptive war 
which is suppressed by Herodotos, with the fleet constructed after 
the passage of his naval bill A. In 490, the islands had apparently 
been compelled by the Persians to follow them, and after Mara-
thon the Athenian fleet was back, this time led by Miltiades, not 
Themistokles. 
• l\1iltiades was injured in the thigh by a shot which he assumed 
came from Demeter, not by jumping the enclosure wall of her 
sanctuary. 
• He died in prison.12 
To some extent, Ephoros may have drawn upon Hero-
datos and rationalised his account; that might for instance account 
for the total absence of the priestess Timo and the Delphic oracle 
from Stephanos and the Aristeides scholia. But the version of l\1il-
tiades approaching the sanctuary of Demeter tainted with enemy 
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blood and being hit by a shot which he assumed was sent by 
Demeter, is no more the work of a rationalising historian than 
Ephoros-Diodoros' story of Datis as a Mede claiming kingship in 
Athens." Like the pre-Marathon Athenian dominion and l\iilti-
ades' death in prison, the enemy blood and Demeter's shot must 
somehow be derived from earlier, non-Herodotean tradition. 14 It 
will not do to dismiss Ephoros as nothing but a late rationalisation 
of Herodotos. 
The use of Ephoros by Nepos (whether mediate og immediate 
makes no difference for our purpose) is clearly documented for 
the Paros expedition in his Miftiade.r ch. 7: 
After the battle of Marathon the I\thcnians entrusted Miltiades with a 
fleet of 70 ships, in order to make war on the islands that had given 
help to the barbarians. While holding that command he compelled 
many to return to their allq.,>iance, bur with others he resorted to 
force. Among the latter, Paros was so confident of its strength that he 
could not bring it to terms by argument. Therefore he disembarked 
his troops, invested the town with siege-works, and completely cut 
off its supplies. Then he set up his mantlcts and tortoise-sheds and 
advanced against the walls. He was on the point of taking the town, 
when a grove, which was some distance off on the mainland but 
visible from the island, by some chance caught fire one night. When 
the flames were seen by the townspeople and the besiegers, both 
parties thought it a signal t,>iven by the king's marines. The result was 
that the Parians were kept from surrendering, while Miltiades, fearing 
that the king's fleet was approaching, set fire to the works that he had 
constructed, and returned to Athens with all the ships which he had 
taken with him, to the great vexation of his fellow-citizens. In 
consequence, he was accused of treason, on the t,rround that, when he 
might have taken the town, he had been bribed by the king and had 
left without accomplishing his purpose. ;\t the time he was disabled 
by wounds which he had suffered in the attack on the town, and 
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since for that reason he could not plead his own case, his brother 
Stesagoras spoke on his behalf. When the trial was concluded, he was 
not condemned to capital punishment, but to pay a fine, the amount 
of which was fixed at 50 talents, the sum which had been spent on 
the fleet. Since he could not pay the fine at once, he was put in the 
state prison, and there he met his end. 
Like in Ephoros, Miltiades died in the prison, and the campaign 
was against a number of islands, in order to reduce them under 
Athenian dominion after they had given aid to the Persians. Again, 
the previous suzerainty presupposes the use by Themistokles of 
the fleet resulting from his naval bill A, in a preventive war with 
Aigina and other islands. The naval bill is duly reported by Nepos 
in Them. 2.2, where the war is oddly not with Aigina and other 
medizing islands but with Korkyra and the pirates, whether Nepos 
himself or an intermediary source is to blame. No less oddly, 
Ephoros' forest fire in Mykonos is transplanted far off to the 
mainland. In Ephoros, the besieged Parians withdrew their capi-
tulation when they believed the Persians were approaching, 
whereas Miltiades seems to have returned to Athens in religious 
fright after being wounded by a shot from Demeter. The wound 
reappears in Nepos, but without a word of Demeter and a shot 
from her; it was in fear of the Persian fleet, not of a goddess, that 
the Miltiades of Nepos returned to Athens. Although Nepos fails 
to mention Ephoros as a source in any of his biographies, he un-
doubtedly used him widely - directly15 or indirectly16 - for his 
Mi/tiades and Themistoc/es. 17 But we would have preferred him 
to stick more slavishly to the original. 
As stated above, the fact that Ephoros, unlike Herodotos, 
did record Miltiades' reduction of islands to their former alle-
giance, implies that he included Themistokles' bill A and his use of 
the new fleet in a preemptive war with Aigina and other islands 
that had submitted to the king. The Miltiades of Ephoros had thus 
to share with Themistokles some of the glory for the triumph at 
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Marathon. Nepos' record of pre-Marathon naval bill A in Tbem. 2, 
must accordingly be based on Ephoros, and the same will apply to 
the un-Herodotean battle A in Milt. 5, in which the Persians were 
on the offensive.1x But the question is whether Ephoros reported 
two separate encounters, first battle A with Kallimakhos in com-
mand and some days later battle B with l\1iltiades. Did Miltiades in 
the most influential historian Ephoros have to share some of the 
glory of Marathon not only with Themistokles but also with Kalli-
makhos? The total absence of Kallimakhos in the Marathon ac-
counts of both Nepos, Plutarch and Iustinus, and his next to total 
disappearance in the tradition, speak against it. And the chances 
are that Ephoros, like Aristophanes' wasps and Nepos Milt. 5, 
telescoped the two battles into one; omitting any light-armed 
troops, Ephoros had it that the hoplites immediately, without 
allowing themselves a rest after warding off the Persian attack on 
their defensive position, took up a pursuit of the enemy to the 
ships. And Miltiades was the commander in Ephoros' one and 
only battle. In Ephoros-Diodoros 10.27, we are told that when 
Datis, after landing at Marathon and before arraying his troops for 
battle (obviously battle A), demanded the return of the sovereignty 
in Athens, he was reputiated not by the polemarch Kallirnakhos 
but by Miltiades on behalf of the ten strateges. But even if the 
Ephorean Miltiades avoided having to share glory with Kalli-
makhos,19 the fact that the historian must have included Themi-
stokles' bill A and his preemptive war with states that had sub-
mitted to the Persians, indicates that Marathon was not the same 
stunning triumph for !vliltiades in Ephoros as in Herodotos. The 
peripatia of the fortunes of Ephoros' Miltiades was less in both 
directions; he was not so high up, and did not to fall so deep as the 
Herodotean one. On his post-Marathon campaign he followed up 
his previous capture of Lemnos by reestablishing Athenian domi-
nation in the Aegean; he did not mount an isolated, ill-starred 
attack on Paros but led a campaign that was successful in other 
islands before the Parian fiasco; nor did he attack Paros from a 
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purely personal motive. To approach the sanctuary of Demeter 
tainted with Parian blood was probably a lesser offence than the 
sacrilege intended by the Herodotean Miltiades, and accordingly 
there was no Delphic Apollo to declare that he was destined to die. 
The battered papyrus fragment of Ephoros (F 191) ends 
with a laudatory excursus on the character of Themistokles and the 
Athenians' shameful ingratitude to him?) In the same vein, Nepos' 
Miltiades ends with moralising praise of Miltiades, who although 
innocent was sentenced by the people and died in prison. This 
smacks of the same Ephoros.21 Thus Herodotos and Ephoros 
both painted Miltiades and Themistokles with many traits in com-
mon, but the two historians' portraits of the two men were quite 
unlike. Modern scholars follow suit. One school follows Hero-
datos in depicting Miltiades as a fiirstlicher Herr acting in a yet 
poorly developed polis, a towering individual who placed himself 
above the state and attacked Paros out of private motives, mani-
pulating his fellow citizens at will.22 Following scholars with a more 
optimistic view of the early democracy, I prefer the version of 
Ephoros, in whom the expedition was against more islands than 
just Paros, and enacted by citizens who were well aware what they 
were doing.2 ' In 499, the majority of the citizens in the assembly 
had voted for helping the Ionians in their rising, and under the 
threat from Persia in the late 490s, they elected anti-Persian The-
mistokles flrst archon and voted for employing the proflts from 
the silver strike to build a large public fleet rather than for dis-
tribution among themselves. And they had decided to use the fleet 
in a preventive war with Aigina and other medizing islands. Con-
sequently, in 490 Datis was unable to simply mobilise Aigina and 
the other states which had given earth and water, for a frontal 
surprise attack on Athens from Phaleron. Before turning against 
Athens, he had to spend time forcing Karystos and other states 
back under Persian sway, thus giving the Athenians time to pre-
pare their defence. 
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If Ephoros-Nepos are preferable to Herodotos on Milti-
ades' last campaign/~ so are they also on the defensive battle A at 
Marathon, fought shortly after the Athenians and Plataians had 
arrived there, as well as when Nepos states that the ships resulting 
from naval bill A were indeed employed for the purpose for which 
they were built. But what about Ephoros' sources? I have argued 
earlier that when Ephoros-Diodoros and other secondary sources 
disagree with Thukydides on Pentekontaetia chronology, they are 
indebted to Hellanikos, whom Ephoros is known to have used and 
whose chronology was not Thukydides' cup of tea (1.97.2). 25 The 
same Hellanikos may ultimately be behind much non-Herodotean 
matter in Ephoros and writers dependent on him. The loss of Hcl-
lanikos' Atthi.r and other works from his pen may be among the 
saddest losses of Greek literature. Arid reading perhaps, far below 
the standard of Herodotos' golden pen and Polemon's golden 
tongue. But preserving non-Herodotean and non-Thukydidean 
traditions. 
A final sigh about sources. When we are in the lucky posi-
tion of having two diverging versions, as about Miltiades' Parian 
expedition, we optimistically surmise that one of them gives us 
something near to the historical truth. When we only have one 
version, like Herodotos on the Aiginetan war, we more or less 
swallow what he says, despite knowing that the father of history 
was also the father of lies. 
The e?Jent.r 
The adult Themistokles only enters our sources when he was 
elected eponymous archon in 493, at the time when the Persians 
finally quelled the Ionian rising by their capture of Miletos. But 
Themistokles' fellow citizens are unlikely to have elected an un-
known quantity for first archon. He must have been known as an 
anti-Persian who predicted that the Persians would soon come to 
take vengeance for their aid to the lonians. And Themistokles is 
likely to have had a hand in the preemptive fighting with medizing 
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Aigina that ended with the loss of four ships. In preparation of his 
punitive campaign, king Dareios is likely, straight after quelling the 
Ionian revolt, to have required earth and water from Athens' 
enemy Aigina and other islands, as well as from Argos and other 
mainland states. The Athenians asked king Kleomenes of Sparta 
for help to neutralise Aigina, and before his defeat of medizing 
Argos at Sepeia in 494 he took ten prominent Aiginetans as host-
ages and brought them over to Athens. To no avail, for Aigina 
responded by capturing a number of prominent Athenians, and an 
exchange of hostages followed. Next the Athenians, after attem-
pting to foment an unsuccessful democratic revolution in Aigina, 
went to war with a fleet of ships partly their own and partly 
borrowed from Aigina's rival Korinth. But after initial victories at 
sea and on land, and the return of the borrowed ships, they 
suffered defeat and lost four ships. This was the situation when 
Themistokles was elected first archon. On his motion the citizens 
decided to begin fortifying Piraeus and to employ godsent new-
found silver from the mines to expand their fleet. The next 
godsent gift came in 492 when on the first Persian punitive expe-
dition against Greece, Mardonios had his ships destroyed off 
Athos by the god Boreas. Themistokles was sent with the ex-
panded fleet on a successful preemptive campaign against Aigina 
and other islands that had submitted to king Dareios, and so in 
490 Datis could not just order from them the provision of men 
and ships. He was obliged to sail around and force the islands back 
to their allegiance. Datis will have been well aware of the Athenian 
fleet stationed in Phaleron or half-fortified Piraeus. After recov-
ering Paros and other islands, and ordering ships and men, he did 
not risk sailing on against Aigina which was now under an anti-
Persian regime, and then further on to Phaleron. Instead, he took 
to Euboian Karystos and Eretria, thus giving the Athenians time to 
prepare their defence and call for help from Sparta and other 
states. After the death of the strongly anti-Persian king Kleomenes 
probably in 491, the Spartans declined to march out right away. 
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Only a contingent from Plataiai arrived in time in Athens, and 
when it was reported that Datis was about to land at Marathon, the 
assembly commissioned the polemarch Kallimakhos to lead the 
Athenian spearmen and missile-troops plus the Plataians out to 
Marathon. There they took a defensive position, blocking the way 
to the Persians while waiting for their Spartan reinforcements to 
arrive. After an unsuccessful assault on the strong Greek position, 
most of the Persian forces reembarked for a frontal attack on 
Athens from Phaleron, confident that like in Eretria, their friends 
in Athens would open the city gates to them. But the attack was 
warded off by the Athenian fleet and the home guard; warriors had 
also returned in time from Marathon, after having, under the 
command of Miltiades, defeated the Persian forces left behind by 
Datis. After his two attempts at taking vengeance, in 492 and 490, 
king Dareios started preparations for a third campaign, but his 
godsent death in 486 and the ensuing troubles in the Persian 
empire gave the Athenians time to prepare their defence in three 
ways. First, they thanked Athena and Apollo for their help in 490 
by initiating the building of the huge pre-Parthenon temple on 
Akropolis and the treasury at Delphi, thus securing their divine aid 
when the Persians returned. Second, by introducing the institution 
of ostracism/6 they got rid of a number of suspected medizers. 
Third, adopting Themistokles' interpretation of Apollo's Wooden 
Wall oracle in the mid 480s, they launched a second shipbuilding 
scheme. And on the eve of the great invasion of Dareios' son 
Xerxes in 480 they contracted an alliance with a number of states, 
patching up any grudges that might remain against Aigina. The 
expanded fleet of Athens, and the collaboration of the former 
enenues Athens and Aigina, rendered possible the victory of 
Salamis. 
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NOTES 
1. Kinzl 1976: 283 'einer herodoteischen Stereotypvorstellung vom 
Verhalten des athenischen Demos.' Contra Bengtson 1939: 53 
'Nariirlich ist die Nichtangabe des Expeditionsziels, an deren 
Geschichtlichkeit man nicht zu zweiflen hat, aus militarischen 
Grunden von Miltiades als notwendig empfunden worden.' Ignoring 
Themistokles' pre-Marathon preemptive expedtition against Aigina 
and other islands, Bengtson (p. 59) states that Miltiades' expedition 
against Paros 'stellt den ersten Versuch Athens dar, mit der Flotte 
seine Herrschaft in der Agais zu begriinden.' Also Burn 1962: 259 
and Develin 1977: 573 accept that Miltiades did not specify his aims. 
2. Fehling 1989: 12. 
3. Fehling 1989: 109. 
4. Macao 1895: 250; How & Wells 1912: 121. 
5. Fehling 1989: 216. 
6. Blose! 2001: 197; cf. Bornitz 1968: 108 \\lie Urteile tiber einc 
"angebliche Tendenz" bei Herodot, der durch die Quellen bedingt 
sein soli, miissen neu iiberpriift werden.' 
7. lmmerwahr 1966: 192 'The history of Miltiades and his family 
follows a particular pattern of fortune and impiety, since that family 
had risen to greatness by the good fortune of having the tyranny of 
the Chersonese offered them through an oracle.' Fornara 1971 b: 65 
'Herodotus' method is artistic, not historical.' Fornara (66-74) treats 
Herodotos' picture of Themistokles well, stating that 'Herodotus 
assuredly did not write his history in order to present Themistocles 
as if he were the hero of a nineteenth-century novel.' Kinzl 1976: 
292 'Hdt.s Bericht handelt vom Verderben des Mannes Miltiades 
und ist als solcher beschrankt 'historisch' in seiner Zielsetzung.' I do 
not find that Link 2000 argues well against Kinzl and for Herodotus 
as 'correct and serious historiot,>raphy ' (p. 53). Cf. Gottlieb 1963: 63 
who speaks of the 'objektive Geschichtsschreibung' of Herodotos. 
8. BlC>sel 2001: 181. Knight 1970: 36 states that Herodotos rarely gives 
Themistokles credit for anything original, 'and whatever Themi-
stokles does falls into the category of double-dealing.' 
9. Macao 1895: 251; Kinzl1976: 288 n. 38. 
10. Kinzl 1976: 295-307. 
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11. Dindorf 1829, scholia on l~ypothesis Miltiades; 177,2; 232,2; 244,3. 
12. Kinzl 1976: 296 oddly has it that 'Ephoros vermutlich keine von 
Hdt. unbeeinflusste, und somit unabhant,>ige, Tradition vorgclegen 
haben mag.' According to him, the only point where Ephoros and 
Herodotos cannot be reconciled is Miltiades' death in prison. Also 
Bengtson 1939 and Gottlieb 1963: 65-68 will play down any 
opposition between Herodotos and Ephoros. 
13. A number of scholars unfortunately agree with How 1919: 60 'Here, 
as elsewhere, Ephorus gives us little more than a plausible but 
shallow attempt to rationalize the biased and defective tradition 
preserved in Herodotus.' Schachermcyr 197 4: 98 n. 2 states that 
whether Ephoros 'von Herodot abweichende Versioncn mit-
erwandte, scheint mir ausscrst fraglich.' 
14. Nenci 1998: 313 Ephoros 'si ritiene attinga a una foote diversa da 
quella di Erodoto.' Bicknell 1972: 225 'we must suppose that 
Ephoros got his non-Hcrodotean material from Hellanikos or 
Charon of Lampsakos who had at their disposal some authentic 
information.' Ephoros' usc of Hcllanikos is discussed by Barber 
1935: 113-123. With Lehmann-Haupt, Obst 1913: 29 claims 
Dionysios of Miletos as Ephoros' source for his non-Hcrodotean 
matter about the expedtion of Xerxes. Obst cites literature on 
Herodotos versus Ephoros-Diodoros on pp. 30-32. lt is his odd 
view that Dionysios 'wahrscheinlich vie! eher als Herodot den 
Ehrenname 'Vater der Geschichtc' verdient.' 
15. So apparently Kinzl1976: 294. 
16. Nipperdey 1962: 14. 
17. Noethe 1881: 27 expresses communis opinio: 'etiam in vitis Themi-
stoclis, Aristidis, Pausaniae componendis maximam partcm narra-
tionis Ephoro debuit.' 
18. Against Meyer 1954: 312 n. 
19. Possibly following Ephoros, Diod. 11.82.4 copares Myronides with 
the heroes of old, Miltiades and Themistokles, not Kallimakhos. 
20. Gaps in the papyrus can be filled in by reference to Diodoros who 
presents a verbatim echo, 11.59.3. 
21. Kinzl1976: 301-302. 
22. Berve 1979: 56 in the year after Marathon 'ging der cinstige Herr der 
Chersones an die Gewinnung einer neue Hausmacht' in Paras. 
Ehrenberg 1946: 138 leaves no room for doubt, stating that later 
138 CHAPTER VII 
sources explain the Parian expedition 'in a rational, but obviously 
misleading way. As it is emphasized by several scholars ... this must 
be said of the story which Ephorus tells us. There is no doubt that 
his (Hdt.'s) story is to be preferred.' Link 2000: 52 speaks of 'das 
vorpolitische, altarisokratische Paros-Abenteuer.' Grote 1870: 290 
n. 2 'The authority of Herodotus is preferable in every respect.' 
(Grote's editors 2001: 194 n. 48 prefer Ephoros-Nepos to Hero-
datos.) How: 1919: 60. Develin 1977: 572 finds considerable diffi-
culties in elevating Ephoros' version above that of Herodotos. 
23. Wecklein 1876: 8-9; Duncker 1888: 151; Macan 1895: 256. Even the 
great Herodotean Hammond 1997: 519 who blames the puerilities of 
Herodotos' account on sources bitterly hostile to Miltiades. His main 
position is (p. 493) that 'literary sources after Herodotus ... should 
not be regarded as rivals to Herodotus.' 
24. Against the amusing statement of Macan 1895: 255 'the whole 
acccount of the affair from first to last as given by Nepos is so 
reasonable and coherent that the chief ground for doubting it is to 
be found in these, its good gualities.' 
25. Schreiner 1997. As stated by Schepens 1977: 98, 'Ia vecchia 
tradizione gloriosa' of Schwartz, Laggueur and Jacoby is very critical 
of Ephoros. Add e.g. Busolt, Meyer, Swoboda, Whadey, Hammond, 
Lazenby, Pritchett. Hignett 1963: 16 is typical, 'when he merely 
supplements Herodotus, his additions to the story of the war are no 
more than the products of 'constructive inference' and at worst they 
are pure fiction.' Any attempt at an Ehrenrettung of the influential 
universal historian must be welcome. 
26. In Schreiner 1978, I argue against communis opinio and with 
Androtion F 6 and Beloch 1914: 29 in dating the law of ostracism in 
488. 
Less common Sources 
Ephoros, FGrHist 70 
Stephanos Byzantios s. Paros 
6 OE Ml TLctOflS' TWV flEV a\.\wv V~CJWV TlVCtS' chro~ctCJElS' 
TTOLflCJGflEVOS' E:mSp8flCJE, Ilcipov 8f: EUOGLflOVECJTctTTJV KGL 
flEYLCJTflV ouaav TOTE Twv KuKA.a8wv Ka8E(OflEVOS' ETTOAL-
opKEL TTOAUJJ xpovov TfjS' eaA.aTTflS' ELpywv KaL KaTa yfjv 
llflXGV~flGTa aywv. ~811 TWJJ TELXWV TTL TTTOJJTWJJ Kal ETTL TQ 
TTapa8L86vm T~V TT6ALV Twv Ilap(wv OLWflOAOYflflEVWV UAflS' 
TLVOS' E:~ auTOflctTou TTEpl T~v MuKovov E:~a~8ELCJflS' ot flEV 
IlapLm Tov ~anv aino'iS' TTupaEUELv imoA.a~ovTES' 
El\JEUCJavTo TGS' OflOAoy(aS' KaL T~v TTOALV OUKETL TQ MLATL-
ci8T;J TTapEOOCJGJJ. 08Ev ~aal.v ETL KGL vvv ~lla.S' xpfja8m Tfl 
TTapOLflL4 TOVS' l\JEu8oflEVOUS' TGS' ofloA.oy(aS' civaTTapLa(ELV 
~ctCJKOJJTGS'. 
Schol. Aristeides For the Four, Dindorf, probably partly depen-
ding on Ephoros 
hypothesis 1\liltiades 
KaTflYOPfl8ELS' 8E imo AA.KflEov(8wv 6n Nci~ov ~ Ilapov 
(a11~w yap AEYETm) 8uvfl8E1s E.A.E'iv KaTEXOflEVflv imo 
IlEpCJWJJ OUK E:~oux.~efl. EKLJJOUVEUECJE flEv aTTo8aJJELJJ TECJCJQ-
pctKOJJTa OE TctAGJJTQ E(flflLW8fl a E~ETLCJE KLflWV. TE8VflKE OE 
flETa ouo h11 Tf\S' flGXflS', wS' ot TTAELouS' l\Jll~((ovTm E:v T0 
OECJflWTflPL4J. 
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177,2 
[lETa Ta KaTa Mapa8wva EO"TpaTEUO"EV ETTL TOUS' nap(ous 6 
MtA.nciOTJS', ~ on auvETTpa~av T4J DEpO"l:J il on aTTEO"Tllaav 
Twv A8TJva(wv· €an OE aVTTJ ~ v~aos ElJTEA~S'. TaVTTJV TToA.t-
opKouvTos aVTOV ETTEfl<!>8TJ ~EAOS' E~ a<j>avous, KOL ETpWO"EV 
avTov Tov f!TJp6v. 6 OE vof!(aas T~S' ~~IJ.llTPOS' dvm TO 
~EA.os (~v yap TTA.~mov Tou TE(xous ~w11-os avT~S') Kal TO 
LEOV <j>O~TJ8ELS' QVEXWPTJO"E. 
232,2 
KaTaoouA.ou8m Tas v~aovs To1s A8TJva(ms, Kal E~EA.8wv ELS' 
ncipov TTPWTT]V, KOL TTapEA.8wv TO LEp6v, [lEIJ.OAUO"flEVOS' a'([!a-
Tl Twv TTOAEf!(wv· oi f!EV <j>amv ws ~EAEL E:~A.~8TJ, oio' ws aTTo 
Tov Tdxous KaTTJVEX8TJ. KaTEayEls ovv Tov f!opov imE-
aTpE\j;Ev clTTpaKTOS'. 
244,3 
MlATlclOTJS' OE Na~ov il ncipov OUVclflEVOS' EAELV ETTEL TTPOS' 
TOV f!TJPOV E:~ a<j>avovs EV Tfj TTOAlOpKLq OELO"OS' [!~ apa imo 
T~s ~~flTJTpos Toih' ETTEfl<!>8TJ (~v yap TTA.~mov vEws T~s 
8Eou) EKEL8Ev aVEXWPTJO"E. KaTE\j;TJ<J>(aavTo OE avTov A9TJ-
va'im ota T~V avaxwpT]O"lV ElS' TO OEO"flWT~plOV ElO"EA8ElV, 
(TJTOUVTES' avTov TaA.avTa TETapciKovTa. 
Himerios 6.20 
OUTTW [lEV yap €<!>8TJO"OV T~V aTT6~aO"LV TWV ~ap~cipwv TTU-
86[!EVOL, Kal Tov E:v6TTA.LOv E8Eov· ouTTw oE TOLS' aTTo~aat 
O"UVE[ltayov, KOL TTapaUTLKO ETpETTOVTO. 
59.2 
oE(~w OE Vf!LV Kal aTpanwTas E: flO US, Tov f!EV Tfj <j>vaEL Kav 
Tfj ypa<J>fj f!axof!Evov - 86~EL yap Vfl'lv Kal TTapa Tfj TEXVl:J 
TTOAEf!OUvn f!GA.Aov E:otKEVaL ~ TE8vEwn KaAA.(flaxos. 
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lustinus 2.9.8-15 
Igitur Athenienses audita Darei adventu auxilium a Lacedaemoniis, 
soda tum civitate, petiverunt, quos ubi viderunt quadridui teneri 
religione, non expectato, instructis decem milibus civium et 
Plataeensibus auxiliaribus mille adversus sescenta milia hostium in 
campis Marathoniis in proelium egrediuntur. Miltiades et dux belli 
erat et auctor non expectandi auxilii: quem tanta fiducia ceperat, ut 
plus praesidii in celeritate quam in sociis duceret. Magna igitur in 
pugnam euntibus animorum alacritas fuit, adeo ut, cum mille 
passus inter duas acies essent, citato cursu ante iactum sagittarum 
ad hostem venirent ... Victi Persae in naves confugerunt, ex quibus 
multae suppressae, multae captae sunt. In eo proelio tanta virtus 
singulorum fuit, ut, cuius laus prima esset, difficile iudicium vide-
retur. Inter ceteros tamen Themistoclis adulescentis gloria emicuit, 
in quo iam indoles fututae imperatoriae dignitatis apparuit. 
2.12.12 
Namque Athenienses post pugnam Marathoniam praemonente 
Thernistocle, victoriam illam de Persis non finem, sed causam 
maioris belli fore, CC naves fabricaverunt. 
Nikolaos of Myra, Prosgymnasmata 8.7, in Rhet. gr. val. I, p. 339 
El Ta A8T)va[wv oil1rw yLvwaKovTwv Ta vavnKa, TTpG>Tov 
ELGT)YELTO T~V TEXVT)V, KGL!lEA.ETqv TTPOS' eaA.aaaav ETTELGE, 
Kat vE!lO!lEvwv A8T)va[wv dKfj Ta Ti)S' TToA.Ews TTpay11aTa ~ 
XP~IlaTa, OaTTGVT)V aA.oyov ELS' T~V TWV VEWV 11ETE8T)KE 
xpdav, KGL Tp(a Ka"-A.LaTa OLa !lLGV ELGT)y~aaTo TEXVT)V" E~ 
wv A8T)VGLOL KpaTouaL Twv v~awv KGL Twv AtyLVT)Twv· TOVS' 
A.Ol TTOUS' KGTEGTpEcpETO, KGL T~V apx~v Ti)S' 8aA.aTTT]S' avy-
KGTEGKEUa(ov, Kal vavnKov ETTOLELTO TTPOS' EA."-T]VLKOV Kat 
~ap~apLKOV TToA.E!lOV, EKGTEpov ybos TEXV"Q !lLq Twv VEWV 
TTapLGTG!lEVOV. 
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Polemon 
1,5 
KaAA(~axov ~EV ws TIOAE~apxov avayK~ T~S apx~s ~YEV 
Eis Mapa0wva KQL ~~ ~ovAo~EVOV a~vvaaem T~V TWV ~ap­
~apwv OTIO~aaLv· Kuva(yELpos OE im' apET~S KQL TOA~~S, 
E:0EAOUOLOS, ETIEL KQL VEOS wv KO~LO~, GXEOOV KQL TipO T~S 
~ALKlOS, ~ETEO"XE T~S E:~6oou, EPWTL o6~~s Kal ~EyaAwv 
Epywv opEyo~EVOS. 
1.21 
ETL BE, KaH(~axos E:v To'is TipwTms ~ ~Eams T~s ~ax~s 
OTIE0UVEV OUK avnaxwv TOLS TIAElOO"lV Epyms KQL TIOVOLS' 
Kuva( yELpos OE ~EXPL T~S Twv TIOAE~Lwv ~PKEaE <j)uy~s, 
waTE 6 ~Ev E:v ~EPEL T~s ~ax~s E:~~Taae~ ~6vov, 6 oE 
TIQVTQ TOV TIOAE~OV ou:l TEAous ETIOA~~~O"EV. 
1.28 
~~ELS ~Ev E:v yfj Kal. 0aAaTT-r:J ~E~ax~~E0a, u~ELS BE E:v yfj 
~6v-r:~· Kal. u~E'is ~Ev aTIE~axEa0E ~6vov To'is ~ap~apms, 
~~ELS OE <j)uyELV QUTOUS TIOLOUVTES OUK a<j)LO"TQ~E0a QVTWV. 
1.49 
an', w A'laxuAE TIQL, TOV Aoyov ~Ol au TIOL~aov KQL avy-
Koa~~aov Tas Mapa0wvos ~ax as TQ TiaTpL 
2.2 
KaAAL~axou yap TIQT~p wv TIQVTOS anou TIPETIW ~anov ETIL 
Tou Kmvou ~~~aTos E:aTavm. (wv ~Ev ovv KaH(~axos 
(wvTos Kvvm ydpou [ TIOAE~apxos] ~v-
2.5-8 
aTIE~mvE ~Ev Eis Mapa0wva 6 ~apdou aT6Aos ~ETa n1s E:~ 
At ya(ou TWV v~awv apTiayas, Tfj OE ATTLKfj ~o~0ELV EOEL 
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T~V AaKE8aq.10VLWV ElpWVELaV 1..1~ TIEPLIJ.EVOVTa<; - oeus yap 
o KLv8uvos ~v - Kal. TQ aTpann0 MLAnci8TJ T~v TaXLOTTJV 
EB0KEL TPEXELV. EVTauea ~YE T~V 8vva1J.LV aTiaaav 0 EIJ.OS' 
ut6s, TIOAEIJ.apxos wv Kal. KaTa Tov VOIJ.OV Kal. aTiov8~v i.8[av 
on 9Ep1J.OTGTTJV EXWV Epya IJ.EyaA.a TiapaaxEa9m · Kuv-
a[ yELpos 8E ELS' ns wv Twv TioAA.wv ~TIEL yETo. aUIJ.IJ.LeavTES 
OE TOLS' ~ap~apOLS' IJ.EIJ.1TTOS' IJ.EV ou8El.s ~v, EV OE TolS' 
Epyms KaAA[IJ.axos EBELeEv auTo'is on TIOAEIJ.apxos ~v. 
TiapaKEAEUOGIJ.EVOS' yap auTQ TO OWIJ.a KaL T~V t)ivx~v l!TIEp 
Tf)S' KOLVllS' EAEU9Ep[as avaAwam KaL 1Tpos 1Taaav T~V 
8Vva1J.LV ~aaLAEWS' GVTL Taeas aUTOV WS' av aeLoiJ.axos wv, 
E:KWV Tipos Tov ~apELou aToA.ov EOTTJ T~v Aa[av Tipo-
KaAOUIJ.EVOS' Kal. Tiaaav EK Twv vEwv EKXEOIJ.EVTJV auTos 
EOEXETO ... 
2.23 
0 IJ.EV yap aTiaVTas ELS' Mapa9wva ~YE auv9~1J.aTL, 0 OE 
EOEXETO' 0 IJ.EV EKEAEUEV, 0 OE E1TEL9ETO' 
2.28 
oA.ws OE Tel IJ.EV Kuvm YELpou KaAALIJ.axos TiapEOKEuaaEV' 
EK yap Tf)s KaAALIJ.axou IJ.GXTJS TipoTEpas yEvoiJ.EVTJS KaTa-
TIAayEvTES OL ~cip~apoL Tel VWTa odeavTES' TiapELXOV TOLS' 
aUeLs Em¢EPOIJ.EVOLS' pq.8[av T~v 8[wew· Ta 8E Kuvm-
ydpou 8EuTEpa Kal. TEAEUTa'ia TIETipayiJ.EVa Twv KaAAL-
IJ.axou AaiJ.TIPWV apLaTELaV ai TEL WOTE KaL TOUTO TOV Aoyov 
TQ 9aTEP4JTiapaaxE'iv. 
2.40 
KaAALIJ.axou IJ.EV ovv ~ TOAIJ.a Kal. IJ.GXTJ TOUTO E~ouAETO, 
VKf)am Tov ~aaLAEWS' aTpaTov Kal. T~v ATTLK~V aUTOLS' 
a~aTOV ELVaL. Kuva[ yELpos OE KaL <j)EuyovTas ~IJ.LV TOUS' 
~ap~cipous GVELPYE KaL KaTELXEV EV TD xwpq. TOUS' 1TOAE-
IJ.LOUS' KaL IJ.GXTJS' ETipaTTEV apxas OEUTEpas. 
144 LESS COMMON SOURCES 
2.49 
TWV yap aA.\wv TTOAEIJ.apxwv OElALav EVTl8EjlEVWV Tel) TT.\~8El 
~ T01hou tJ;~<j>oc; TTpoayEVOIJ.EVTJ T~v OATJV aviJ.~o.\~v ETTOL TJaE 
Kal OTTWc; OEL UTTOIJ.GXEa8al Kal TOAIJ.GV EKUpWaEV waTE 
TTaVTOS av KaL IJ.OVOS KaL IJ.GALaTa TOU KaTop8WjlaToc; 
OLTlOc; VOIJ.L(OlTO. 
Suda s.v. xwplc; i. TTTTELc; 
~anooc; EIJ.~a.\6vToc; de; T~v ATnK~v, Touc; lwvac; <j>aaw 
avaxwp~aaVTOS aUTOU avE.\86vTac; ETTl Ta OEVOpa aT]-
IJ.OLVElV TOLe; A8TJVOLOlc; we; ElEv xwpl.c; ot LTTTTELS, Kal 
Ml.\naOTJV auvlEVTa T~v aTTOXWPTJalv avTwv aviJ.~a.\Eiv 
oihw Kal VlK~am. 
s.v. hm(ac; 2 
ot of. A8TJVOLOl, aviJ.~ov.\EvaavTEc; Ev6c;, ~aav yap oEKa, 
TTEPliJ.ELvm Touc; AaKEOmjlov(ouc;, Ml.\naoou of. TTapm-
vouvToc; EelEVal Kal KaAAliJ.GXOU, Ee~.\8ov aUTOliJ.EV OVTEc; 
,8, IT.\aTmEac; EXOVTES ,a. Kal EV aUTD <j>aal TD ~IJ.Epq 
EVLKTJUOV. 
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72 CHAPTER IV 
no one could understand what the oracle meant, Themistokles 
convinced the people that Apollo's advice was that they should take 
to their ships with all their possessions; for that was what the god 
meant by a wooden wall. Having adopted that plan, they added to the 
fleet already mentioned an equal number of triremes, and transported 
all their movable property either to Salamis or to Troizen. 
Themistokles' praetorship looks uncommonly like his archonship 
in 493/2, bill A being carried in the same year when according to 
Thukydides 1.93.3 he initiated the fortifications of Piraeus.14 
(Nepos only reports on the fortification of Piraeus and Athens in 
ch. 6, when he is passing from Themistokles in war to Themisto-
kles in peace. So also Diodoros, and the two authors are better 
discussed together below.) Nepos' Themistokles used the ships for 
the purpose they had been built for, surprisingly a campaign 
against Korkyra and the pirates, not a preemptive war with Aigina 
and other islands that had given earth and water to the Persian 
king. In Milt. 7.1, however, Nepos has it that that after Marathon, 
the Athenians entrusted Miltiades with 70 ships, 'in order to make 
war on the islands that had given help to the barbarians. While 
holding that command he compelled many of the islands to return 
to their allegiance (ad officium redire coegit), but with some he 
had to resort to force.' Before being compelled to give help to the 
expedition of Datis, the islands had accordingly been in alliance 
with Athens. This means that Themistokles, with the new fleet 
resulting from his naval bill A, had forced under Athenian 
supremacy islands that had succumbed to the Persians, in a war 
that made the Athenians 'not only rich, but highly skilled also in 
naval warfare.' By no means had he waged war against Korkyra 
and the pirates. Later on Themistokles, upon his interpretation of 
Apollo's Wooden Wall oracle, by bill B expanded the fleet by 
another 100 ships, to be used not against other Greeks this time 
but against the Persians themselves. 15 
